Showing posts with label Debt Irish banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Debt Irish banks. Show all posts

Monday, October 31, 2011

31/10/2011: IRL5 banks - no signs of real improvements in September

Few posts back I looked at the latest data for Irish banking system stability from the CBofI. Here, I complete my analysis by focusing on 5 covered institutions or IRL 5 (previously known as IRL 6 before the merger of Anglo & INBS into IBRC).

Here's the data:

  • Borrowing from the euro system by IRL5 has risen from €68,430mln in August to €70,340mln in September. Year on year, this is still down 4.73% or €3,489mln, but at that rate of unwinding IRL6 liabilities to euro system will take, oh, some 20 years (!)... Mom, the increase in borrowing from the euro system was €1,910mln or more than 50% of the reductions achieved yoy.
  • Deposits from Irish residents in IRL6 were up from €192,431mln in August to €193,929mln in September, prompting cheers from the Irish Times and Department of Finance, among others. Mom rise of 0.78% or €1,498mln contrasts a 22.22% decline yoy in very same deposits or €55,393mln loss. In other words, to get us back to September 2010 levels (not exactly healthy ones) at current rate of mom increase would take 37 months. In the last three months, on average, deposits were down €26,337mln compared to 3 months through June 2011 (-12.05%).
  • The mystery of rising deposits is explained easily by looking at their composition: Monetary and financial institutions (aka other banks) have seen their deposits in IRL5 rising €1,298mln in September (+1.47%) mom, although these deposits are down €32,308mln or -26.53% yoy. This explains 87% of the entire increase in the overall deposits.
  • In addition, General government deposits also rose €333mln in September (+16.28%) mom, explaining the remainder of the rise in overall deposits, heralded by our Green Jerseys as 'signs of improvement/stabilization' in Irish banks.
  • In contrast to the above two sub-categories, private sector deposits in Irish banks (IRL 5) have shrunk in September by €133mln (-0.13%) mom and are down 18.12% (-€22,589mln) yoy. September marked 5th consecutive month of declines in private sector deposits, which have shrunk by €6,135mln since April 2011.


As mentioned above, borrowings from the euro system have gone up in September. In contrast, as shown in the chart below, total borrowing from the ECB & CBofI have declined slightly in September to €123,596mln from €124,379mln in August (a mom drop of 0.63%). Year on year, the borrowings are still up massive €28,572mln or 30.7%. Over the last 3 months (July-September), average borrowings from the euro system and CBofI declined 1.39% or €1,748mln compared to 3 months from April through June.


Loans to irish residents have contracted once again in September, reaching €294,224mln against August levels of €294,503. The declines were accounted by drops in loans to MFIs and increases in loans to the General Government (+€58mln) and Private Sector (+€95mln). hardly anything spectacular.


Now to the last bit - recall that the comprehensive reforms of the Irish banking sector envision deleveraging Irish banks to loans-deposits ratio of 125.5%. These targets were set in PCARs at the end of March 2011. back in march 2011, LTD ratios stood at 143.25% for all of the IRL6/IRL5 and 173.71% for private sector LTD ratio only. Since then, if anything was going up to the CBofI / Government plans, we should have seen at least some reductions in LTDs.


As chart above illustrates:

  • Overall LTD ratio for IRL5 at the end of September 2011 stood at 151.72% - below August reading of 153.04%, but well ahead of March 2011 reading of 143.25% and certainly much ahead of the target of 125.5%.
  • For private sector loans and deposits, LTD ratio was 174.61% in September - ahead of 174.29% in August and still above 173.71% back in March.

And the summary is: there's no real stabilization or improvement I can spot in the above for IRL5.



Saturday, July 2, 2011

02/07/2011: Was banks Guarantee 2008 a subsidy to foreign lenders?

Please note: the figures below are estimates, based on Table A.4.2 data from the Central Bank of Ireland for 6 covered banking institutions liabilities as of September 2008. These charts illustrate the comment I provided to the Quarterly Journal of Central Banking - forthcoming issue for Q3 2011.
First, straight forward composition of liabilities as shown in the chart above.

Next, the same expressed as percentages of total liabilities:
Finally, assumptions and calculations of total implicit subsidy from the Irish taxpayers/Exchequer to foreign liabilities holders:
Click on the chart to enlarge and see assumptions and calculations. Euro area residents accounted for €39.572 billion of our banks' liabilities or 6.42%, while non-Euro area residents accounted for €218.836 billion or 35.5% of total Ireland-6 liabilities at the time the Guarantee was issued. Thus, Euro area residents received an implicit subsidy from the Irish taxpayers to the tune of €5.5-6.7 billion over the time of the Guarantee - well in excess of the life-time cost of 1% reduction in the interest rate on our EU loans.

Of course, this is a crude estimate based on official provided and expected default rates on assets held by the Irish banks - excluding Anglo and INBS. Which means it is likely to be an under-estimate. Expected losses at INBS and Anglo are multiples of those assumed for the Ireland-4 covered in the main PCARs. With Anglo & INBS thrown into the mix, subsidy to Euro area residents rises to ca €8 billion.

Another issue here is that I am using estimates through 2013 only. This means that, like the CBofI I am assuming (ad hoc) that post-2013 IRL-6 will be able to cover their own losses without resorting to taxpayers capital injections. This assumption, in my view, is absolutely unrealistic.

Finally, no allowance is made here for the Irish Government underwriting of the funding debts incurred by the banks vis-a-vis ECB and CBofI - the debts which, at least in the case of Anglo & INBS, should be treated as largely reckless lending to insolvent institutions and which should not be a liability of the taxpayers.

In the end, in my opinion, Irish Government had no business underwriting a Guarantee for any of the liabilities in excess of €130.2 billion of domestic deposits and €2.813 billion of its own deposits with the IRL-6.

Note - another issue not addressed in these estimates, but also likely to increase the implicit subsidy extended to Euro area residents is that Monetary & Financial Institutions deposits figures cover IRL-20 banks regulated here, which include a large number of deposits from Euro area banks that are within IRL-20.

Sunday, May 29, 2011

29/05/11: Who's to be blamed?

Here's an interesting chart based on ECB data for lending rates charged on various types of loans:
What does this hart tell us? Several interesting things:
  1. In so far as the euro area retail rates are linked to the ECB rates, it appears that the lenders were factoring in a positive risk premium on Irish companies for large loans and small loans alike 9as reflected by the positive premia on corporate lending of both types). throughout the 2003-2010 period, Irish companies borrowings were priced at a risk premium relative to the Euro area average.
  2. This premium has declined (bizarrely) for larger loans (as the risk of borrowers rose during the crisis, the premium fell) and it rose for smaller loans (presumably the SME effect - with SMEs being more risky as borrowers in the crisis).
  3. On the net, it is hard to make an iron-clad case that ECB was driving over-lending to Irish corporates, as these corporates did face a risk premium on their borrowings.
  4. Where things really break down is in the housing mortgages lending. Here, there was and remains a deep discount on Euro area average when it comes to Irish lenders rates. Only during 2010 did this discount briefly turned to a premium. The trend is still on an increasing discount, which would be consistent with a lenders' perception that Irish house purchasers are lower risk than Euro area average. Which, of course , is a farce.
  5. So the net result is that it is hard to make a real direct case that the ECB reckless interest rates policy was the sole or the main driver of Irish over-lending. Instead, the evidence suggests that it was our own lenders' (banks) enthusiasm for underpricing risk in housing finance that was at pay consistently before the crisis onset and since then.

Saturday, February 12, 2011

12/02/2011: Just how much are the bondholders in Irish banks worth to the taxpayer?

In recent weeks the question of bondholders and the extent of our banks exposure to the bonds-linked debts has been hotly debated in the media and by the political parties.

Many supporters of the Government position have repeated, in their defence, the claim that at this moment in time there are virtually no unpaid bond holders left, so applying ‘burden-sharing’ haircuts to their bond holdings will produce little gain, while causing much of pain to Ireland’s ‘reputation’.

So the question is – just how much of bonds is left for a potential haircut and what such a haircut might save for the country.

There is a lot of confusion in this area, some caused by the fact that the Central Bank does not readily publish any real information about the six banking institutions covered by the extended guarantee. I personally heard a number of times the following two figures used as an estimate of the total bonds-backed debt still outstanding: €15bn senior bonds and €6bn subordinated bonds.

This implies that total bonds outstanding amount to €21bn and any savings that can be had from these would be on average around: 40% senior debt haircut + 70% subordinated debt haircut, to the total amount of €10.2bn maximum.

However, the figure of €21bn is simply not a true or correct estimate of the total bonds still remaining outstanding.

The table below provides what we know officially (note: the last column refers to the unpublished document that was Minister Lenihan’s clarification of his own statement on record to the Dail, not published previously).

So per table above, the total amount of bonds outstanding for the six guaranteed credit institutions is €50bn. Of this
  • ca €28.1bn is guaranteed senior bond debt - standard haircut assumption for CDS pricing – 40% or €11.24bn;
  • un-guaranteed senior debt roughly of €11.7bn (we can assume a haircut of 50%, which is smaller than the simple average of the senior guaranteed and subordinated un-guaranteed debt), to the potential savings of €5.85bn;
  • subordinated debt (all un-guaranteed) of €10.2bn (which can be subject to a 100% write-off, but let’s assume it is haircut at 70%) generating potential for savings of €8.4bn.

So total scope for savings under relatively normal (by market pricing) haircuts is a cool €25.49bn (with a full hit on un-guaranteed debt we can save €33.14bn) – more than the cost of rescuing Anglo to-date (€23.9bn).

Note: hat tip to P.D. for providing the two documents referenced in the table above.

Update: related story today here clearly shows that the markets now expect significant haircuts and that any resistance by the ECB to such haircuts is, at this stage, irrelevant from the markets/investors perspective.

Friday, February 4, 2011

4/02/2011: Can economy function with shut banks?

Last night on Vincent Browne's programme, Prof. Antoin Murphy (TCD) - an excellent scholar of economic history - stated that absent the Government Guarantee of 2008 and/or in the case of a 'default' by Ireland on its debts, the banking system will collapse precipitating the 'ATMs with no cash' crisis.

According to Prof. Murphy - such an outcome would be more disastrous than loading up some €185bn worth of banks debts onto ECB and our own CBofI and pushing Irish taxpayers into even more debt to the tune of ca €100bn.

I do not wish to engage (for the lack of time and space now) in the arguments as to which outcome (debt death spiral or cashless ATMs) is the worse one. Nor do I wish to argue here (for the very same reasons) as to whether a 'default' (I prefer - restructuring) of our banks debts will trigger a crisis leading to the total shut down of the banking system in the country.

But let me provide you with the following summary of the economist's opinion on the matter of an economy's viability in the case of a systemic banking crisis with no cash circulating via the banking system (a hat tip to B. Lucey):

Quote (original source here):

"Since banks create money under fractional-reserve banking, we would expect the closure of banks severely to disrupt the functioning of an economy. The Irish experience in 1970 an interesting counterexample. In that year, a major strike closed all Irish banks for a period of six and a half months. All the indications from the start, moreover, were that this would be a long closure. As a consequence of the strike, the public lost direct access to about 85 percent of the money supply (M2). Irish currency still circulated, of course, British currency was also freely accepted in Ireland, and some North American and merchant (commercial) banks provided banking facilities. Increases in Irish and British currency and in deposits in these banks, however, accounted for less than 10 percent of M2.

Somewhat remarkably, checks on the closed banks continued to be the main medium of exchange during the dispute. Despite the increased risk of default, individuals continued to be willing to accept personal and other checks. [The author] summarizes the situation as follows: “a highly personalized credit system without any definite time horizon for the eventual clearance of debits and credits substituted for the existing institutionalized banking system.”

According to [the author], it was the small size of the Irish economy (the population of Ireland was about 3 million at that time) and the high degree of personal contact that allowed the system to function. Stores and pubs took over some of the functions of the banking system. “It appears that the managers of these retail outlets and public houses had a high degree of information about their customers—one does not after all serve drink to someone for years without discovering something of his liquid resources. This information enabled them to provide commodities and currency for their customers against undated trade credit. Public houses and shops emerged as a substitute banking system.”

Presumably as a result of this spontaneous alternative banking system, economic activity in Ireland was not substantially affected by the banking strike. Detrended retail sales did not differ much on a month-by-month basis from average levels in the absence of banking disputes, and a central bank survey concluded that the Irish economy continued to grow over the period (although the growth rate fell)."

The paper referred to in the above citation is: A. Murphy, “Money in an Economy without Banks: The Case of Ireland,” The Manchester School (March 1978): 41–50.

Once again, let me repeat, I do not believe that such a cashless economy is a good idea, nor do I believe that the banks debt restructuring will lead to a significant disruption in supply of cash or access to deposits, especially if such restructuring is pre-planned, with liquidity buffers set in place by the CBofI. But I find it interesting that a superb economic history researcher - Prof Murphy - would argue the inevitability of something happening today which did not happen in the less financially and economically advanced 1970.

Yes, the conditions have changed - we are less personal of a society today than back in the 1970s. But we also have much stronger presence in the country of other banks and we have access to the global markets (currently shut by the insolvent banking system). We also have, presumably, our European partners, who can help, and most importantly - for now - significant funding buffer in the form of NPRF. The CBofI has printed enough cash already to cover a large share of our deposits (except it chose to dump this cash into the banks balance sheets instead). In fact, between CBofI cash printing for the banks and NPRF and pre-borrowed money, Irish state has potential access to more cash than the 80% deposits base for deposits at a risk of flight (those with demand withdrawal terms of <3mo and overnight).

Virtually none of these were there in 1970... and still, the economy did not collapse after losing some 85% of cash from circulation!

Saturday, October 2, 2010

Economics 2/10/10: EU Commission official view of Minister Lenihan's plans

Much debate has been thrown around about the EU Commission position on the latest Government announcements concerning banks recapitalizations. Here is the fact (linked here) - note comments and emphasis are mine:

Full quote: MEMO/10/465, Brussels, 30 September 2010 "Statement by Competition Commissioner Almunia on Irish banks"

"European Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia welcomes the comprehensive statement issued by the Irish Finance Minister on banking. Commissioner Almunia said:

"I welcome the statement on banking which brings clarity with regard to the remaining transfer of assets to NAMA and the capital needs of some banks and building societies. [Note there is no finality assertion here on the estimates]. Regarding NAMA, the announced changes to the way it manages loans are in line with the Commission's approval of the NAMA scheme.

"Concerning Anglo-Irish Bank, from a competition point of view, it is clear that the foreseen restructuring and resolution of the bank addresses competition distortions created by the large amounts of aid at stake. Once the Commission receives the details of the plan, it will proceed rapidly towards taking a final decision. [The gombeens haven't yet supplied the Anglo Plan to the Commission, despite the claims made today on RTE Radio by Minister Hanafin to the contrary]

"I also welcome the announcement that subordinated debt holders will make a significant contribution towards meeting the costs of Anglo. This is in line with the Commission's principles on burden sharing since it both addresses moral hazard and limits the amount of aid, with benefits to the taxpayers. [So Commission operates under the direct assumption that subbies will be soaked. And that this will correspond to the spirit of the European common markets.]

"I note that Allied Irish Bank will need to receive further capital in the form of State aid, which will have to be notified to the Commission for approval. I will of course follow this process very closely. I have no doubt that, as in all previous cases, the collaboration between the Irish authorities and the European Commission will be satisfactory. [No blanket endorsement of new AIB capital injections]

"I note positively that Bank of Ireland will be able to continue the restructuring process without further recourse to State resources. The Commission in July 2010 approved the aid and the restructuring plan of Bank of Ireland, and is monitoring its implementation."

"With regard to building societies INBS and EBS, the Commission remains in close contact with the Irish authorities. For INBS, the Commission will await the notification of the additional capital as well as the details on the institution's future, and will assess them thoroughly and swiftly. For EBS, the Commission is in the process of finalising its initial assessment of the restructuring plan submitted end May 2010. "

So let's recap Commission's official opinion:
  • Anglo subs must be haircut;
  • No Anglo plan delivered to the Commission;
  • No Anglo recapitalization additions endorsed;
  • No AIB recapitalizations (announced by Minister Lenihan) are endorsed
  • No INBS and EBS measures endorsed

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Economics 02/06/2010: Central bank data analysis

Latest monthly data from the CB is out and here are a couple of updates on series I've been covering before.

First harmonized competitiveness indicators (EU-wide data update coming soon):
Notice some serious progression on competitiveness front is finally starting to take place. This is good. The trend is also good - strong downward trajectory in the series since November 2009. Accelerating again since March. Data lags should not be this significant, so I will be keeping a watch on earnings data from the CSO.

For all the good news, so far we are still in the zone of low competitiveness, down to March 2006 level and well above the period when Ireland Inc was performing at much stronger rates in the 1990s. Remember, these are real indicators, so price levels changes since the 1990s are factored in already.

Private sector credit. First the totals:
We are back to August 2007 levels and the fall rate is slowing down. Year on year change, subsequently, is flat at -9.3% same as in March. Too early to call it a recovery or even a full stabilization, as seasonality suggests that we might see some trend reversal in the short run. Remember, these are declines on already bottom-hitting 2009!

Next: mortgages.
Levels are down to July 2008 and the rate of decline is -1.6% yoy, compared to -1.4% in March. This, however, can be due to a significant declines in mortgages due to write-offs of defaulting loans. In addition, this deterioration rate might be also masking the fact that pretty much anyone in distress who could have done so has already re-negotiated their mortgages in 2009. Thus, only the really tough cases are still sitting out there.

The data on actual new borrowing is below. At the aggregate levels, there is no turn around in household investment, which, of course, is the main leading indicator of recoveries. Also worrisome is the fact that there is no deleveraging of mortgages debt.

Private sector credit outside mortgages is dynamically virtually identical to the total private sector credit figure reported above. Year-on-year changes seem to be reflective of some seasonal effects, with improved rate of contraction in April. General trend is for flatter rates of decline overall since about January. This means little, however, as we need a term structure decomposition of credit in order to tell if this is really a flattening of the downward trajectory or simply restructuring of non-performing lines of credit.

Now, let's take a look at actual changes in rates and volumes in PS credit. First, new loans:
Notice that both for corporates and households, longer term rates are moving up, while shorter term rates are moving down. This likely reflects banks' and interbank credit markets' expectation for a steepening in the interest rate curve, plus some easing in wholesale cost of credit in March. Also note that mortgage rates for new, and especially for fixed rates, mortgages are rising. Hardly a robust support for the housing market.

On corporate investment side, sizable declines for short term maturity loans - operating capital, and reasonably improving environment for larger investment-suitable loans with longer term fixes.

On volumes side, there is a worrisome increase in all shorter term loans - a sign that both companies and households are reliant increasingly on short bank finance for operational and short-term credit. This might mean two things:
  1. These increases might reflect increase in supply against a pinned up demand; or
  2. These increases might be consistent with increased cash flow pressure on companies (if non-payment and defaults by clients is rising) and households (if arrears are building up on the side of unemployed and underemployed after the households have gone through their savings and redundancies).
We can't tell which one of these forces is operative here. But it does not look to me like operational demand is rising naturally. Remember, so far we only have strong exports performance across the economy. This means you would expect an increase in trade credits (short-term). Most of trade finance in Ireland is actually not done via Irish banks, but through MNCs-own global arrangements. Apart from exports, it is hard to see where organic demand for short term loans would come from.

An even more interesting picture is emerging when we look at existing clients:
Notice how all of the rates changes (except for 5 year plus maturity corporate loans) are trending up? Are the banks ripping off their existent client base to beef up their margins? Well, lets put these changes side by side:
Notice that the above table comparisons are really only loose approximations. But there is a remarkable regularity with which existent loans holders are being loaded with the almost opposite type of changes in rates charged as compared with new clients.

Monday, May 3, 2010

Economics 03/05/2010: World Debt Wish 6

Final part of the series presents two tables, which are largely self-explanatory.

The first table compares Irish Gross External Debt Liabilities to those of other 36 Most Indebted Countries, reporting these countries' GED as % of Irish GED. No adjustments for GDP etc are taken:
You can judge by yourself if Ireland is really economically mightier than Australia, or Argentina, or Brazil and so on...

The second table does two things:
First I reproduce the raw numbers for Ireland and for the group of 36 Most Indebted Countries across three categories of debt, total debt and GDP/GNP. I then compute the relative weight of Ireland in every one of these categories. Column 4 in the top part of the table shows the results as percentages. Thus, Ireland's General Government Debt accounts for 0.96% of the total General Gov Debt incurred by all 36 countries. Ireland's banks' debt accounts for almost 4% of the total banking sector debt for all 36 countries - a hefty weight for the country that has GDP share of the Group of 36 that is only 0.37% or GNP share that is just 0.30%. You can judge for yourselves if the private sector (other than banks) in Ireland is really that healthy to carry us out of the recession, but the figure of 5.88% representing the share of Irish real economy debt as a percentage of the real economy debt for all 36 countries is scary! Especially realizing that this makes our economy leveraged to the tune of 1960% compared to the rest of the world. Imagine having that level of LTV on your house?!

The second part of the table above shows Irish debt levels as percentage of Irish GDP and GNP. Our headline figure here is the level of absolute (not relative to other nations) level of leverage - that of 1,326% or x13.26 times if we are to continue imagining that MNCs-dominated sectors really do carry all activities billed through Ireland here in Ireland (in other words, if we are to use our GDP as income measure). Alas, were we to step down to earth and use our GNP as a metric for income, our level of leverage is reaching a frightening 1,617% or x16.17 times annual income. Compared to that, world's most indebted 36 nations have leverage of just 119%!

Still feel like sending some foreign aid to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs)? Or, for that matter, to Greece?

Economics 03/05/2010: World Debt Wish 5

This is the fifth post in the series covering world debt issues. In the previous posts I provided analysis of the aggregate debt levels for 36 largest debtor nations (here) and for the Government debt (here), the banks debt (here) and the country level data (here). This post puts things into comparative perspective.

Before we begin, however, let me quote from today's Financial Times: "On my estimate, the total size of a liquidity backstop for Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and possibly Italy could add up to somewhere between €500bn ($665bn, £435bn) and €1,000bn. All those countries are facing increases in interest rates at a time when they are either in recession or just limping out of one. The private sector in some of those countries is simply not viable at those higher rates."

Notice the numbers Wolfgang Munchau quotes above, and the countries he includes in the end-game rescue package. Ireland, figures in marginally - the last in line. Yet, what you are about to witness puts a different order on the potential default scenario within the PIIGS.

First the so-called 'good news' - per our Government's repeated boasting, Ireland is a country with sound public sector debt levels. Oh, really?
Chart above shows General Government Debt as percentage of GDP. Note, I decided to play 'fair' with Brian Lenihan here - he seemingly cannot understand the GDP/GNP gap, so let us not challenge him too much in his job and use GDP as a benchmark. Per chart above, as of Q4 2009 we had a 62% ratio of GGD to GDP. This puts us into a 'sound' fifth position in the group of world's most indebted 36 nations, behind such 'sound' public finance countries as
  • Greece (93%)
  • Belgium (74%)
  • Italy (65% - getting dangerously close to Ireland)
  • France (63% - virtually indistinguishable to Ireland)
Note, this is GGD nomenclature of the IMF/BIS/World Bank framework, which is slightly different from the Stability & Growth Pact methodology deployed by the EU, but unlike the EU's methodology, this one is comparative across the world.

Nothing to brag about here, folks. Fifth. And rising faster than France's or Italy's or Belgium's...
Chart above puts us into comparison in terms of banks' debt - need any explanation here? Oh, yes, we are the most indebted nation in the world by that metric. Worse than this. Suppose we chop off the IFSC (roughly 60% of the banks & 'other' credit institutions' debt). We end up being - the 3rd most indebted banking system in the world.

Of course, in the end it will be the real economy of Ireland - including our corporates and households - who will be paying for Brian Cowen's policies (GGD) and for the banks (Gross Banks Debt), so perhaps here Ireland is doing well? There has to be hope somewhere?
Oops, not really. In terms of private (non-banks and non-Exchequer) sectors debt Ireland Inc is actually in worse shape than it is in terms of banks and the Exchequer (which of course begs a questions - what are we doing rescuing banks while the real economy sinks?). Notice that we occupied this dubious first place in the world back in the days of 2003 as well, and part of this is IFSC as well - pension funds and investment funds. But the amount of debt we piled on since then is purely spectacular.

And so now, down to the main figure - the combined external debt liability of Ireland relative to other most indebted nations:
I bet the unions who are calling for more borrowing to finance more growth (the irony of ironies is, of course, that they were so loudly opposing 'growth for growth sake' during the Tiger years) want Mister Lenihan to pull out the state cheque book...

Now let me slightly digress from Ireland and focus on the US. Per above data:
  • US public sector debt is only a notch above the 36 countries average;
  • US Gross bank's debt is by leagues and bound lower than the 36 countries average;
  • US private sector debt is just above the average for the 36 most indebted countries, which implies that
  • US total economy debt is below the average for the 36 countries.
Now, for all Messrs Lenihan and Cowen talk about how the US caused Irish crisis, somehow the real data shows nothing of the sorts... Instead - the real data paints a picture of Ireland deeply sick by all fiscal and financial standards back in Q4 2003. If you go back to those days, really, there were only few economists who warned about some aspects of this problem - myself, Morgan Kelly inclusive. But there was only one economist who consistently argued back then that the entire picture of the Irish economy was wrong. It was David McWilliams. It turns out - he was right!

Economics 03/05/2010: World Debt Wish 4

This is the fourth post in the series covering world debt issues. In the previous post I provided analysis of the aggregate debt levels for 36 largest debtor nations (here) and for the Government debt (here) and the banks debt (here). The current post looks at the country-level data.
Chart above plots the evolution of the Gross External Debt for top 10 debtor nations. The US, predictably leads the way. Remember - these are absolute debt volumes, not relative to GDP. UK comes in second. While the UK Gross External Debt has actually declined in the duration of the crisis, that of the US remained on the rising path, with current GED levels in the US above the 2007 bubble peak. The same is true of the third (France) and fourth (Germany) countries.

Ireland is a remarkable member of this list, coming in ranked 8th largest debtor nation overall in the world in Q4 2009 - up from the 10th in Q4 2003. This clearly shows that in the Irish case, the debt bubble has been forming in the economy well before 2003. My previous research suggests that Irish debt bubble has started forming back in 1998-1999, the last year when our current account registered positive balance, as chart below illustrates:
What's even more interesting is that in 2009 Ireland held 4.1% of the total debt of the 36 most indebted countries, while producing less that 0.37% of the same group of countries' combined GDP. This implies that our economy's dependence on debt is 11 times greater than that of the group of 36 most indebted nations. Put into household finances perspective, we have managed to borrow ourselves into a complete corner, whereby our indebtedness is systemically important to the world, while our economic existence is not. If not for the euro, folks, we would have bailiffs from the IMF calling in.

Having borrowed more than Japan and Belgium, we are also leagues ahead of other, much larger economies in terms of GED:
Think of it: Irish debt is
  • x2 times greater than Australia,
  • x2.5 than Canada,
  • x3 Hong Kong & Denmark,
  • x5 Greece
  • x2 the combined debt of Brazil, India & Russia which have combined 2009 GDP more than x44 times that of Ireland!
And we are the 'rich country' that is contributing to international aid and relief for the HIPCs (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) and whose Presidents (current and former) are jet-setting around the world dispersing piles of taxpayers' cash in aid and preaching economic reforms. Comical or farcical, folks?

Couple of scatter plots showing Q4 2003 position against Q4 2009 one:
Predictably, the US and UK are outliers, so let's zoom on the data ex-US & UK:
Majority of the 36 countries which are world's largest debtors locate above the 1-1 line, implying that between 2003 and 2009 total debt levels have risen in these countries. Countries that are above the regression line have above-average propensity to increase indebtedness between 2003 and 2009. Ireland sticks out like a sore thumb - sporting the largest Gross External Debt increase of all comparators, relative to the starting position in Q4 2003. The overall relationship between the starting debt levels and the current ones is extremely strong - something to the tune of 98% of variation in current debt positions is explained by the starting ones, which simply means that all 36 countries are habitual addicts to debt. Again, Ireland is the leading addict in the club.

A caveat, of course is due here - the figures for Ireland do include IFSC, but hey, why shouldn't they - IFSC is our economic miracle, isn't it? It provides jobs in Ireland. It pays taxes in Ireland. It pays rents to Irish developers...

Of course, do recall that GED includes 3 sectors in it - Banks, Government and the rest of the economy. Banks and Government, as I've shown in the previous post, are linked:
But the link is not particularly strong: correlation between GGD & Banks Debt was +0.49 in 2003 - positive, but not exceptional. It rose to +0.55 in 2009, reflecting the crisis measures transferring taxpayers wealth to the banks. But this too is not dramatic. A relatively modest increase in correlation between 2003 and 2009, plus the fact that we already had a positive correlation back in 2003 highlight pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies worldwide.

Now, let's put the GEDs together, for comparatives:
Ireland is the member of USD1 trillion debt club, despite having a substantially smaller income than any of the countries around it. Even removing IFSC out of this equation still leaves us in the club, pushing our total debt to the 12th position worldwide.

In the next post, I will look at the debt levels relative to countries' GDP, so stay tuned.

Sunday, May 2, 2010

Economics 02/05/2010: World Debt Wish 3

Having covered the aggregate debt levels (here) and Government debt (here), now its time to move on to Banks. And some surprising stuff the numbers are throwing:
The UK is clearly an outlier in the entire global series. This is, of course, due to two factors - firstly, the international hub position of London, and secondly - the over-reliance of European and other non-US economies on banks lending (as opposed to the much more significant role played by equities and bonds in the US). Irish reliance on banking sector is also formidable. Also notice that
  1. Irish banking deleveraging began in 2008, similar to other countries;
  2. Recall from the previous post that Governments ramp up of liabilities in most countries, unlike Ireland, has began with a lag to banks deleveraging.
These two facts indicate that Irish banks unable to deleverage outside the state aid support, which, of course simply means that instead of writing down their debts, they re-loaded them onto us, the taxpayers.

Taking out the UK, as an influential outlier:
The remarkable part of the above picture is that virtually no banking sector amongst the top 10 debtor nations has managed to deleverage to anywhere near pre 2006 levels. The crisis, folks, has not gone away - it has been covered up with a thick layer of state-issued liquidity. In other words, printing presses, not structural reforms, what has been working over time to 'resolve' the crisis. And this can only mean two possible outcomes: high inflation or renewed crisis. Since the former relies at least on some recovery in consumer ability to take on new debt, the only way we can avoid a double-dip crisis scenario is if consumers have deleveraged more than the banks did during the last two years. I will be moving on to the real economy sector in my later posts, but for now let me give you an idea of the findings - there was virtually no deleveraging of consumers. Instead, the real economy is now deeply in debt itself.

Back to the banks for now. Chart above shows that the story of banks deleveraging is even worse in the second tier of debtor nations. In fact, with exception of Belgium, no banking system amongst the 11th-20th ranked debtor nations has managed to reduce the levels of debt incurred during the bubble formation.

Chart below once again highlights the nature of the UK banking system
Zooming onto the main group of countries (ex-UK):
All of the banking sectors in top 36 debtor countries are carrying more debt today than they did in Q4 2003. And Ireland once again stands out as the most debt-dependent country in the group when it comes to the rate of growth in banking liabilities since 2003.

So let us summarize the findings so far:
  1. Irish Government debt position is by far not the strongest today - in absolute terms, our General Government Debt levels rank 13th highest in the world, up from 19th back in 2003 Q4.
  2. Irish Government debt has been rising faster than that of the other 36 most-indebted countries between 2003 and the end of 2009.
  3. Irish banking sector debt position is 8th highest in the world, up from 10th highest in Q4 2003 - in absolute dollar terms.
  4. Irish banks deleveraging has in effect resulted in a swap of private liabilities for public liabilities, with no net reduction in overall economy's debt levels.
From the world economy point of view:
  1. Global debt levels remain at extremely high levels and deleveraging has not taken place to the extent needed to resolve the crisis.
  2. Private (ex-Banks and ex-Government) sectors debt remains at virtually peak level consistent with the bubble.
  3. Banks deleveraging also has fallen short of what would be required to bring the debt levels down to more realistic levels.
Next, I will be looking at the data on total debt across 36 economies. Stay tuned.

Saturday, April 24, 2010

Economics 24/04/2010: Greece and Ireland

The unedited version of my op-ed in today's Irish Independent (link here)

“It’s been a brilliant day,” said a friend of mine who manages a large investment fund, as we sat down for a lunch in a leafy suburb of Dublin. “We’ve been exiting Greece’s credit default swaps all morning long.” Having spent a couple of months strategically buying default insurance on Greek bonds, known as CDS contracts, his fund booked extraordinary profits.

This wasn’t luck. Instead, he took an informed bet against Greece, and won. You see, in finance, as in life, that which can’t go on, usually doesn’t: last morning, around 9 am Greek Government has finally thrown in the towel and called in the IMF.

As a precursor to this extraordinary collapse of one of the eurozone’s members, Greece has spent the last ten years amassing a gargantuan pile of public debt. Ever since 1988, successive Greek governments paid for their domestic investment and spending out of borrowed cash. Just as Ireland, over the last 22 years, Greece has never managed to achieve a single year when its Government structural balance – the long-term measure of public finances sustainability – were in the black.

Finally, having engaged in a series of cover-ups designed to conceal the true extent of the problem, the Greek economy has reached the point of insolvency. As of today, Greece is borrowing some 13.6% of its domestic output to pay for day-to-day running of the state. The country debt levels are now in excess of 115%. Despite the promise from Brussels that the EU will stand by Greece, last night Greek bonds were trading at the levels above those of Kenya and Colombia.

Hence, no one was surprised when on Friday morning the country asked the IMF and the EU to provide it with a loan to the tune of €45 billion. This news is not good for the Irish taxpayers.

Firstly, despite the EU/IMF rescue funds, Greece, and with it the Euro zone, is not out of the woods. The entire package of €45 billion, promised to Greece earlier this month is not enough to alleviate longer term pressures on its Government. Absent a miracle, the country will need at least €80-90 billion in assisted financing in 2010-2012.

The IMF cannot provide more than €15 billion that it already pledged, since IMF funds are restricted by the balances held by Greece with the Fund. The EU is unlikely to underwrite any additional money, as over 70% of German voters are now opposing bailing out Greece in the first instance.

All of which means the financial markets are unlikely to ease their pressure on Greece and its second sickest Euroarea cousin, Portugal. Guess who’s the third one in line?

Ireland’s General Government deficit for 2009, as revised this week by the Eurostat, stands at 14.3% - above that of Greece and well above that of Portugal. More worryingly, Eurostat revision opened the door for the 2010 planned banks recapitalizations to be counted as deficit. If this comes to pass, our official deficit will be over 14% of GDP this year, again.

All of this means we can expect the cost of our borrowing to go up dramatically. Given that the Irish Government is engaging in an extreme degree of deficit financing, Irish taxpayers can end up paying billions more annually in additional interest charges. Adding up the total expected deficits between today and 2014, the taxpayers can end up owing an extra €1.14 billion in higher interest payments on our deficits. Adding the increased costs of Nama bonds pushes this figure to over €2.5 billion. Three years worth of income tax levies imposed by the Government in the Supplementary Budget 2009 will go up in smoke.

Second, the worst case scenario – the collapse of the Eurozone still looms large despite the Greeks request for IMF assistance. In this case, Irish economy is likely to suffer an irreparable damage. Restoration of the Irish punt would see us either wiping out our exports or burying our private economy under an even greater mountain of debt, depending on which currency valuation path we take. Either way, without having control over our exit from the euro, we will find ourselves between the rock and the hard place.

Third, regardless of whatever happens with Greece in the next few months, Irish taxpayers can kiss goodby the €500 million our Government committed to the EU rescue fund for Greece. Forget the insanity of Ireland borrowing these funds at ca 4.6% to lend to Greece at ‘close to 5%’. With bonds issuance fees, the prospect of rising interest rates and the effect this borrowing has on our deficit, the deal signed by Brian Cowen on March 26th was never expected to break even for the taxpayers. In reality, the likelihood of Greece repaying back this cash is virtually nil.

Which brings us back to our own problems. What Greek saga has clearly demonstrated is that no matter how severe the crisis might get, one cannot count on the EU’s Rich Auntie Germany to race to our rescue. We have to get our own house in order. Unions – take notice – more deficit financing risks making Ireland a client of the IMF, because in finance, as in life, what can’t go on, usually doesn’t.

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Economics 01/10/2009: External Debt - still a problem

As of 30 June 2009, per CSO’s today release, “the gross external debt of all resident sectors (i.e. general government, the monetary authority, financial and non-financial corporations and households) amounted to almost €1,689bn. This represents a drop of €7bn or 0.4% …compared to the level shown (€1,696bn) at the end of March 2009.”

“…the bulk of Ireland’s external debt arises from the liabilities of IFSC financial enterprises and also that most of its overall foreign financial liabilities are offset by Irish residents’ (including IFSC) holdings of foreign financial assets.” Hmmm… again this over-emphasis of IFSC. One note of caution - we do not actually know if these 'assets' are valued at fair rates (we do not know what percentage of these assets is valued at mark-to-market, and what percentage is valued at hold-to-maturity bases), so some questions to the quality of the assets can be raised.

“Liabilities of monetary financial institutions (credit institutions and money market funds) consisting mostly of loans and debt securities were almost €691bn, a drop of almost €27bn on the 31stMarch 2009 stock level and down €117bn on the June 2008 level.” In other words, our banks are de-leveraging… as in charts below… but at whose expense?

The reduced liabilities of MFIs “are broadly reflected in the significantly increased Monetary Authority liabilities of €103bn, up by over €98bn since June 2008. These obligations are to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)...” Aha, de-leveraging by loading up on those ECB loans, then?

But wait, there is more: “The liabilities of other sectors including those of insurance companies and pension funds, treasury companies and other relevant financial enterprises, as well as non-financial enterprises were €624bn, remaining relatively flat compared to end-March 2009. However, compared to end-June 2008, these liabilities had increased by €28bn.” Yeeeeks – banks de-leveraging is pushing ‘other sectors’ – aka the real economy – deeper into debt.

But wait, there is more: “The level of general government foreign borrowing increased by €10bn to €72bn between March and June this year and was €29bn up on the June 2008 level.” Ooops, banks are costing us here too (as do our social welfare rates and public sector wages bills).
Pull one end of the cart up, the other end sinks?

Some details on top of CSO’s release:
Table above shows percentage increases in debt levels across sectors and maturities. Pretty self-explanatory. The Exchequer is borrowing short and increasingly so. But the Exchequer is borrowing long as well, and rather aggressively as well. Monetary Authority is truly remarkable. Incidentally, MA borrowings are mostly short-term (higher than 3:1 ratio to long-term).

Banks (oh, sorry, MFIs) are cutting back debt more aggressively this year than in 2008. And, strangely enough, they are cutting more long-term debts than short-term debts (in proportional terms). Of course, this in part reflects bad loans provisions and pay downs of Irish subsidiaries debt by foreign parents.

Other sectors are rolling up accumulated interest and amassing new loans. Short-term liabilities net of trade credits are up over two years, trade credits flat over last year. What does it tell you about importing activities?
Shares of MFIs in total debt thus are falling across the years, as are FDI shares, but everything else is rising.

Looking at short vs longer term debt issuance by sector:
Monetary Authority is now almost all short-term, Government is increasingly short-termist as well. Maturity mismatch risk is rising as is, but with Nama (a rolling 6-months re-priced bond against 10-20 years work out window on loans) maturity mismatch risk on Government balance sheet will go through the roof.
MFIs short term debt is now also declining, while long term debt has been declining for some time. It would be interesting to have this broken down by foreign vs domestic lenders, but there is no such detail in CSO figures, despite CSO's constant repeating that the figures include IFSC. If IFSC is so important to this analysis - why not report it separately?

Other sectors are relatively flat, which is bad news. Trade credits flat as well.

Overall, lack of significant de-leveraging and in some cases, continued accumulation of liabilities, in the real economy.