Showing posts with label Global debt crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Global debt crisis. Show all posts

Friday, June 29, 2018

29/6/18: Debt Bubble: Staying the Course into Hurricane


In three and a half years, the world debt has gone from being a worry to a bubble. At the end of 2014, there were just under $44 trillion worth of corporate and government debt on issue with roughly 1.4 percent of these yielding negative rates. As of June 2018, there are now more than $49 trillion worth of corporate and public sector bonds in the markets, with ca $8 trillion of these (or 16 percent) trading at negative yields.


And this is just a part of the overall debt bubble picture. In April this year, the IMF report noted that non-bank funding for households and wholesale lending "is on the rise since the Lehman-crisis, and constitutes a major source of bank credit to the economy" (see https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/03/19/Leverage-A-Broader-View-45720). IMF estimates for non-bank funding for the U.S. banks alone, shown below, add $11.7 trillion to the debt system in 2016, against $10 trillion in 2008. Meanwhile, another roughly $8 trillion worth of non-bank debt is sitting in the dealer funds and hedge funds' pledged collateral exposures.

Meanwhile, in the U.S. alone, $6.3 trillion corporate debt bubble is now at a risk of rising interest rates. U.S. speculative-grade corporate borrowers are now at a new record-low cash-to-debt ratio of just 12 percent, below the 14 percent in 2008. Worse, per S&P report, more than 450 investment-grade companies that are not in the top 1 percent of cash-rich debt issuers, have highly risky cash-to-debt ratios of around 21 percent.

Thursday, December 29, 2016

29/12/16: Drowning in Debt


Recently, I posted about the return - with a vengeance - of one of the key drivers of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession, the rapid rise of the debt bubble across the global economy. The original post is available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/161216-root-of-2007-2010-crises-is-back.html

There is more evidence of the problem reaching beyond corporate finance side of the markets for debt. In fact, in the U.S. - the economy that led the de-risking and deleveraging efforts during the early stages of the recovery - household debt is now once again reaching danger levels.

Chart 1 below shows that, based on data from NY Federal Reserve through 3Q 2016, full year 2016 average household debt levels are likely to exceed 2005-2007 average by some 3 percent. In 3Q 2016, total average household debt was around USD98,312, a level comparable to USD98,906 in 2006.


And Chart 2 shows that overall, aggregate levels of household debt and per capita levels of household debt both are now in excess of 2005-2007 averages.



Finally, as Chart 3 below indicates, delinquencies rates are also rising, despite historically low interest rates and booming jobs markets. For Student Loans and Car Loans, 3Q 2016 delinquencies rates are 1 percentage points and 3.8 percentage points above the 2005-2007 average delinquency rates. For Mortgages, current delinquency rates are running pretty much at the 2005-2007 average. Only for Credit Cards do delinquency rates at the present trail behind the 2005-2007 average, by some 2 percentage points.

Now, consider the market expectations of 0.75-1 percentage increase in Fed rates in 2017 compared to 3Q 2016 (we are already 0.25 percentage points on the way with the most recent Fed decision). Based on the data from NY Fed, and assuming average 2015-2016 growth rates in credit forward, this will translate into extra household payments on debt servicing of around USD1,085-USD1,465 per annum depending on the passthrough rates from policy rate set by the Fed and the retail rates charged by the banks.

Given the state of the U.S. household finances, this will be some tough burden to shoulder.

So here you have it, folks:
1) Corporate debt bubble is at an all-time high
2) Government debt bubble is at an all-time high
3) Household debt bubble is at an all-time high.
Meanwhile, equity funding is slipping even for the usually credit-shy start ups.

And if you want another illustration, here is total global Government debt, based on IMF data:


We’ve learned no lessons from 2008.


Sources for data:
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/average-credit-card-debt-household/
https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/data.html
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx

Sunday, May 24, 2015

24/5/15: Markets, Patterns and Catalysts: Irish Growth Story


Some of my slides from last week's presentation at the All-Ireland Business Summit, covering three key themes:

The Current State of the Irish Economy "The Market Section"





The New Normal of rising global risk "The Pattern"




A Policy Path to Growth "The Catalysts"



Friday, March 27, 2015

27/3/15: Debt, Glorious Debt, Deluge of Debt... and Negative Yields


In the article on global debt woes forthcoming in one of the financial letters I contribute to in April, I will be looking more in depth at the problems brewing in the global asset markets. But for now, couple of interesting (additional) points.

According to Pictet, the share of global debt that is trading at negative yields has now risen to 8% of the total debt outstanding. For the Euro markets, 19% of all debt traded is now negative yielding, for debt denominated in Swedish SEK - 33% and for for Swiss CHF denominated debt - 44%.

If this is not enough to raise your hair, here is what investors think of the bonds markets:
Source: @lebullmarche
Per above, two core concerns are now taking over the worry-ranks for institutional investors: valuations bubble in bonds markets (up from 17% to 30% between January and March 2015) and Supply and quality of issuance of new debt (up from 6% in January to 26% in March).

Monday, September 16, 2013

16/9/2013: A Liquidity Slush or an Equity Switch?

Three more charts from BIS Quarterly (http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1309a.pdf), showing the switch of liquidity out of the Emerging Markets into Advanced Economies...



 And then from the Advanced Economies bonds into Advanced Economies equities with a small bounce up on Emerging Markets equities side too...

Two thoughts:

  1. There is no yield-driven bounce anymore, so pricing is not a huge help in this process; and
  2. Is this the end of the debt bubble and the start of the equities rise (structural, not nominal rise, driven by shift in corporate funding models) or is this a temporary slush of liquidity?


Monday, April 2, 2012

2/4/2012: Two studies on Global Financial Crisis

An interesting analysis of the International Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 from Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, both Yale and NBER just out - see link here. Worth a read and contrasting with Taleb's excellent paper on same (earlier work than that of Gordon and Metrick) here.

Friday, February 10, 2012

10/2/2012: Few thoughts on the global policy crisis

What makes me really concerned nowdays is not the ongoing crisis, but the logical and numeric impossibility of the mounting policy "solutions' to the crisis. Here's a quick synopsis. Take a look around the world:

  • Bank of England repeated QE rounds in the face of £1 trillion+ debt pile is a strategy for growth via debasement of the currency
  • Fed's continued unrelenting QE is much the same
  • ECB has been debasing any real connection between banks, real economy and banks profits via uninterrupted injection of cash into banks - giving a license to earn free profits on interest margins while monetizing already excessive Government debts. Real economy, of course, gets hammered by sterilization via reduced real credit flows. The end game - moral hazard of massive proportions in the financial sector across Europe
  • EU itself is hell-bent on debasing real incomes and wealth of its citizens by implementing the Fiscal Compact as the sole policy tool for dealing with the crisis
  • Obama Administration is debasing, in contrast with EU, the future generations' wealth and income by continuing to spend Federal dollars like a drunken sailor arriving in a casino
  • Ireland's Government is actively debasing the entire domestic economy, oblivious to the reality that households and businesses deleveraging is being prevented by banks and Government deleveraging - all for the sake of grand posturing of "We will pay all our debts" variety
  • Japan is engaged in an active pursuit of debasing Government balancesheet as the debt bubble spreads to Japanese Government bonds - now in negative yields
  • China is debasing its monetary and fiscal policies to deliver a 'soft landing' to the massive train wreck of its vastly bubble-like property and banking sectors
Close your eyes and think - how will the world be able to reverse out of these disastrous desperate policies in years ahead without completely shutting off growth via high interest rates, destabilized savings-investment links and in the presence of ever-rising public, private and corporate debts? What levels of inflation will be required to 'inflate' out of this mess? What degree of real wealth destruction has to be imposed on the ordinary people to sustain these gambles without a structured, orderly and coordinated restructuring of debts? What asset class and geography hedge can protect you from this avalanche of disastrous policy choices by the Western leaders?

Monday, January 23, 2012

23/1/2012: Extreme Events

Going through 2 charts and mapping the big themes of the ongoing crises, one has to be in awe of the volatility. Here are the maps of extreme (3-Sigma-plus) events with 'directionality' reflected:


Lovely, aren't they? But the trick in the above is: we are not at the decay stage of volatility on the sovereigns re-pricing stage. This, to me, suggests that once the sovereign crisis re-pricing draws to conclusion (whenever that might happen - isa different story), there will be the need for finding that 'new normal' (reversion-to-the-trend target) for the markets valuations overall. And that is the whole new game, dependent less on the previous equilibrium that should have followed the Great Bursting period, but more on the future risks and trends in post-debt economies. Which, itself, really depends on whether any given market can sustain growth without endless supports (implicit and explicit) from the Government borrowings.

Just thought I'd throw few thoughts out there...

Monday, September 12, 2011

12/09/2011: IMF admits failures in debt risk forecasting frameworks

In the analysis published just minutes ago, the IMF ("Modernizing the Framework for Fiscal Policy and Public Debt Sustainability Analysis" by the Fiscal Affairs Department and the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, dated for internal use from August 5, 2011) implicitly admits deep errors in the methodology for analyzing public debt dynamics. Given the magnitude of errors reported by the IMF (see table summary below), the entire exercise puts the boot into the EU-led attacks on the Big 3 ratings agencies - it turns out that the wise and uncompromisable IMF was not much good at dealing with fiscal sustainability risks either.

Here are the core conclusions: "Modernizing the framework for fiscal policy and public debt sustainability analysis (DSA) has become necessary... [This paper] proposes to move to a risk-based approach to DSAs for all market-access countries, where the depth and extent of analysis would be commensurate with concerns regarding sustainability..."

DSA could be improved, according to the IMF report, through a greater focus on:
  • Realism of baseline assumptions: "Close scrutiny of assumptions underlying the baseline scenario (primary fiscal balance, interest rate, and growth rate) would be expected particularly if a large fiscal adjustment is required to ensure sustainability. This analysis should be based on a combination of country-specific information and cross-country experience." (Note that in Ireland's case such analysis would probably require, in my view, using GNP metrics in place of GDP).
  • Level of public debt as one of the triggers for further analysis: "Although a DSA is a multifaceted exercise, the paper emphasizes that not only the trend but also the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is a key indicator in this framework. [Apparently, before the level of debt didn't matter much, just the rate of growth in debt - the deficit - was deemed to be important] The paper does not find a sound basis for integrating specific sustainability thresholds into the DSA framework. However, based on recent empirical evidence, it suggests that a reference point for public debt of 60 percent of GDP be used flexibly to trigger deeper analysis for market-access countries: the presence of other vulnerabilities (see below) would call for in-depth analysis even for countries where debt is below the reference point." [So, now, folks, no formal debt bounds, but 60% is the point of concern. Of course, by that metric, IMF would have to do country-specific analysis for ALL euro area states]
  • Analysis of fiscal risks: "Sensitivity analysis in DSAs should be primarily based on country-specific risks and vulnerabilities. The assessment of the impact of shocks could be improved by developing full-fledged alternative scenarios, allowing for interaction among key variables..." [Another interesting point, apparently the existent frameworks fail to consider interacting risks and second order effects. That is like doing earthquake loss projections without considering possibility of a tsunami.]
  • Vulnerabilities associated with the debt profile: IMF proposes "to integrate the assessment of debt structure and liquidity issues into the DSA." [Again, apparently, no liquidity risk other than maturity profile analysis is built into current frameworks]
  • Coverage of fiscal balance and public debt: "It should be as broad as possible, with particular attention to entities that present significant fiscal risks, including state owned enterprises, public-private partnerships, and pension and health care programs." [It appears that the IMF is gearing toward more in-depth analysis of the unfunded state liabilities, such as longer-term liabilities relating to pensions and health expenditure, as well as more explicitly focusing on unfunded contractual liabilities, such as specific contractual exposures on state pensions. If that is indeed the case, then there is some hope we will see more light shed on the murky waters of forthcoming sovereign exposures that are currently outside the realm of exposures priced in the market.]

Now, several interesting factoids on sovereign debt forecasts and sustainability as per IMF paper.

Here's the summary of IMF own assessment of its forecasting powers when it comes to Ireland: "The 2007 Article IV staff report included a public DSA, which showed that government net debt (defined as gross debt minus the assets of the National Pensions Reserve Fund and the Social Insurance Fund) was low and declining. In the baseline scenario, net debt was projected to fall from 12 percent of GDP in 2006 to 6 percent of GDP by 2012. The medium-term debt position was judged to be resilient to a variety of shocks. The worst outcome-a rise in net debt to 16 percent of GDP in 2012-occurred in a growth shock scenario. Staff identified age-related spending pressures as the most significant threat to the long-run debt outlook. The report noted that, although banks had large exposures to the property market, stress tests suggested that cushions were adequate to cover a range of shocks. Net debt to GDP subsequently increased nearly fivefold from 2007 to 2010, owing to a sharp GDP contraction and large fiscal deficits linked mainly to bank recapitalization costs."

No comment needed on the above. The IMF has clearly missed all possible macroeconomic risks faced by the Irish economy back in 2007.

On Greece: "In the 2007 Article IV staff report, staff indicated that fiscal consolidation should be sustained over the medium term given a high level of public debt and projected increases in pension and health care costs related to population aging. ...In the baseline scenario, public debt to GDP was projected to fall from 93 percent in 2007 to 72 percent in 2013. All but one bound test showed debt on a declining path over the medium term. In the growth shock scenario, debt was projected to rise to 98 percent of GDP by 2013. Two years later, staff warned that public debt could rise to 115 percent of GDP by 2010-even after factoring in fiscal consolidation measures implemented by the authorities-and recommended further adjustment to place public debt on a declining path."

So another miss, then, for IMF.

Here's the summary table on these and other forecast errors:

Next, take a look at a handy summary of debt sustainability thresholds literature surveyed by the IMF (largely - sourced from IMF own work):
So for the Advanced Economies (AE), debt thresholds range from 80-150 percent of GDP, the range so wide, it make absolutely no sense. Nor does it present any applicable information. By the lower bound, every euro area country is in trouble, by the upper bound, Greece is the only one that is facing the music. Longer term sustainability bound is a bit narrower - from 50% to 75%, with maximum sustainable debt levels of 183-192%.

And, for the last bit, off-balance sheet unfunded liabilities and actual debt levels chart:
Here's an interesting thing. Consider NPV of pension and health spending that Ireland is at - in excess of aging economies of Italy, Japan and close to shrinking in population Germany. One does have to ask the question: why the hell does the younger economy of Ireland spend so much on age-linked services and funds?

Another thing to notice in the above is that there appears to be virtually no identifiable strong statistical relationship between debt levels and pensions & health expenditures. This clearly suggests that the bulk of age-related spending looking forward is yet to be factored into deficits and debt levels. Good luck with getting that financed through the bond markets, I would add.

Thursday, August 18, 2011

18/08/2011: VIX signals crunch time for the crisis

Summary:


Few charts on VIX - hitting historic, second highest ever, 1-day dynamic semi-variance range:
VIX itself above and intraday range below:

3mo dynamic STDEV showing emerging and reinforced trend up on semi-variance side:
And same for straight volatility (symmetric)
This, folks is a crunch time.

The reasons I bothered with this are here.

Monday, August 8, 2011

08/08/2011: What VIX tells us about today's markets meltdown

Let's chart what I called the Roy Lichtenstein-styled "KABOOM" moment for the markets today. Recall that by definition the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is "a key measure of market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. Since its introduction in 1993, VIX has been considered by many to be the world's premier barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility."

Now, basically, VIX is as close to a pure price risk bet as we have. Again per CBOE: reported VIX index values represent "market estimate of expected volatility that is calculated by using real-time S&P 500 Index (SPX) option bid/ask quotes. VIX uses near-term and next-term out-of-the money SPX options with at least 8 days left to expiration, and then weights them to yield a constant, 30-day measure of the expected volatility of the S&P 500 Index."

Now to the charts.

Starting from the top, we have actual VIX itself - today's close at 48.00 which was:
  • Still well below the historical max of 80.86 attained on 20/11/2008
  • Well ahead of the historical average of 20.35 or January-2008 to present average of 27.21 or the average since January 2010 of 21.11
  • Today's close VIX reading was 63rd highest daily reading for the entire history of the series and the highest since January 2010
  • All 64 top readings (equal or above that attained today) were recorded in the period since January 2008.
Today's intraday spread of 35.65% is below Friday intraday spread of 45.52. However, the two readings are quite extraordinary:
  • Intraday spread average for historical series is 3.01%, while since January 2008 through present intraday spread averaged 9.06%.
  • Today's spread was 7th highest in history of the series, the 5th highest since January 2008 and the second highest (after last Friday's) since January 2010.
  • Friday's intraday spread was the 5th highest daily spread in the history of the series and the 4th highest since the crisis start (January 2008)
To see just how extraordinary last couple of days are, consider two time horizons for volatility in VIX itself:
and a shorter horizon:
3mo dynamic standard deviation for today's close is only 433rd highest reading in the series history and the 60th highest since January 2010, while 1mo dynamic standard deviation is the 56th highest over entire history and the 5th highest since January 2010.

However, in terms of daily percentage changes, today's rise of 50% is the fourth highest daily increase since the beginning of the VIX history and the highest since January 2008.

In terms of 1mo dynamic semi-variance (measuring only variance for the days of increasing VIX index, in other words - only for those days when risk rises), the last chart above clearly shows that we are in for a treat in these markets.