Showing posts with label Debt crisis in Ireland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Debt crisis in Ireland. Show all posts

Thursday, August 1, 2013

1/8/2013: Anatomy of the Personal Crises: QNHS Q3 2012

CSO has published Q3 2012 survey concerning the Effect on Households of the Economic Downturn: here.

Some core findings:

  • 82% of households cut spending on at least one of the main categories of expenditure as a result of the economic downturn in the 12 months before July-September 2012. 
  • Nearly a quarter of all households indicated that they had cut back on five or more categories of spending out of 9 categories listed.
  • Over 1/3 of households who used a car had cut back on their expenditure on this means of transport.
  • "Some 14% of owner occupied households with a mortgage were unable to make mortgage repayments on time at least once in the previous twelve months due to financial difficulties." This number is strangely well below the current rate of mortgages arrears by accounts. Does this suggest that households tend to overstate their financial health?
  • "On the rental side 19% of all renting households failed to pay rent on time at least once."
  • 43% of households "indicated that they had experienced difficulties in keeping up with their bills and debts."
  • "Two fifths of individuals were concerned about their level of personal debt. Over half of these said that they were currently more concerned than they had been twelve months previously. Only 5% indicated that their level of concern had decreased."
  • "households consisting of one adult aged 65 or over said they had the least difficulty" paying bills and funding debt (27%).
  • "Of households where the reference person was at work 41% experienced difficulty [paying bills and funding debt] compared with 73% where the reference person was unemployed." Note that 41% is a frightening number, still.
  • "Looking specifically at those households which had experienced difficulty in managing bills and debts, 47% of them said that it was due to loss of income, 73% said it was due to higher than expected or additional costs and 5% said the difficulty was due to other reasons."
  • "Looking more deeply into the type of higher or additional costs mentioned by those households for whom it caused difficulty, 90% of those households mentioned higher or additional utility bills , 32% mentioned higher or additional school, college or university costs, 17% mentioned higher or additional medical or dental costs and 15% mentioned higher or additional loan or mortgage repayments" Now, run through these again. All of them are state-controlled and state-regulated services, ex mortgages and loans. That's the cost of Irish State policy of extracting rents out of already stretched households.


And a handy chart summarising demographics of debt crisis:
That's right: core crisis impact on debt side - 25-54 year olds, majority with kids and homes, just the crowd that the Government is targeting for cash extraction via higher prices and charges for services like health, health insurance, transport, energy, utilities, education... you name it.

And as you read data in Table 1.1.1. showing details of the households experiencing financial difficulty due to loss of income, classified by main reasons over 12 months prior to July-September 2012, keep in mind - almost all 'employment creation' in the labour market that the Government and 'green jerseys' keep talking about is taking place in the part-time jobs, which cannot cover the true cost of living in this country.

Finally, take a look at Table 1.2. This shows the extent of debt restructuring delivered by the 'reformed' banks. At 7% total - it is laughably low.

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

10/10/2012: Irish Real Economic Debt - Busting Records


Last night I came across the latest data from the IMF on the overall levels of indebtedness and leverage across a number of countries. Here's the original data:


Much can be taken out of the above. For the purpose of discussion below, I define real economic debt as a sum of household, non-financial corporate and government debts, excluding financial firms' debts. This real economic debt is liability of the Irish economy: households, private enterprises and public sector providers of goods and services.

First up, total debt levels:

Ireland's total real economic debt runs at a staggering 524% of our GDP and 650% of our GNP. In fact, I use 24% GDP/GNP gap as a basis for adjustment which is significantly less than the current gap, but is consistent with 2011-2012 (to-date) average. Put into perspective:

  • Our economy's overall indebtedness is 1.73 time higher than the euro area levels in GDP terms and if GNP is used as a basis it is 2.14 times higher
  • Our real economic debt is 14.4% ahead of that of Japan (second most indebted country on the list) if GDP is used and is 41.9% ahead of Japanese debt if GNP is used.

Our real economic debt can be decomposed into the following three components contributions:


In other words, the above chart clearly shows that Ireland's core debt overhang arises not from the Government finances, but from accumulation of liabilities on the side of the companies. More than that:

  • Ireland's Government debt levels are 25.5% ahead of the euro area
  • Ireland's Household debt levels are 64.8% above the euro area
  • Ireland's corporate debt levels are at 209% of the euro area levels.
Thus, with the Government policy firmly focused on taxing households to save own balancesheet, we have a perverse situation that the economy is dealing with debt overhang in Government debt that is more benign than the debt overhangs in the sectors the Government is obliterating. Households faced with increased taxation to pay for Government debts and deficits implies lower spending on goods and services and lower ability to repay household debt. Thus higher taxes on households (direct and indirect, including aggressive extraction of income via semi-states' charges) imply growing burden of the debt overhang in the private sectors (firms and households).


Adding financial debts to the overall real economic debt in the economy forces Ireland into a truly unprecedented position vis-a-vis other countries in the sample. (Note - adjustment for IFSC is mine).


Using the bounds for debt of 90% (consistent with upper range for Checchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011) and Reinhart, Reinhart & Rogoff (2012)), the levels of cumulated real economy debts that are consistent with reducing future long-term potential growth in the economy are taken to be 270% of GDP. Hence:


and


In the above, the larger the size of the bubble, the greater is the drag on future economic growth from debt. The further to the right on the chart the bubble is located, the greater is the problem associated with Government debt (as opposed to other forms of debt). What the above shows is that Ireland's debt crisis is truly unique in size, but it also shows that the most acute crisis is not in the Government debt, but in private sectors debt.

Now, at 4.5% per annum cost of funding overall debt, irish economy interest rate bill on the above levels of real economic indebtedness runs at ca 29.2% of our GNP. Do the comparative here - interest rate bill equivalent to the total annual output of the Irish Industry (that's right - all of our Industrial output in 2011 amounted to less than 29.3% of our GNP. This is deemed to be 'long-term sustainable'... right...


Note: In my presentation at a private dinner event yesterday I referenced by earlier estimate of the total economic debt in Ireland at 420% of GDP. My 2011 estimate was ca 400% GDP. These figures have been published by me in the Sunday Times and also correspond closely to the 2010 figures cited by Minister Noonan in the Dail and made public here on this blog. They also were confirmed by Peter Mathews TD. My estimates were based on publicly available data which is less complete than data available to the IMF.

Monday, September 10, 2012

10/9/2012: Corporate debt iceberg


Another topic, much ignored by the Irish media and the Government and covered by the IMF in today's releases is the corporate debt.

The chart below shows the extent of debt overhang in Ireland:

Here's what IMF has to say on that (emphasis mine):
"Despite an overall decline in corporate debt, an increasing number of firms are facing difficulties covering interest payments on debt. Interest coverage ratios [ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to interest expenses] have declined, with the interest coverage for the median firm having decreased from 6.9 in 2002 to 0.8 in 2009, and with an increasing number of firms not generating sufficient income to cover interest payments on outstanding debt. ... Moreover, the interest coverage is markedly lower for SMEs, with a median of 0.8 compared to 1.9 for large firms. The decline in firm profitability associated with depressed demand is playing an important role in the reduction in interest coverage ratio. This suggests that financing constraints are particularly important among SMEs and in property-related sectors."

In other words, whatever supply of credit is doing, demand for credit is severely constrained by deterioration in firms' financial sustainability.

Although "Leverage for the median firm (which is a small firm) has fallen to 46 percent of equity, with the usage of bank debt showing a similar decline. The data also indicate that trade credit and other non-debt liabilities play an important role in the financing of SMEs, together with internal financing from retained earnings." Although leverage overall has dropped, debt affordability has fallen off the cliff:

Why? "The decline in firm profitability associated with depressed demand is playing an important role in the reduction in interest coverage ratio. This suggests that financing constraints are particularly important among SMEs and in property-related sectors."


So what can be done? Here's the list of IMF outlined options:


"Credit guarantees or subsidies on SME loans can in principle stimulate SME financing. ... Until recently, Ireland was one of the few OECD countries without some form of loan guarantee scheme. ...However, the international experience with SME lending schemes is mixed. ...Moreover, the historical experience shows that credit guarantee schemes can only be effective when there are competent, financially sound banks, with adequate staff to effectively screen and monitor SME loans. ...

Government support for SMEs will need to be complemented with progress in improving the operational capacity of banks to work out loans. The restructuring of SMEs on a case-by-case basis is resource intensive yet important to ensure that where a viable core business exists, that it has the possibility to invest and grow, and contribute to broader economic recovery.

Considering the number of SMEs, it would not be appropriate to rely principally on court-based bankruptcy procedures. Rather, banks will need to build their capacity to design and implement work outs though out-of-court workout processes. Drawing on international expertise may well be needed to help major banks build capacity in this area.

The government could also explore ways to facilitate the securitization of SME loans. However, liquidity premia currently demanded by market participants even on senior
tranches, plus the inability of the Irish government to offer substantial credit enhancements
on such securitizations given the low sovereign credit rating, imply that, at least for the
moment, the market for securitization of SME loans is limited."

So, in other words: NOTHING can be done on the scale required. We are boxed into the corner with SMEs debt overhang too. All state resources and economy's resources wasted on rescuing the banks bondholdres, folks. No powder left for the rest of the economy. Sit tight and pray for a miracle.



Aside: An interesting observation via the IMF concerning the links between the negative equity and property values and firms formation: "With depressed home prices it has become more difficult to finance a new firm using home equity, which has hampered job creation."


10/9/2012: Insane path of Irish 'wealth'


Another interesting chart from the IMF reports today:
Now, look at the red line - Net Wealth in Ireland, which has dropped to levels below those in Q1 2002, while housheolds' total taxes (VAT and Income taxes combined, excluding other) has ballooned from €17.96bn in 2002 to €23.54bn in 2011. So let's do a simple mental exercise: net wealth is down ca 30%, household taxes are up ca 31%... and we are supposed to:

  • Deleverage our own debt
  • Deleverage the banks-related debts of the Exchequer
What a better illustration of madness can one find? Oh, wait, I know - the Armchair Socialists' one: "Ireland is a very wealthy country and we must tax wealth to extract funds for the Government". Alas, we are rich... rich as we were more than 10 years ago. Since 2002, folks, it's not the wealth of ours that grew, but the appetite of the State for our wealth.