Showing posts with label Euro area debt crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Euro area debt crisis. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 5, 2016

5/1/16: Debt Pile: Advanced Economies Lead


After some 8 years of crisis and post-crisis deleveraging, one would have expected a significant progress to be achieved in terms of reducing the overall debt piles carried by the world’s most indebted economies.

Alas, the case cannot be made for such improvements. Here is a chart based on the latest BIS data (through 1Q 2015) plotting the distribution of total real economic debt (Government, private non-financial corporates and households) across the main economies:




















As the chart above indicates, there are at least 23 economies with debt/GDP ratio in excess of 200 percent, seven economies with debt to GDP ratio close to or above 300 percent and 3 economies with debt to GDP ratio in excess of 300 percent. But the true champs of the debt world are Japan and Ireland, where based on BIS data, debt to GDP ratio is in excess of 375 percent. 

It is worth noting that Germany is the only advanced economy in the chart that has debt/GDP ratio below 200 percent. Of all original Euro area 12 economies, Germany, Austria and Finland are the only three economies with debt/GDP ratio below 250 percent. Six out of top 10 most indebted economies in the chart are Euro area members.


Do note that the above omits local authorities and state bodies debts, so the true extent of debt pile up around the world is significantly larger than that presented in this figure.

Monday, July 27, 2015

27/7/15: IMF Euro Area Report: Debt's a Mean Bitch…


The IMF today released its Article IV assessment of the Euro area, so as usual, I will be blogging on the issues raised in the latest report throughout the day.

The first post looks at debt overhang.

Per IMF, low inflation environment in the Euro area is "pushing up real rates, more in countries with higher debt burdens"

And here's a handy chart from the Fund:


Note: Net debt is the total economy’s financial liabilities minus assets.

Broadly-speaking, with annual expected inflation at or below 1%, we have serious pressure on Portugal and Spain, where Government borrowing costs (and by some proximity, banks funding costs) have not declined as dramatically as in, say, Ireland. The second sub-group at risk are countries with lower debt ratios, but still high enough funding costs - Slovenia and Italy. Ireland is in a separate category, having enjoyed significant declines in cost of funding, without a corresponding improvement in debt ratios. In other words, for Ireland, so far, the challenge is less of day-to-day funding of debt, but the quantum of debt outstanding. Short-run sustainability is fine, but longer run sustainability is still problematic.

The problematic nature of debt carried across the euro area goes well beyond the sovereign cost of funding and into the structure of European banks balance sheets.

Per IMF: "A chronic lack of demand, impaired corporate and bank balance sheets, and deeply-rooted structural weaknesses are behind the subdued medium-term outlook:

  • Insufficient demand. Business investment continues to lag the cycle, remaining well below pre-crisis levels, reflecting weak demand, as well as high corporate debt, policy uncertainty, and tight credit. While overall unemployment has begun to recede, it remains above 11 percent, with long-term and youth unemployment near historic highs. Fiscal policy is broadly neutral, but is not providing offsetting support.
  • Weak balance sheets. The ECB’s comprehensive assessment (CA) found that banks had raised capital, but also saw NPLs continuing to rise, reaching systemic levels in some countries. High levels of NPLs and debt have held back bank lending and investment, limiting the pass-through of easier financial conditions. Europe’s experience contrasts sharply with that of the U.S. recently and Japan in the 2000s where, after their financial crises, aggressive NPL resolution helped support a faster recovery in credit.
  • Low and divergent productivity. Progress on structural reforms has been piecemeal and uneven across countries, as highlighted by the slow implementation of Country-Specific Recommendation (CSR) reforms under the European Semester. Productivity remains well below pre-crisis levels and lags the U.S., especially in important sectors such as information technology and professional services."


Note, I wrote extensively on the three factors holding back credit cycle before and recently testified on the subject at the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, the Houses of the Oireachtas: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/07/8715-ecb-qe-strong-monetary-weak-real.html

Here is a chart highlighting the state of NPLs across the Euro area, U.S. and Japan which shows just how dire are the conditions in European banking really are:


Even by provisions measure, Europe is a total laggard. Which means there is plenty more delve raging left in the system.

And here is the IMF chart on productivity:

Which really neatly highlights the debacle that is euro area productivity growth: we have a massive uplift in unemployment during the crisis. Normally, rising unemployment automatically induces higher labour productivity through two channels: by destroying more jobs in lower value-added sectors, and by destroying jobs of, on average, less productive workers. In Europe, of course, the former factor did took place, but there was no corresponding retainment of activity in the higher value-added sectors, and the latter factor did not take place because of inflexible labour markets (for example, unions rules preventing lay offs of less productive staff, basing any employment adjustments on superficial criteria of tenure and/or union membership/contracts structures). So net result: jobs destruction (bad) was not even contributive to improved productivity (bad). But things are actually even worse. Chart below shows the distribution of productivity growth by broader sector, comparing euro area and the U.S.:


This is truly abysmal, for the euro area, which managed to post negative growth in productivity in Professional Services, and undershoot U.S. productivity growth in everything, save agriculture (where U.S. already enjoyed significant pre-crisis advantage over the EU, which implies normally lower productivity growth for the U.S.) and Construction (where the U.S. has enjoyed more robust recovery since 2010 against continued decline of activity in the euro area).


Yeah, remember those flamboyantly delightful days of denial, when everyone was keen on repeating the Krugmanite thesis that 'debt doesn't matter'? In reality, debt overhang is such a bitch… especially when it comes to messing up value-added investment and productivity growth. But never mind - Europe is not about these capitalist concepts, with its Knowledge Economy (as measured by IT and Professional Services and Manufacturing) shrinking in both metrics compared to the U.S.

Stay tuned for more excerpts and analysis from the IMF report.

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

22/7/15: Paging from the Planet Debt...


Ah, good old Europe... Austerity, Reforms, Structural Changes, Improved Competitiveness, Return to Growth... and rising, rising, rising debt.

Per latest Eurostat release (see here), euro area Government debt/GDP levels have hit 92.9% of GDP in 1Q 2015, up on 92.0% in 4Q 2014 and up on 91.9% of GDP in 1Q 2014. Year on year, Government debt rose from EUR9.179 trillion to EUR9.433 trillion.


Of the five most indebted (fiscally_ economies (excluding Ireland, which did not report 1Q 2015 GDP figures):

  • Debt fell in the case of Greece by 8.3 percentage points between 4Q 2014 and 1Q 2015 to 168.8% of GDP; 
  • Debt rose in the case of Italy by 3 percentage points to 135.1% of GDP;
  • Debt fell 0.6 percentage points in Portugal to 129.6% of GDP;
  • Debt rose 4.5 percentage points in Belgium to 111.0% of GDP;
  • Debt fell 0.7 percentage points in Cyprus to 106.8% of GDP.

Italian debt is now at the highest level since the peak of Inter-war period in the 1920s:


Source: @Schuldensuehner 

Congratulations to the inhabitants of the Planet Debt...



Friday, May 8, 2015

8/5/15: BIS on Build Up of Financial Imbalances


There is a scary, fully frightening presentation out there. Titled "The international monetary and financial system: Its Achilles heel and what to do about it" and authored by Claudio Borio of the Bank for International Settlements, it was delivered at the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) “2015 Annual Conference: Liberté, Égalité, Fragilité” Paris, on 8-11 April 2015.

Per Borio, the Achilles heel of the global economy is the fact that international monetary and financial system (IMFS) "amplifies weakness of domestic monetary and financial regimes" via:

  • "Excess (financial) elasticity”: inability to prevent the build-up of financial imbalances (FIs)
  • FIs= unsustainable credit and asset price booms that overstretch balance sheets leading to serious financial crises and macroeconomic dislocations
  • Failure to tame the procyclicality of the financial system
  • Failure to tame the financial cycle (FC)

The manifestations of this are:

  • Simultaneous build-up of FIs across countries, often financed across borders... watch out below - this is still happening... and
  • Overly accommodative aggregate monetary conditions for global economy. Easing bias: expansionary in short term, contractionary longer-term. Now, what can possibly suggest that this might be the case today... other than all the massive QE programmes and unconventional 'lending' supports deployed everywhere with abandon...

So Borio's view (and I agree with him 100%) is that policymakers' "focus should be more on FIs than current account imbalances". Problem is, European policymakers and analysts have a strong penchant for ignoring the former and focusing exclusively on the latter.

Wonder why Borio is right? Because real imbalances (actual recessions) are much shallower than financial crises. And the latter are getting worse. Here's the US evidence:

Now, some think this is the proverbial Scary Chart because it shows how things got worse. But surely, the Real Scary Chart must reference the problem today and posit it into tomorrow, right? Well, hold on, for the imbalances responsible for the last blue line swing up in the chart above are not going away. In fact, the financial imbalance are getting stronger. Take a look at the following chart:


Note: Bank loans include cross-border and locally extended loans to non-banks outside the United States.

Get the point? Take 2008 crisis peak when USD swap lines were feeding all foreign banks operations in the U.S. and USD credit was around USD6 trillion. Since 'repairs' were completed across the European and other Western banking and financial systems, the pile of debt denominated in the USD has… increased. By mid-2014 it reached above USD9 trillion. That is 50% growth in under 6 years.

However, the above is USD stuff... the Really Really Scary Chart should up the ante on the one above and show the same happening broader, outside just the USD loans.

So behold the real Dracula popping his head from the darkness of the Monetary Stability graveyards:



Yep.  Now we have it: debt (already in an overhang) is rising, systemically, unhindered, as cost of debt falls. Like a drug addict faced with a flood of cheap crack on the market, the global economy continues to go back to the needle. Over and over and over again.

Anyone up for a reversal of the yields? Jump straight to the first chart… and hold onto your seats, for the next upswing in the blue line is already well underway. And this time it will be again different... to the upside...

Monday, January 26, 2015

26/1/15: If not Liquidity, then Debt: ECB's QE competitive limping


I have written before, in the context of QE announcement by the ECB last week (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/01/2312015-liquidity-fix-for-euro-what-for.html) that the real problem with the euro area monetary and economic aggregates has nothing to do with liquidity supply (the favourite excuse for doing all sorts of things that the ECB keeps throwing around), but rather with the debt overhang.

In plain, simple terms, there is too much debt on the books. Too much Government debt, too much private debt. The ECB cannot even begin directly addressing the unspoken crisis of the private debt. But it is certainly trying to 'extend-and-pretend' public and private debt away. This is what the fabled EUR1.14 trillion (or so) QE announcement is about: take debt surplus off the markets so more debt can be issued. More debt to add to already too much debt, therefore, is the only solution the ECB can devise.

While EUR1.14 trillion might sound impressive, in reality, once we abstract away from the fake problem of liquidity, is nothing to brag about. Take a look at the following chart:


Forget the question in red, for the moment, and take in the numbers. Remember that 60% debt/GDP ratio is the long-term 'sustainability' target set by the Fiscal Compact - in other words, the long-term debt overhang, in EU-own terminology, is the bit of debt above that bound. By latest IMF stats, there is, roughly EUR3.5 trillion of debt overhang across the euro area 18, just for Government debt alone. You can safely raise that figure by a factor of 3 to take into the account private sector debts.

Which puts the ECB QE into perspective: at the very best, when fully deployed, it will cover just 1/3rd of the public debt overhang alone (actually it won't do anything of the sorts, as it includes private and public debt purchases). Across the entire euro area economy (public and private debt combined) we are talking about the 'big bazooka' that aims to repackage and extend-and-pretend about 10-11% of the total debt overhang. Not write this off, not cancel, not burn... but shove into different holding cell and pretend it's gone, eased, resolved.

This realisation should thus bring us around to that red triangle and the existential question: What for? Between end of 2007 and start of 2015, the euro area has managed to hike its debt pile by some EUR3 trillion, after we control for GDP effects. Given that this debt expansion did not produce any real growth anywhere, one might ask a simple question: why would ECB QE produce the effect that is any different?

The answer, on a post card, to the EU Commission, please.

Thursday, January 1, 2015

1/1/2015: Shared Liability: Debtor and Lender


In a recent blogpost on geography of Euro area debt flows prior to the crisis, I noted the extent to which Irish (and other peripheral euro area economies') debt bubble pre-2008 has been inflated from abroad (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/27122014-geography-of-euro-area-debt.html). The argument, of course, is that the funding source, just as the funding user, should co-share in the liability created by the bubble.

This argument, advanced by myself and many others over the years of the crisis, has commonly been refuted by the counter-point that no such liability is implied: borrowers willingly borrowed from the banks, banks willingly borrowed from the markets (aka other banks) and that is where liability ends.

Here is a cogent paper on the subject from the Bank for International Settlements (not some lefty-leaning think tank or a libertarian hothouse of dissent): Turner, Philip, Caveat Creditor (July 2013). BIS Working Paper No. 419: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384445).

The paper asserts that "One area where international monetary cooperation has failed is in the role of surplus or creditor countries in limiting or in correcting external imbalances." In common parlance, that is the area of liability of one economic system that, having generated surpluses of savings, provides funding to another economy.

"The stock dimensions of such imbalances - net external positions, leverage in national balance sheets, currency/maturity mismatches, the structure of ownership of assets and liabilities and over-reliance on debt - can threaten financial stability in creditor as in debtor countries." In other words, net lender (e.g. Germany) co-creates the imbalance with the net borrower (e.g. Ireland).

And thus, "creditor countries ...have a responsibility both for avoiding "overlending" and for devising cooperative solutions to excessive or prolonged imbalances."

Unless responsibility does not imply liability (in which case me being responsible for driving safely should not translate into me being liable for any damages done to other parties from failing to do so), we have confirmation of my logic: net lending countries (I refer you to the chart in the blogpost linked above) bear shared liability with the borrowers. By extension, lending banks share liability with the borrowers. Per BIS. Not just per the unreasonable myself.

Sunday, August 10, 2014

10/8/2014: Can EU Rely on Large Primary Surpluses to Solve its Debt Problem?


Another paper relating to debt corrections/deflations, this time covering the euro area case. "A Surplus of Ambition: Can Europe Rely on Large Primary Surpluses to Solve its Debt Problem?" (NBER Working Paper No. w20316) by Barry Eichengreen and Ugo Panizza tackle the hope that current account (external balances) surpluses can rescue Europe from debt overhangs.

Note: I covered a recent study published by NBER on the effectiveness of inflation in deflating public debts here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2014/08/1082014-inflating-away-public-debt-not.html.

Eichengreen and Panizza set out their case by pointing to the expectations and forecasts underpinning the thesis that current account surpluses can be persistent and large enough to deflate Europe's debts. "IMF forecasts and the EU’s Fiscal Compact foresee Europe’s heavily indebted countries running primary budget surpluses of as much as 5 percent of GDP for as long as 10 years in order to maintain debt sustainability and bring their debt/GDP ratios down to the Compact’s 60 percent target." More specifically: "The IMF, in its Fiscal Monitor (2013), sketches a scenario in which the obligations of heavily indebted European sovereigns first stabilize and then fall to the 60 percent level targeted by the EU’s Fiscal Compact by 2030. It makes assumptions regarding interest rates, growth rates and related variables and computes the cyclically adjusted primary budget surplus (the surplus exclusive of interest payments) consistent with this scenario. The heavier the debt, the higher the interest rate and the slower the growth rate, the larger is the requisite surplus. The average primary surplus in the decade 2020-2030 is calculated as

  • 5.6 percent for Ireland, 
  • 6.6 percent for Italy, 
  • 5.9 percent for Portugal, 
  • 4.0 percent for Spain, and 
  • (wait for it…) 7.2 percent for Greece."

It is worth noting that Current Account Surpluses strategy for dealing with public debt overhang in Ireland has been aggressively promoted by the likes of the Bruegel Institute.

These are ridiculous levels of target current account surpluses. And Eichengreen and Panizza go all empirical on showing why.

"There are  both political and economic reasons for questioning whether they are plausible. As any resident of California can tell you, when tax revenues rise, legislators and their  constituents apply pressure to spend them." No need to go to California, just look at what the Irish Government is about to start doing in Budget 2015: buying up blocks of votes by fattening up public wages and spending. Ditto in Greece: "In 2014 Greece, when years of deficits and fiscal austerity, enjoyed its first primary surpluses; the government came under pressure to disburse a “social dividend” of €525 million to 500,000 low-income households ... Budgeting, as is well known, creates a common pool problem, and the larger the  surplus, the deeper and more tempting is the pool. Only countries with strong political and budgetary institutions may be able to mitigate this problem (de Haan, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau 2013)."

More significantly, Eichengreen and Panizza show that "primary surpluses this large and persistent are rare. In an extensive sample of high- and middle-income countries there are just 3 (non-overlapping) episodes where countries ran primary surpluses of at least 5 per cent of GDP for 10 years." These countries are: Singapore (clearly not a comparable case to Euro area countries), Ireland in the 1990s and New Zealand in the 1990s as well.

"Analyzing a less restrictive definition of persistent surplus episodes (primary surpluses averaging at least 3 percent of GDP for 5 years), we find that surplus episodes are more likely when growth is strong, when the current account of the balance of payments is in surplus (savings rates are high), when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high (heightening the urgency of fiscal adjustment), and when the governing party controls all houses of parliament or congress (its bargaining position is strong). Left wing governments, strikingly, are more likely to run large, persistent primary surpluses. In advanced countries, proportional representation electoral systems that give rise to encompassing coalitions are associated with surplus episodes. The point estimates do not provide much encouragement for the view that a country like Italy will be able to run a primary budget surplus as large and persistent as officially projected."

Good luck spotting such governance institutions in the euro area 'periphery' nowadays. "Researchers at the Kiel Institute (2014) conclude that “assessment of historical developments in numerous countries leads to the conclusion that it is extremely difficult for a country to prevent its debt from increasing when the necessary primary surplus ratio reaches a critical level of more than 5 percent.”"

Eichengreen and Panizza take a sample of 54 emerging and advanced economies over the period 1974-2013. They show that "primary surpluses as large as 5 percent of GDP for as long as a decade are rare; there are just 3 such non-overlapping episodes  in the sample. These cases are special; they are economically and politically idiosyncratic in the sense that their incidence is not explicable by the usual economic and political correlates. Close examination of the three cases suggests that their experience does not scale."

As mentioned above, one case is Ireland, starting from 1991. "Ireland’s experience in the 1990s is widely pointed to by observers who insist  that Eurozone countries can escape their debt dilemma by running large, persistent primary surpluses. Ireland’s move to large primary surpluses was taken in response to an incipient debt crisis: after a period of deficits as high as 8 per cent of GDP, general government debt as a share of GDP reached 110 per cent in 1987. A new government then slashed public spending by 7 per cent of GDP, abolishing some long-standing government agencies, and offered a one-time tax amnesty to delinquents. The result was faster economic growth that then led to self-reinforcing favorable debt dynamics, as revenue growth accelerated and the debt-to-GDP ratio declined even more rapidly with the accelerating growth of its denominator. This is a classic case pointed to by those who believe in the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990). But it is important, equally, to emphasize that Ireland’s success in running large primary surpluses was supported by special circumstances. The country was able to devalue its currency – an option that is not available to individual Eurozone countries – enabling it sustain growth in the face of large public-spending cuts by crowding in exports. As a small economy, Ireland was in a favorable position to negotiate a national pact (known as the Program for National Recovery) that created confidence that the burden of fiscal austerity would be widely and fairly shared, a perception that helped those surpluses to be sustained. (Indeed, it is striking that every exception considered in this section is a small open economy.) Global growth was strong in the decade of the
1990s (the role of this facilitating condition is emphasized by Hagemann 2013). Ireland, like Belgium, was under special pressure to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio in order to meet the Maastricht criteria and qualify for monetary union in 1999. Finally, the country’s multinational-friendly tax regime encouraged foreign corporations to book their profits in Ireland, which augmented revenues."

The point of this is that "Whether other Eurozone countries – and, indeed, Ireland itself – will be able to pursue a similar strategy in the future is dubious. Thus, while Irish experience has some general lessons for other countries, it also points to special circumstances that are likely to prevent its experience from being generalized."

Another country was New Zealand, starting with 1994. "New Zealand experienced chronic instability in the first half of the 1980s; the budget deficit was 9 percent of GDP in 1984, while the debt ratio was high and rising. Somewhat in the manner of Singapore, the country’s small size and highly open economy heightened the perceived urgency of correcting the resulting problems. New Zealand therefore adopted far-reaching and, in some sense, unprecedented institutional reforms. At the aggregate level, the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1994 limited the scope for off-budget spending and creative accounting. It required the government to provide Parliament with a statement of its long-term fiscal objectives, a forecast of budget outcomes, and a statement of fiscal intentions explaining whether its budget forecasts were consistent with its budget objectives. It required prompt release of aggregate financial statements and regular auditing, using internationally accepted accounting practices. At the level of individual departments, the government set up a management framework that imposed strong separation between the role of ministers (political appointees who specified departmental objectives) and departmental CEOs (civil servants with leeway to choose tactics appropriate for delivering outputs). This separation was sustained by separating governmental departments into narrowly focused policy ministries and service-delivery agencies, and by adopting procedures that emphasized transparency, employing private-sector financial reporting and accounting rules, and by imposing accountability on technocratic decision makers (Mulgan 2004). As a result of these initiatives, New Zealand was able to cut public spending by more than 7 per cent of GDP. Revenues were augmented by privatization receipts, as political opposition to privatization of public services was successfully overcome. The cost of delivering remaining public services was limited by comprehensive deregulation
that subjected public providers to private competition. The upshot was more than a decade of 4+% primary surpluses, allowing the country to halve its debt ratio from 71 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 30 per cent in 2010."

Agin, problem is, New Zealand-style reforms might not be applicable to euro area countries. Even with this, "it is worth observing that it took full ten years from the implementation of the first reforms, in 1984, to the emergence of 4+% budget surpluses in New Zealand a decade later."


Key conclusion of the study is that "On balance, this analysis does not leave us optimistic that Europe’s crisis countries will be able to run primary budget surpluses as large and persistent as officially projected." Which leaves us with the menu of options that is highly unpleasant. If current account surpluses approach to debt-deflation fails, and if inflation is not a solution (as noted here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2014/08/1082014-inflating-away-public-debt-not.html) then we are left with the old favourites: debt forgiveness (not likely within the euro area), foreign aid (impossible within the euro area on any appreciable scale), or debt restructuring (already done several times and more forthcoming - just watch Irish Government 'early repayment' of IMF loans).

10/8/2014: Inflating Away the Public Debt? Not so fast...


There is a lot of talk amongst Irish and european policymakers about the big great hope for deflating public debts across euro area periphery: the prospect of inflation taking chunks out of the real debt burdens. This hope is based on a major misunderstanding of history. In many a cases, in the presence of debt overhang, higher inflation does help erode the real value of debt. Alas, "While across centuries and countries, a common way that sovereigns have paid for high public debt is by having higher, and sometimes even hyper, inflation, this rarely came without some or all of fiscal consolidation, financial repression, and partial default (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009)." This quote starts the new NBER paper, titled "Inflating Away the Public Debt? An Empirical Assessment" by Jens Hilscher, Alon Raviv, and Ricardo Reis )NBER Working Paper No. 20339, July 2014)

In other words, it remains to not entirely clear just how effective inflation can be in current environment, given there are no defaults and there are no direct and aggressive financial repression measures implemented in the majority of the advanced economies, yet.

The NBER paper takes on the issue from the U.S. debt perspective. Per authors, "…with U.S. total public debt at its highest ratio of GDP since 1947, would higher inflation be an effective way to pay for it?"

"Providing an answer requires tackling two separate issues:

  1. "The first is to calculate by how much would 1% unanticipated and permanently higher inflation lower the debt burden. If all of the U.S. public debt outstanding in 2012 (101% of GDP) were held in private hands, if it were all nominal, and if it all had a maturity equal to the average (5.4 years), then a quick back-of-the-envelope answer is 5.5%.1 However, we will show that this approximation is misleading. In fact, we estimate that the probability that the reduction in U.S. debt is as large as 5.5% of GDP is below 0.05%. The approximation is inaccurate since the underlying assumptions are inaccurate. The debt number is exaggerated because large shares of the debt are either held by other branches of the government or have payments indexed to inflation and the maturity number is inaccurate because it does not take into account the maturity composition of privately-held nominal debt."
  2. "The second issue is that assuming a sudden and permanent increase in inflation by an arbitrary amount (1% in the above example) is empirically not helpful. After all, if the price level could suddenly jump to infinity, the entire nominal debt burden would be trivially eliminated. It is important first to recognize that …if investors anticipated sudden infinite inflation, they would not be willing to hold government debt at a positive price. Second, the central bank does not perfectly control inflation, so that even if it wanted to raise inflation by 1% it might not be able to. Moreover, there are many possible paths to achieving higher inflation, either doing so gradually or suddenly, permanently or transitorily, in an expected or unexpected way, and we would like to know how they vary in effectiveness. Therefore, it is important to consider counterfactual experiments that economic agents believe are possible."

The authors "calculate novel value-at-risk measures of the debt debasement due to inflation, and ...consider a rich set of counterfactual inflation distributions to investigate what drives the results. Using all these inputs, [authors] calculate the probability that the present value of debt debasement due to inflation is larger than any given threshold. The 5th percentile of this value at risk calculation is a mere 3.1% of GDP, and any loss above 4.2% has less than 1% probability. Interestingly, much of the effect of inflation would fall on foreign holders of the government debt, who hold the longer maturities. The Federal Reserve, which also holds longer maturities, would also suffer larger capital losses."

The paper also "…explores the role of an active policy tool that interacts with inflation and is often used in developing countries: financial repression. It drives a wedge between market interest rates and the interest rate on government bonds, and acts as a tax on the existing holders of the government debt. We show that extreme financial repression, where bondholders are paid with reserves at the central bank which they must hold for a fixed number of periods, is equivalent to ex post extending the maturity of the debt. Under such circumstances inflation has a much larger impact, such that if repression lasts for a decade, permanently higher inflation that previously lowered the real value of debt by 3.7% now lowers it by 23% of GDP."

In short, there is no miracle inflationary resolution of the U.S. debt conundrum. And similarly, there is probably none for the euro area sovereigns stuck with debts in excess of 90-100% of GDP. The pain of inflation alone is simply not enough to magic away debts. Instead, the pain of inflation will have to be coupled with the added pain of financial repression, and in the euro area case, this pain will befall more domestic investors and savers, than in the U.S. case simply due to differences in debt holdings. While no one expects the financial repression in the euro area to match that deployed in Greece and Cyprus, one can expect the financial repression measures (higher taxation in general, higher taxation of savings and overseas investments, higher rates of cash extraction from consumers via public sector pricing and higher concentrations in the financial services sector to increase rates of cash extraction by the banks) are here to stay and to most likely get worse before things can improve a decade later.

The myth of higher inflation as a (relatively) painless salvation to our debt ills is getting thinner and thinner...

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

22/7/2014: Remember that Fiscal Compact? Well, Don't Remind Europe...


Remember the Fiscal Compact? Yes, the one where debt/GDP ratio should be at 60% and the countries with ratios in excess of 60% must take 1/20th of the excess in adjustment down in debt per annum? So a country with 130% debt/GDP ratio is committed to an annual reduction of (130-60)/20=3.5% of GDP in year 1 and so on...

Oh, yes, the Fiscal Compact underpins the macroeconomic stability in the Euro area, making the euro as a currency 'sustainable'…

Oh yes, and the latest figures from the Eurostat on Government debt show that…

  1. 18 out of EU28 countries have seen increases in Government debt/GDP ratios in Q1 2014 compared to Q1 2013.
  2. 9 countries have posted increases in excess of 5% of GDP.
  3. Year on year: the highest increases in the ratio were recorded in Cyprus (+24.6 pp), Slovenia (+23.9 pp), Greece (+13.5 pp) and Croatia (+9.9 pp), while the largest decreases were recorded in Poland (-7.7 pp), Germany (-3.2 pp), the Czech Republic (-2.2 pp), Latvia (-1.4 pp) and Belgium (-0.9 pp).
  4. 15 EU28 countries had Government debt/GDP ratio in excess of 60%
  5. EA18 Government debt in Q1 2013 stood at EUR8.793 trillion or 92.5% of GDP. In Q1 2014 this was EUR9.056 trillion or 93.9% of GDP. That is excluding intergovernmental debt. Adding this, Q1 2013 debt/GDP ratio was 94.6% and this rose to 96.3% in Q1 2014.

Good to see the Fiscal Compact holding so much better than the Maastricht Criteria.

So in the Age of European Austerity, savage cuts to public spending are resulting in rising debt at a rate of 1.7 percentage points of GDP per annum. One might wonder, were it not for the savage Austerity, where the debt levels might have been?

Full Eurostat release here: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-22072014-AP/EN/2-22072014-AP-EN.PDF



Sunday, July 13, 2014

13/7/2014: Household Debt Mountains


In the earlier post (here) I covered IMF data on Non-Financial Corporations debt, comparing Spain and other 'peripherals' with Ireland. And here is one other comparative: for household debt


I know, I know... it doesn't matter, really, that households are being tasked with funding Government debt first, their own debt later. All is sustainable...

One caveat: per my understanding, the above does not include household debts transferred to investment funds, as data for Ireland comes from ECB, which does not include data not covered by the CBofI, which does not include household mortgages and other debt sold to institutions not covered by the banking licenses in Ireland. So there, keep raising taxes and reporting higher revenues as a 'success' or 'recovery'... because household debt does not matter... until it matters...

Thursday, August 22, 2013

22/8/2013: Slow Moving Sovereign Debt Crises: a new MIT Paper

Guido Lorenzoni and Ivan Werning (LW, 2013) new paper "Slow Moving Debt Crises" (June 30, 2013, MIT Department of Economics Working Paper 13-18. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298813) theoretically links the environment and policies conditions that can lead to self-fulfilling increases in sovereign interest rates.

To do so, the authors use a model of the dynamics of debt and interest rates in a setting where default is driven by insolvency. "Fiscal deficits and surpluses are subject to shocks but influenced by a fiscal policy rule. Whenever possible the government issues debt to meet its current obligations and defaults otherwise."

The result is a model that has multiple equilibria where both "low and high interest rate equilibria may coexist". There are self-fulfilling risks as "higher interest rates, prompted by fears of default, lead to faster debt accumulation, validating default fears. We call such an equilibrium a slow moving crisis, in contrast to rollover crises where investor runs precipitate immediate default." In a sense, Italy, and potentially the rest of the euro area periphery, ex-Ireland, appear to be stuck in this 'slow moving debt crisis'.

In September 2012, commenting on the ECB announcement of OMT, the ECB’s president,
Mario Draghi, clearly linked the on-going sovereign debt crisis in euro area peripheral states to a self-fulfilling crisis: “…we are in a situation now where you have large parts of the Euro Area in what we call a bad equilibrium, namely an equilibrium where you have self-fulfilling expectations. You may have self-fulfilling expectations that generate, that feed upon themselves, and generate adverse, very adverse scenarios. So there is a case for intervening to, in a sense, break these expectations [...]”

According to LW (2013): "If this view is correct, a credible announcement is all it takes to rule out bad equilibria, no bond purchases need to be carried out. To date, this is exactly how it seems to have played out."

In the LW (2013) model, "the government faces a fluctuating path of fiscal surpluses or deficits, that are affected by shocks and the current debt level. Each period, it attempts to meet these obligations by visiting a credit market, issuing bonds to a large group of risk-neutral investors. The capacity to borrow is limited endogenously by the prospect of future repayment and default occurs when a government’s need for funds exceeds this borrowing capacity. In equilibrium, bond prices incorporate the probability of default."

Bonds can be issued as short-term and long-term. "In the case of short-term debt", LW (2013) show that "the equilibrium bond price function (mapping the state
of the economy into bond prices) is uniquely determined."

The main point, however, is that uniqueness of he price function "does not imply that the equilibrium is unique. Multiplicity arises from what we call a Laffer curve effect: revenue from a bond auction is non-monotone in the amount of bonds issued. If the borrower targets a given level of revenue, then there are multiple bond prices consistent with an equilibrium."

"With long-term bonds the price function is no longer uniquely determined, because a
bad equilibrium with lower bond prices in the future now feeds back into current bond
prices. In addition, the existence of a good and bad equilibrium may be temporary. For
example, if we follow the bad equilibrium path for a sufficiently long period of time,
the debt level may reach a level for which there exists a unique continuation equilibrium with high interest rates; the bad equilibrium may set in."

This is important to the current case, as it links directly high level debt starting position to the bad equilibrium outcome without the need to reference investors' withdrawal from the funding market. This is the core difference to the traditional crises and LW (2013) call this a 'slow moving debt crisis' "to capture the fact
that it develops over time through the accumulation of debt" as distinguished "from liquidity or rollover debt crises". The 'liquidity crisis' occurs when "current investors, …pull out of the market entirely, leading to a failed bond auction; complete lack of credit then triggers default, analogous to depositors running on banks".

LW (2013) model "can be used to identify a “safe” region of parameters, for which
the equilibrium is unique. In particular, the safe region corresponds to a low initial debt level and to high responsiveness of the surplus to debt in the fiscal policy rule."

Very interesting conclusion from the LW (2013) paper is that "with long term debt, a slow moving crisis, by its very nature is due to a breakdown in the coordination of investors at different dates. As a result, it cannot be averted by coordinating investors meeting in a given market at a certain moment of time. If, instead, the borrower could commit to a certain bond issuance, this would eliminate the multiplicity problem." The commitment that ends such a crisis, in theory, implies commitment to specific steady levels of borrowing - a deficit path - while maintaining certain debt bounds forward. In contrast to mainstream literature, LW (2013) "assume that the borrower cannot commit to a certain bond issuance, because it cannot adjust its spending needs. Thus, it will issue the bonds needed to finance its obligations." The reason for this assumption is that while the borrowers "can control the amount of bonds issued… during any given market transaction or offer", in the long run, the actual amounts raised in the markets will not be fully predictable. Per LW (2013): "consider a borrower showing up to market with some given amount of bonds to sell. If the price turns out to be lower than expected the borrower may quickly return to offer additional bonds for sale to make up the difference in funding [and thus] …the overall size of the bond issuance remains endogenous to the bond price."

LW (2013) conclude that "it seems difficult to dismiss the concern that a country may find itself in a self-fulfilling “bad equilibrium” with high interest rates. In our model, bad equilibria are not driven by the fear of a sudden rollover crisis, as commonly modeled in the literature following Giavazzi and Pagano (1989), Alesina et al. (1992) and Cole and Kehoe (1996) and others. Thus, the problems these “bad equilibria” present are not resolved by attempts to rule out such investor runs. Instead, high interest rates can be self fulfilling because they imply a slow but perverse debt dynamic. Our results highlight the importance of fiscal policy rules and debt maturity in determining whether the economy is safe from the threat of these slow moving crises."

Monday, July 22, 2013

22/7/2013: That Growing Debt Pile...

In the week when Irish debt/GDP pushes above 125% that some of the luminary 'green jerseyists' said it will never do, let's say loudly to ourselves: "Ireland is not Greece..."


A gentle reminder to stay calm and not to worry, because, as we now know, debt does not matter at all... what matters is pants,.. bright pink pants...

Chart source: http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2013e1.pdf

Monday, July 8, 2013

8/7/2013: IMF on Euro Area: Repetition in the Endless Unlearning of Reality

IMF released its statement on 2013 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area

The Statement reads (emphasis mine):
"Policy actions over the past year have addressed important tail risks and stabilized financial markets. But growth remains weak and unemployment is at a record high."

So what needs to be done, you might ask? Oh, nothing new, really. Euro area needs:
-- To take "concerted policy actions to restore financial sector health and complete the banking union". Wait… err… this was not planned to-date? Really?
-- "continued demand support in the near term and deeper structural reforms throughout the euro area remain instrumental to raise growth and create jobs". In other words: find some dish to spend on stuff and hope this will do the trick on short-term growth. Reform thereafter.

Not exactly encouraging? How about this: "…the centrifugal forces across the euro area remain serious and are pulling down growth everywhere. Financial markets are still fragmented along national borders and the cost of borrowing for the private sector is high in the periphery, particularly for smaller enterprises. Ailing banks continue to hold back the flow of credit." So the solution is - more credit? Now, what did we call credit in old days? Right… debt, so: "In the face of high private debt and continued uncertainty, households and firms are postponing spending—previously, this was mainly a problem of the periphery but uncertainty over the adequacy and timing of the policy response is now making itself felt in falling demand in the core as well." Wait a second, now: more credit… err… debt will solve the problem, but the problem is too much debt… err… credit from the past…

Ok, from IMF own publication earlier this year, what happens when credit - debt - is let loose:

Source: http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/03/05/a-missing-piece-in-europes-growth-puzzle/


Just in case you need more of this absurdity: "…reviving growth and employment is imperative. This requires actions on multiple fronts—repairing banks’ balance sheets, making further progress on banking union, supporting demand, and advancing structural reforms. These actions would be mutually reinforcing: measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors, which in turn would help restore competitiveness and raise growth in these economies. A piecemeal approach, on the other hand, could further undermine confidence and leave the euro area vulnerable to renewed stress." Oh, well, 5 years ago we needed

  1. 'actions on repairing banks balance sheets' - five years later, we still need them;
  2. actions on 'supporting demand' - aka, no tax increases and some investment stimulus - five years on, we still need them;
  3. actions on 'advancing structural reforms' and five years on, we still need them too;
  4. "measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors" - wait a second ten years ago we had easy credit conditions in the periphery and they failed comprehensively to 'boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors', having gone instead to fuel property and public spending bubbles… five years since the start of the crisis, we now should expect a sudden change in the economies response to easier credit supply?


IMF is more sound on banks: "bank losses need to be fully recognized, frail but viable banks recapitalized, and non-viable banks closed or restructured". But, five years, bank losses needed to be fully recognised too and we are still waiting. And when it comes to closing or restructuring non-viable banks, pardon me, but where was the IMF in the case of Ireland when the country was forced by the ECB to underwrite non-viable banks with taxpayers funds?

"A credible assessment of bank balance sheets is necessary to lift confidence in the euro area financial system." Ok, we had three assessments of euro area banks - none credible and all highly questionable in outcomes. Five years in, we are still waiting for an honest, open, transparent assessment.

Cutting past the complete waffle on the banking union and ESM, "The ECB could build on existing instruments—such as a new LTRO of longer tenor coupled with a review of current collateral policies, particularly on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)—or undertake a targeted LTRO specifically linked to new SME lending." Ooops, I have been saying for years now that the ECB should create a long-term funding pool for most distressed banks, stretching 10-15 years. Five years into the crisis - still waiting.


On structural reforms, IMF is going now broader and further than before and I like their migration:

"For the euro area, …a targeted implementation of the Services Directive would remove barriers to protected professions, promote cross-border competition, and, ultimately, raise productivity and incomes. A new round of free trade agreements could provide a much-needed push to improve services productivity. In addition, further support for credit and investment could be achieved through EIB facilities. The securitization schemes proposed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank could also underpin SME lending and capital market development." Do note that the last two proposals are still about debt generation (see above).

"At the national level, labor market rigidities [same-old] should be tackled to raise participation, address duality—which disproportionally hurts younger workers—and, where necessary, promote more flexible bargaining arrangements. At the same time, lowering regulatory barriers to entry and exit of firms and tackling vested interests in the product markets throughout the euro area would support competitiveness, as it would deliver a shift of resources to export sectors [ok, awkwardly put, but pretty much on the money. Except, greatest protectionism in the EU is accorded to banks and famers, and these require first and foremost restructuring]."

In short - little new imagination, loads of old statements replays and little irony in recognising that much of this has been said before… five years before, four years before, three years before, two years before, a year before… you get my point.

Wednesday, April 10, 2013

10/4/2013: EU Commission on debt-overhang in Europe


A new paper on the effects of debt and deleveraging in Europe was published by the EU Commission. The paper can be accessed here.

Some nice charts summarising the debt overhang in the real economy (households and non-financial corporates):


Gross level relative to GDP, Irish households are 3rd most indebted in the euro area by 2011 measure. However, adjusting for GDP/GNP gap puts us at the top position, well ahead of Cyprus and even ahead of the EU27 'leader' - Denmark.


Now, much is usually being said about Irish net debts being lower due to immense wealth accumulated by the households. Table above shows that, actually, that is not true. We rank second from the top. Interest burden has declined, but it remains the third highest in the euro area.

Now to non-financial corporations:
 Irish corporates are second most indebted (after Luxembourg) in the EU and adjusting for GDP/GNP gap, the difference to the third most-indebted country is even more dramatic than the chart above indicates. Irish corporates debt rose in 2008-2011, rather dramatically - marking the highest increase in the euro area.

Detailed decomposition:
Again, adjusting for GDP/GNP gap, Irish economy is the most indebted in the euro area and the EU when measured relative to overall economy size (note: Luxembourg comparatives are wholly meaningless due to massive presence of brass-plates operations in the economy).

More fun charts:

Again, Ireland is in top first (corporates ex-Luxembourg) or second (households) positions.

Deleveraging household debt overhang will be extremely painful for Ireland:

And although asset valuations suggest the pain will be milder, in reality, one has to consider the fact that Irish household assets valuations are not exactly (a) fully reflective of real extent of price contractions in the housing sector, and (b) liquid.
 Here's EU Commission view:
"as regards households capacity to repay (figure 12), Ireland, Spain, Estonia, the Netherlands, Latvia, Denmark, the United Kingdom and, to some extent, Cyprus are amongst those that experienced a rapid increase in household indebtedness before the crisis. Despite the varying starting position in terms of household debt, the information content of the level dimension also points to the same set of countries as potentially prone to suffer from deleveraging pressures, on top of Portugal and Sweden. Ireland, Latvia and Estonia also appear as subject to high  pressures when considering actual leverage as well as its build-up (figure 13)".

And on non-financial corporates deleveraging:
"on the firms' side, there is also a clear positive relationship between the  accumulation and the level factors when considering the capacity to repay (figure 14). Countries like Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal and Bulgaria stand out as presenting vulnerabilities related to their firm's indebtedness. This snapshot is highly nuanced when looking at firm's asset side (see figure 15). Belgium and Cyprus present a healthier picture while firms in countries like Greece, Italy, Slovenia and Latvia appear as subject to higher pressures. As a robustness check, this exercise was also run with consolidated data and the results are consistent but for the case of Belgium, where the relevance of intra-company loans calls for further qualifications when assessing non-financial corporates debt sustainability"

Using more sophisticated analysis, the Commission paper concludes that:
"The following countries can be identified as more prone to face deleveraging pressures in the household and non-financial corporation sectors: Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom on the household side and Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Ireland,  Italy, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom on the corporate side."

Of all countries listed above only Ireland, Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and the UK fall into both groups, but only Ireland falls into extreme scenarios of debt sustainability in both categories:


In EU Commission calculations (see link above), Ireland has the greatest gap to sustainability (35.2%) when it comes to debt overhang in the entire euro area, and second highest in the EU.

Thursday, April 4, 2013

4/4/2013: Real Debt: European Crisis in 4 charts

Some interesting charts from Liu, Yan and Rosenberg, Christoph B., World Economic Outlook, April 2013. IMF Working Paper No. 13/44. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2229653

Chart 1 below details the extent of the debt overhang in a number of countries:


Charts 2 and 3 outline the problem relative to financial assets available to offset the debt (theoretical offset, obviously):


Non-performing loans problem...


Quite telling, with no commentary needed, imo.

Saturday, March 23, 2013

23/3/2013: And the Strong Are Yet to Become Strong: German Debt Sustainability


A very interesting paper by Burret, Heiko T, Feld, Lars P. and Koehler, Ekkehard A., titled "Sustainability of German Fiscal Policy and Public Debt: Historical and Time Series Evidence for the Period 1850-2010" (February 28, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4135. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228623

Here's from the abstract:

"In the last decades, the majority of OECD countries has experienced a continuous increase in public debt. The European debt crisis has prompted a fundamental re‐evaluation of public debt sustainability and the looming threat of sovereign debt default. Due to a multitude of large scale events in its past, Germany is far from being an exception: In fact, Germany’s peacetime debt‐to‐GDP (Gross Domestic Product) ratio has never been higher."

And a chart:
[Click on the chart to enlarge]

On methodology: "In this paper, we analyse the sustainability of Germany’s public finances against the standard theoretical back‐ground using a unique database, retrieved from multiple sources covering the period from 1850 to 2010. Multiple currency crises and external events offer anecdotal evidence, contradicting the historical perception of Germany as the poster child of European public finance. Given these corresponding breaks in time series, the empirical analysis is conducted for the sub‐periods 1872‐1913 and 1950‐2010. In addition to an anecdotal historical analysis, we conduct formal tests on fiscal sustainability, including tests on stationarity and cointegration and the estimation of Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Vector Error Correction Models (VECM)."

And the punchline: "While we cannot reject the hypothesis that fiscal policy was sustainable in the period before the First World War, the tests allow for a rejection of the hypothesis of fiscal sustainability for the period from 1950 to 2010. This evidence leads to the conclusion that Germany’s public debt is in dire need of consolidation. Albeit a much needed reform, the incompleteness of the German debt brake will have to be addressed in the coming years, in order to ensure that fiscal consolidation actually takes place"

[Skip below to see the more extensive summary of conclusions]

And the recent experience? Here are the economic fundamentals pertaining to the cost of capital and growth:





A descriptive table of stats summarising the overall performance:


And public expenditure levels (alongside revenue and balances)


So the results after skipping through loads of rigorous tests are:

"After the experience of the two World Wars, the German population is quickly alarmed when debt levels appear to be rising to unsustainable levels. This holds particularly for recent years, as Germany’s debt‐to‐GDP ratio has never been higher in peacetime than today...

In this paper, we analyse sustainability of German public finances from 1872 to 2010. Given the breaks in the data series, in particular those induced by the two World Wars, the main analysis is conducted for the sub‐periods 1872‐1913 and 1950‐2010. …While we cannot reject the hypothesis that fiscal policy was sustainable in the period before the First World War, this only holds if we do not allow for trends in the cointegration relation. The hypothesis of fiscal sustainability for the years 1950 to 2010, on the other hand, must be rejected. After the Second World War, German public finances have become unsustainable.

This evidence leads to the conclusion that public finances in Germany are in dire need of consolidation. In fact, the introduction of the debt brake in the year 2009 is a much needed reaction to this development. Although such fiscal rules always have their loopholes and are necessarily incomplete, they usually have some success in restricting public deficits and debt (Feld and Kirchgässner 2008, Feld and Baskaran 2010). The incompleteness of the German debt brake will have to be addressed in the coming years in order to ensure that fiscal consolidation actually takes place. One shortcoming of the new debt rule requires wider ranging reform, however: The Länder (including their local jurisdic‐tions) not only have huge consolidation requirements, they also do not have the tax autonomy to balance the spending demands on their budgets. The next major reform of the German fiscal constitution should thus allow for more tax autonomy at the sub‐federal level."

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

10/10/2012: Irish Real Economic Debt - Busting Records


Last night I came across the latest data from the IMF on the overall levels of indebtedness and leverage across a number of countries. Here's the original data:


Much can be taken out of the above. For the purpose of discussion below, I define real economic debt as a sum of household, non-financial corporate and government debts, excluding financial firms' debts. This real economic debt is liability of the Irish economy: households, private enterprises and public sector providers of goods and services.

First up, total debt levels:

Ireland's total real economic debt runs at a staggering 524% of our GDP and 650% of our GNP. In fact, I use 24% GDP/GNP gap as a basis for adjustment which is significantly less than the current gap, but is consistent with 2011-2012 (to-date) average. Put into perspective:

  • Our economy's overall indebtedness is 1.73 time higher than the euro area levels in GDP terms and if GNP is used as a basis it is 2.14 times higher
  • Our real economic debt is 14.4% ahead of that of Japan (second most indebted country on the list) if GDP is used and is 41.9% ahead of Japanese debt if GNP is used.

Our real economic debt can be decomposed into the following three components contributions:


In other words, the above chart clearly shows that Ireland's core debt overhang arises not from the Government finances, but from accumulation of liabilities on the side of the companies. More than that:

  • Ireland's Government debt levels are 25.5% ahead of the euro area
  • Ireland's Household debt levels are 64.8% above the euro area
  • Ireland's corporate debt levels are at 209% of the euro area levels.
Thus, with the Government policy firmly focused on taxing households to save own balancesheet, we have a perverse situation that the economy is dealing with debt overhang in Government debt that is more benign than the debt overhangs in the sectors the Government is obliterating. Households faced with increased taxation to pay for Government debts and deficits implies lower spending on goods and services and lower ability to repay household debt. Thus higher taxes on households (direct and indirect, including aggressive extraction of income via semi-states' charges) imply growing burden of the debt overhang in the private sectors (firms and households).


Adding financial debts to the overall real economic debt in the economy forces Ireland into a truly unprecedented position vis-a-vis other countries in the sample. (Note - adjustment for IFSC is mine).


Using the bounds for debt of 90% (consistent with upper range for Checchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011) and Reinhart, Reinhart & Rogoff (2012)), the levels of cumulated real economy debts that are consistent with reducing future long-term potential growth in the economy are taken to be 270% of GDP. Hence:


and


In the above, the larger the size of the bubble, the greater is the drag on future economic growth from debt. The further to the right on the chart the bubble is located, the greater is the problem associated with Government debt (as opposed to other forms of debt). What the above shows is that Ireland's debt crisis is truly unique in size, but it also shows that the most acute crisis is not in the Government debt, but in private sectors debt.

Now, at 4.5% per annum cost of funding overall debt, irish economy interest rate bill on the above levels of real economic indebtedness runs at ca 29.2% of our GNP. Do the comparative here - interest rate bill equivalent to the total annual output of the Irish Industry (that's right - all of our Industrial output in 2011 amounted to less than 29.3% of our GNP. This is deemed to be 'long-term sustainable'... right...


Note: In my presentation at a private dinner event yesterday I referenced by earlier estimate of the total economic debt in Ireland at 420% of GDP. My 2011 estimate was ca 400% GDP. These figures have been published by me in the Sunday Times and also correspond closely to the 2010 figures cited by Minister Noonan in the Dail and made public here on this blog. They also were confirmed by Peter Mathews TD. My estimates were based on publicly available data which is less complete than data available to the IMF.

Monday, July 30, 2012

30/7/2012: Grazie, Sig Draghi?

So Mr Draghi made some serious sounding pronouncements last week. The markets rallied. Over the weekend, more serious sounding soundbites came out of Mr Juncker. The markets... oh... still rallying? And thanks to both, Italy had a 'Successories'-worthy auction today am:

  • Italy 5 year CDS fell 20bps to 478 (lowest since early July) prior to the auction
  • 5 year bond sold at yild 5.29 (against 5.84 in previous) with bid/cover of 1.34 (down on 1.54 achieved in previous auction) and maximum allotment of 2.224bn out of 2.250bn aimed
  • 10 year 2022 5.5% bond sold at 5.96% yield (previous auction 6.19%) and bid/cover ratio of 1.286 (against previous 1.28) with allotment of 2.484bn out of 2.5bn planned.

Grazie Sig Draghi?

Now, wait a sec. Yes, there's an improvement. But on less than €4.7bn of issuance... and Italy needs are:

(Source: Pictet)

And hold on for a second longer:

  • Italy's net debt financing cost was at 4.721% of GDP in 2011 with debt/GDP ratio of 120.11% which implies effective financing rate of 3.931%
  • Of course, a single auction does not lift this up in a linear fashion, but... if Italy had troubles with 3.9%, should we not be concerned with 5.29%?
  • Let's put it differently: Italy's GDP grew in 2010-2011 by 1.804% and 0.431% respectively. Over the same period of time, Italy's government debt net financing costs went from 4.236% of GDP to 4.721% of GDP. This year they are set to rise to over 5.36% of GDP as economy is likely to contract ca 1.9-2.0%.
So maybe (I know, cheeky) cheering the current yields is a bit premature? Eh?