Showing posts with label Greek ELA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greek ELA. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

22/7/15: Another ECB Plasma Bag for Comatose Greek Banks


Another lift for Greek banks' ELA via ECB - a EUR900 million click, as previously:


Once again, the situation remains unaltered - Greek banks remain tied to ELA for funding, while capital controls cannot be lifted under small tick increases in ELA. In effect, we have a nurse replacing the empty plasma bag for a comatose patient. Nothing new, nothing dramatic...

Thursday, July 16, 2015

16/7/15: Lifting Greek ELA by Eur900mln: Tiny Step, Strong Signaling


So ECB lifted Greek banks' ELA by EUR900mln to EUR89.9 billion today for the first time since June 23rd.


This suggests that Mario Draghi and the team ECB have found a way, for now, to set aside all concerns about Greek banks solvency and extend the lifeline to Greek banks until at least the end of July. The lifeline, however is not sufficient to cover deposits withdrawals that would occur if the Greek government were to lift capital controls.

Going forward - two-three weeks time, the ECB will have to deal with two issues at the same time:

  • Increase ELA once again and do it either in small drip format (as today) - sustaining capital controls and possibly even extending these to cover corporate sector - or increase ELA by EUR5-7 billion to cover built up of demand for deposits monetisation and corporates' operational pressures; and
  • Addressing the severity of ECB haircuts on Greek banks' collateral eligible for ELA. Here, the problem is severe: even before the mess with capital controls, Greek banks held poor cushion of eligible collateral. With capital controls, this cushion is even weaker as many households and companies have stopped funding their loans. The ECB will have to lower haircuts on collateral and/or broaden collateral pool - both moves would be hard to pass as it is now publicly apparent to all that Greek banks health is deteriorating rapidly. 
So today's moves is a small positive of largely symbolic size. Much work is yet to be done...

Thursday, June 25, 2015

25/6/15: Monetising Greece


Recently, I mused about cash balances in Greece being monetised by the ECB.

Here is some evidence. First Greek holdings of cash:


Next: Eurosystem ELA:


Monday, June 22, 2015

22/6/15: Another Adrenaline Injection by Dr. ECB


Yesterday, I noted that Greece is now on a daily drip of liquidity injections by ECB via ELA (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/21615-ecb-ela-for-greece-welcome-to.html) and so here we have the latest. Per reports, ECB hiked Greek ELA today to EUR87.8 billion.


Meanwhile, there are rumours of a 'deal' being agreed, albeit only 'in principle'. Draghi is meeting Tsipras later today and we will also have an emergency summit. So a beehive of activities all over the shop.

Friday, June 19, 2015

19/6/2015: Greek ELA and ECB... What's the Rationale?


The price of getting Greece ejected or pushed out of the euro has now risen once again as ECB added to the ELA provided to Greek banks amidst a bank run that is sapping as much as EUR800mln per day.

In basic terms, ECB is allowing lending via Eurosystem to Greek banks to fund withdrawals of deposits. Once deposits are monetised and shifted out of Greek banks, Eurosystem holds a liability, Greek depositors hold an asset and the latter cannot be seized to cover the former. ECB was very unhappy with doing the same for Ireland at the height of the crisis, resulting in a huge shift of ELA debt onto taxpayers' shoulders via Anglo ELA conversion into Government bonds.

But ECB continues to increase Greek ELA. Why? We do not know, but we can speculate. Specifically there can be only three reasons the ECB is doing this:

Reason 1: increase the cost of letting Greece go. If Greece crashes out of the euro zone, the ELA liabilities will have to be covered out of Eurosystem funds, implying - in theory - a hit on member-states central banks. In theory, I stress this bit, this means higher ELA, greater incentives to keep member states negotiating with intransigent Greece. Why am I stressing the 'in theory' bet? Because in the end, even if Greece does crash out of the euro area, ELA liabilities can be easily written off by the ECB or monetized (electronically) without any cost to the member states.

Reason 2: keep Greece within the euro area as long as possible, thus allowing the member states to hammer out some sort of an agreement. In theory, this implies that the ECB is buying time by giving cash to Greek depositors so they can run, in hope that they continue to run at a 'reasonable' rate (at, say, less than EUR2 billion per day or so). In practice, however, this is a very short-term position.

Reason 3: ECB is monetizing Greek run on the banks in hope that Greece does crash out of the euro. Here's how the scheme might work: increasing ELA for Greece weakens Greek banks and, simultaneously, strengthens the incentives for Greece to exit the euro once deposits left in the system become negligible and the economy is fully cashed-in. On such an exit, Greek residents will be holding physical euros that cannot be expropriated by the Eurosystem, and thus Greece can launch drachma at highly devalued exchange rate, while relying on a buffer of cash in euros held within the economy.

I am not going to speculate which reason holds, but I will note that all three are pretty dire.

Take your bets, ladies and gentlemen.

Monday, June 15, 2015

15/6/15: Next Step: Cyprus.


Next stop for Greece:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130321.en.html
... or in simple terms: Cyprus.

Anyone surprised by Draghi not mentioning any of this anywhere today, shouldn't be. Il Capo does not do the work of Soldati... But Dr. Draghi did say he thinks ELA underwrites solvent banks... presumably in an insolvent state... which, of course, makes banks insolvent too.

How? In two steps: Step 1 - banks hold 'insolvent' state bonds. As long as they do, the state remains 'solvent' but once the state becomes insolvent, banks go too. Step 2 - Greek banks have tax offsets. Once the state goes, so do the offsets and banks.

Source: Raoul Ruparel ‏@RaoulRuparel

Tuesday, June 2, 2015

2/6/15: Greece: Back to the [Groundhog Day] Future


Couple of weeks back I posted a detailed list of ECB ELA hikes since February 2015. So here's an updated table:

- Feb 5, 2015 = EUR59.5 bn
- Feb 12, 2015 = EUR65.0bn
- Feb 18, 2015 = EUR68.3 bn
- Mar 5, 2015 = EUR68.8bn
- Mar 12, 2015 = EUR69.4bn
- Mar 18, 2015 = EUR69.8bn
- Mar 25, 2015 = EUR71.0bn
- Apr 1, 2015 = EUR71.7bn
- Apr 9, 2015 = EUR73.2bn
- Apr 14, 2015 = EUR74bn
- Apr 22, 2015 = EUR75.5bn
- Apr 29, 2015 = EUR76.9bn
- May 6, 2015 = EUR78.9bn
- May 12, 2015 = EUR80.0bn
- May 21, 2015 = EUR80.2bn
- May 27, 2015 = EUR80.2bn
- Jun 2, 2015 = EUR80.7bn

Now, that implies 3 weeks cumulative ELA rises of EUR700mln and reserve cushion on ELA below EUR2.5bn by my estimate. And for all that, Greek Central Bank recoverable assets are currently at EUR41 billion. Ugh… Oh… the proverbial nose is tightening… but on who's neck?

The neck is somewhere in here - within the Greek Target 2 liabilities debate, liabilities that continue to rise, prompting a fine, but esoteric debate:


I side with Karl Whelan on this. What is material is Sinn's assertion that the Greek residents' "stock of money sent abroad and held in cash having already ballooned to 79% of GDP". And Greece is facing big bills on debt redemptions and wages and pensions in the next 3 months (see timeline here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/24415-greek-debt-maturities-through-2016.html) or:


One thing is clear from all of this: Credit Swiss estimate of 75% chance of a deal being done this month on Greek 'programme', while the CDS markets are pricing in 75% probability of Greek default over the next 5 years:


And we have equally conflicting 'proposals' on how such  programme might be arranged: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-02/greece-troika-submit-conflicting-eleventh-hour-deal-proposals which can be summarised as "the bottom line seems to be that, fed up Syriza's unwillingness to concede its election mandate, the troika will now write the agreement for Greece and Tsipras can either sign it or not. Apparently, the IMF has scaled back its demands for EU creditor writedowns (another loss for Athens) but remains skeptical of the entire undertaking."

If this is true, the entire 'new deal' being offered to Greece amounts to a new can being kicked down the same road.

Map of the road? [note: the below table excludes short-term debt]

h/t to @NChildersMEP 

So to sum up today on the Greek front:

  1. ELA is running tight, just as deposit flights goes on;
  2. Target 2 liabilities continue to mount;
  3. Probability of default remains material at present;
  4. Choices available to Greek authorities are Plan A: horrible and Plan B: terrible; and
  5. Absent debt write down, even the best case scenario still leads to high risk of a political crisis in the short run and a default in the medium (3 years) term. 
It's Back to the Future, in a Groundhog Day-like sorts of the Future...

Friday, May 15, 2015

15/5/15: Greece on a Wild Rollercoaster Ride


Greece has become a BitCoin of Europe in terms of volatility, and, man, things are soaring and crashing on a daily basis now. Here are three snapshots of Greek Credit Default Swaps:

End of last week:
Mid-week this week:
Closing yesterday:

Meanwhile, the entire financial system of Greece is now on a weekly timeline courtesy of the ECB approvals of ELA:
One move by ECB down on ELA or laterally on collateral requirements, and the house of cards can come crashing.

Note: Sources: CMA and @Schuldensuehner.