Showing posts with label Crisis Eurozone. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Crisis Eurozone. Show all posts

Thursday, August 16, 2012

16/8/2012: Italy's 'this time, it's different' moment


This time it's different for Italy now... according to an excellent article by Charles Wyplosz here. Read the whole thing, Wyplosz is excellent on the basics of the Italian situation.

Update: new link to the article.

Friday, June 15, 2012

15/6/2012: Some probabilities for post-Greek elections outcomes

Some probabilistic evaluations of post-Greek elections scenarios and longer range scenarios for the euro area:



In considering the possible scenarios for Ireland’s position for post-Greek elections period, one must have an explicit understanding of the current conditions and the likelihood of the euro area survival into the future.

Short-term scenarios:

In my opinion, there is currently a 60% chance that Greece will remain within the euro area post elections, but will exit the common currency within 3 years.  Under this scenario, the ECB – either via ESM or directly – will have to provide support for an EU-wide system of banking deposits guarantees, and new writedowns of Greek debt, as well as full support package for Spain’s exchequer and banks. Ireland, in such a case, can, in the short term, benefit from some debt restructuring. Part of the package that will allow euro area to survive intact for longer than 6-12 months will involve increased transfer of structural funds to stimulate capital investment in the periphery, including Ireland.

On the other side of the spectrum, there is a 40% probability that Greece exits the euro area within 12 months either in a unilateral, unsupported and highly disorderly fashion (20%) or via facilitated exit programme supported by the euro area (20%). In the latter case, Ireland’s chances to achieve significant writedown of our debts will be severely restricted and our longer term membership within the euro area will be put in question. In the former case, post-Greek exit, the euro area will require very similar restructuring of debts and real economy transfers as in the first option above. Here, there is an equal chance that the EU will fail to put forward reasonable measures for preventing contagion from the disorderly Greek default to other countries, including Ireland, which would constitute the worst outcome for all member states involved.



Longer-term scenarios: 

In terms of longer horizon – beyond 3 years, the scenarios hinge on no disorderly default by Greece in short term, thus focusing on 80% probability segment of the above short term scenarios.

With probability of ca 30%, the coordinated response via ECB/ESM to the immediate crisis will require creation of a functional fiscal union. The union will have to address a number of structural bottlenecks. Fiscal discipline will have to be addressed via enforcement of the Fiscal Compact – a highly imperfect set of metrics, with doubtful enforceability. Secondly, the union will have to address the problem of competitiveness in euro area economies, most notably all peripheral GIIPS, plus Belgium, the Netherlands (household debt), France. As mentioned in the short-term scenario 1 above, growth must be decoupled from debt overhang and this will require simultaneous restructuring of real economic debt (corporate, household and government), operational system of banks insolvencies, and investment transfers to the peripheral states. The reason for the probability of this option being set conservatively at 30% is that I see no immediate capacity within euro area to enact such sweeping legislative and economic transformations. Much discussed Eurobonds will not deliver on this, as euro area’s capacity to issue such will not, in my view, exceed new financing capability in excess of 10% of euro area GDP.

The second longer-term scenario involves a 60% probability of the euro area breakup over 2-5 years. This can take the form of a break up into broadly-speaking two types of post-Euro arrangements.

The first break up arrangement will see emergence of the strong euro, with Germany at its core. Currently, such a union can include Finland, Benelux, Austria, and possibly France, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The remaining member states are most likely going to see re-introduction of national currencies. Alternatively, we might see reintroduction of 17 old currencies. Italy is a big unknown in the case of its membership in the strong euro.

In my view, once the process of currency unwinding begins, it will be difficult to contain centrifugal forces and the so-called ‘weak’ euro is unlikely to stick. Most likely combination of the ‘strong’ euro membership will have Germany, Benelux, Finland and Austria bound together.

Lastly, there is a small (10 percent) chance that the EU will be able to continue muddling through the current path of partial solutions and time-buying. External conditions must be extremely favourable to allow the euro area to continue in its current composition and this is now unlikely.


Thursday, June 7, 2012

7/6/2012: Sunday Times May 13, 2012


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from May 13, 2012.



With Greek and French elections results out last week, the European leadership is rapidly shifting gears into neutral when it comes to austerity. Within two weeks surrounding the French elections, the Commission has issued a set of statements pushing forward its ‘growth budget’, and issued new proposals for enhancing European investment bank.

This, of course, is a classic rhetoric of damage limitation, contrasted by the reality of the currency union that is in the final stage of the crisis contagion. Having spread from economic to financial and subsequently to fiscal domains of the euro area, the cancer of Europe’s debt overhang has now metastasised to its political leadership. And the financial pressures are back on. Since the late March, credit default swaps spreads have widened for all but two core euro area states (excluding Greece), with an average rate of increase of 10.6%, implying that the markets-priced cumulative probability of the euro zone country default within the next 5 years is now, on average, close to 24%.

Next stop is a period of extended navel-gazing, with summits and ministerial dinners, contrasted by the European electorate moving further away from the centre of power gravity.

By autumn we will be either in a selective euro unwinding (Greece exiting) or in a desperate policies u-turn into mutualisation of the national and banking debts, supported by a return to high pre-2011 deficits and an acceleration of the debt spiral.

The former is going to be extremely disruptive in the short run. Portugal will be watching the Greeks closely, while Spain and Italy will be sliding into unrest. If properly managed, Greek and, later Portuguese exits will allow euro area to cut losses. With a stronger ESM balancesheet, euro area will buy more time to deal with the markets panic, but it will still require serious structural adjustments to shore up the failing currency union. Mutualisation of debt will remain inevitable, but deficits run up can be avoided in exchange for slower reduction in deficits.

The latter option of starting with mutualising debt, while allowing for new deficit financing of growth stimuli will be a road to either a collapse of the common currency within a decade or a Japan-style stagnation. The central problem is that the current political dynamics are forcing the euro area onto the path of growth stimulation amidst a severe debt overhang. The lack of real catalysts for economic recovery means that a temporary stimulus will have to be replaced by sustained debt accumulation. In other words, the political cure to the crisis a-la Hollande, not the austerity, will spell the end of the euro zone.

There are two sides to this proposition.

Firstly, the villain of the European austerity is a bogey. In 2011-2012, euro area fiscal deficits will average 3.7% of GDP per annum, identical to those recorded in 2010-2014 and deeper than in any five-year period from 1990 through 2009, including the period covering the recession of the early 1990s. The ‘savage austerity’, as planned, is expected to result in historically high five-year average deficits. At over 3.2% of GDP, 2012 forecast deficit for the common currency zone will be 6th largest since 1990.

Instead of shrinking, euro area governments over-spending will remain relatively static under the current ‘austerity’ path. Per IMF, general government revenues will account for 45.6% of GDP in 2011-2012, well ahead of all five-year period averages since 1990 except for 1995-1999 when the comparable figure was 46% of GDP. The same comparative dynamics apply to the government expenditure as a share of GDP.

In other words, euro area voters are currently revolting against the austerity that, with exception of Greece and Ireland, is hardly visible anywhere.


Secondly, the talk about Europe’s growth stimulus is nothing more than a return to the policies that have led us into this crisis in the first place. In 1990-1994, euro area public debt to GDP ratio averaged 59%. By 2005-2009, the average has steadily risen to 71%. In 2010-2014, the forecast average will stand at 89%, identical to the ratio in 2011-2012. Euro area is now firmly stuck in the policy corner that required accumulation of debt in order to sustain economic activity. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has produced one growth policy platform after another that relied predominantly on subsidies and public investment.

By the mid-2000s, the EU has exhausted creative powers of conceiving new subsidies, just as the ECB was flooding the banking system with cheap liquidity. At the peak of the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, in March 2010, Brussels came up with Europe 2020 document – yet another ‘sustainable growth’ scheme through featuring more subsidies and public investment.

At the member states’ level, private debt-fuelled construction and banking bubbles were superimposed onto public infrastructure investments schemes and elaborate R&D and smart economy bureaucracies as the core drivers for jobs creation. State spending and re-distribution were the creative force driving economic improvements in a number of countries. Amidst all of this, euro area overall growth remained severely constrained. For the entire period between 1992 and 2007, euro area real economic growth averaged less than 2.1% per annum, while government deficits averaged over 2.5%. The only three years when public deficit financing was not the main driver of growth were the peaks of two bubbles: 2000, and 2006-2007.

In brief, Europe had not had a model for sustainable growth since 1992 and it is not about to discover one in the next few months either.

Which brings us to the core problem facing the European leadership – the problem of debt overhang.

As a research paper by Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff published last week clearly shows, “major public debt overhang episodes in the advanced economies since the early 1800s [were] characterized by public debt to GDP levels exceeding 90% for at least five years.” The study found “that public debt overhang episodes are associated with growth over one percent lower than during other periods.” Across all 26 episodes studied, “the average duration …is about 23 years.”

Now, according to the IMF data, the euro area will reach the 90% debt to GDP bound in 2012 and will remain there through 2015. Statistically, the euro area will be running debt levels in excess of 90% through 2017. Between 2010 and 2017, IMF forecasts that seven core euro area states will be facing debt to GDP ratios at or above 90%. Of the four largest euro area economies, Germany is the only one that will remain outside the debt overhang bound. Increasing deficits into such a severe debt scenario would risk extending the crisis.

After two years of half-measures and half-austerity, the euro as a currency system is now less sustainable. The survival of the euro (even after Greek, Portuguese and, possibly other exits) will depend on structural reforms, including change in the ECB mandate, political federalisation and fiscal harmonisation beyond the current Fiscal Compact treaty.

The real problem Europe is facing in the wake of the last week’s elections in Greece and France is that traditional European elites are no longer capable of governing with the tools to which they became accustomed over decades of deficits and debt accumulation, while the European populations are no longer willing to be governed by the detached and conservative elites. Not quite a classical revolutionary situation, yet, but getting dangerously close to one.



CHARTS: 






Box-out:
This was supposed to be a boom year for car sales as the threat of getting an unlucky ‘13’ stuck on your shiny new purchase for some years was supposed to spell a resurgence in motor trade fortunes. Alas, the latest stats from the CSO suggest that this hoped-for prediction is unlikely to materialise. In the first four months of 2012, new registrations of all vehicles have fallen 8.5% year on year and 60% on 2007. New private cars registrations have suffered an even deeper annual fall, down 10.2% year on year although since the peak they are down ‘only’ 56%. The news of the motor trade suffering is hardly surprising. Unemployment stuck above 14%, fear of forthcoming tax increases in the Budget 2013, plus the dawning reality that sooner or later interest rates (and with them mortgages costs) will climb sky-high are among the reasons Irish consumers continue to stay away from purchasing large ticket items. Cyclical consumption considerations are also coming into play. Over the last 4 years, Irish households barely replaced their stocks of white goods. Given the life span of necessary household appliances, the households are likely to prioritize replacing ageing dishwasher or a fridge over buying a new vehicle. Families compression with children returning back to parental homes to live and grandparents taking over expensive crèche duties are also likely to depress demand for cars. Lastly, there is a pesky consideration of the on-going deleveraging. Irish households have paid down some €36 billion worth of personal debts and mortgages in recent years. Still, Irish households remain the second most indebted in the Euro area. New cars registrations fall off in 2012 shows that in the end, sanity prevails over vanity and superstition, at the detriment to the car sales industry. 

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

21/09/2011: Risk focus swings?

What gives, folks:

Tables below show the swing in risk assessments away from PIIGS to net contributors to the EFSF/EFSM/ESM alphabet soup concocted by the EU to powder over the gaping wounds left by the earlier stages of sovereign debt crisis. Why?

Absent long-term trend we can only speculate, but can it be the ever-widening liability being loaded on Finland, Austria and Netherlands under the current euro area 'burden-sharing' arrangements? Or are the markets re-assessing the prospects for the euro bonds?

Monday, September 5, 2011

05/09/2011: Ackermann: cover us

Deutsche Bank CEO, Josef Ackermann, speaking today at a conference "Banks in Transition", organized by the German business daily Handelsblatt in Frankfurt, made some far reaching comments on the state of European banking system.

"We should resign ourselves to the fact that the 'new normality' is characterized by volatility and uncertainty... All of this reminds one of the autumn of 2008." And as a reminder of these very days 3 years ago, the ECB reported that banks have raised their overnight deposits with ECB to €151 billion - the highest level in more than 12 months. Overnight deposits with ECB are seen as a safe haven as opposed to lending money in the interbank markets, with latest spike suggesting that even European banks are now becoming weary of lending to each other.

Crucially, according to Ackermann, "it is an open secret that numerous European banks would not survive having to revalue sovereign debt held on the banking book at market levels" to reflect their current market value. This is an interesting point - not because it is novel (every dog in the street knows that to be true), but because it is being made by the man who leads the largest banking institution in the land where banks have vigorously fought EBA on methodology and disclosure of stress test results. The battle line drawn back then was precisely their sovereign bond holdings.

And there is an added contradiction in what Ackermann was saying - if banks in Europe will not survive mark-to-market revaluation of their books, then how come Mr Ackermann claims they don't require urgent recapitalization?

In truth, Ackermann was really saying that were the banks in Europe forced to mark-to-market their holdings of PIIGS and Belgian bonds, they would take such losses that can lead to destabilization of banks equity valuations across the EU, thus triggering calls on governments' funding, which will therefore destabilize the bonds markets. Truth hurts, folks. It hurts over and over again when it is denied.

Mr Ackermann also appears to be saying: "Hey politicians. Don't force us to fix our books to the market. Fix the market for us."

Ackermann also repeated his earlier statement that calls for robust and rapid recapitalization of the banks were "not helpful" and threatened to undermine European efforts to assist crisis-stricken euro-zone sovereigns. In his view, such a recapitalization would send the message that the EU had little faith in its own strategy for dealing with the crisis. In other words, in Ackermann's view, if banks need urgent capital to cover losses on sovereign bonds, then the current valuations of these bonds in the market are irreversible. Which, of course, would mean that all efforts of the EU to roll back sky-high yields on PIIGS + Belgian debt are not likely to produce long-term results any time soon.

Which brings us to the point of asking: if so, why the hell are we burning through tens of billions of ECB and taxpayers' funds to buy out sovereign bonds and repay banks bond holders? Is it simply an exercise of buying time?

Another interesting comment from Ackermann relates to longer term prospects of the banking sector: "Prospects for the financial sector overall ... are rather limited... The outlook for the future growth of revenues is limited by both the current situation and structurally." What this means is that with regulatory tightening, new capital requirements (both on quality and quantity of capital) and with devastated savings and investment portfolia of investors, plus rising taxes on income and capital, margins in the banking sector will be depressed over long term horizon, while more risk averse investors will be weary of buying into higher margin high risk structured products.

In other words, all that Mr Ackermann's speech today amounts to is a call by a banker on the European governments to cover up the banks' cover up of losses: "Print money, buy out our bonds, but don't restructure or recapitalize us".

But Ackermann's warning presents an even more dire warning for the Irish officials who have made significant bets (using taxpayers money) on Irish banking sector returning to high rates of profitability soon. If Ackermann is correct and long term profitability of the entire sector is on decline, Irish banks will be unlikely to recover without a dramatic restructuring of their books.

Wednesday, August 31, 2011

31/08/2011: Europe's economic, business & consumer confidence sink in August

Following a precipitous collapse of the US consumer confidence this month (see posts here and here for details), the EU has just posted a series of consumer, business and economic sentiment indicators that are showing a massive drop in overall economic activity across the board. Here are the details.

Starting with Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) first:
  • August ESI reading for EU27 came in at 97.3 (contraction territory) down from July 102.3. 3mo MA for the index is now at 101.4 and yoy the index is down 5.7%.
  • Euro area ESI is also in contraction zone at 98.3 for August, lowest since May 2010, down from 103.0 in July and off 3.8% yoy. 3mo MA of the series is now at 102.2.
  • ESI for Germany is still in expansion at 107.0 in August, but down from 112.7 in July and down on 3mo MA of 111.4. The index is now down 3.1% yoy. This is the lowest reading since July 2010.
  • ESI for Spain is showing deeper contraction in August, reaching 92.7, down from July 93.0 and registering uninterrupted contractionary performance since (oh, sh**t) September 2007. ESI, however is up in Spain yoy by 1.6%.
  • ESI for France latest reading is at 105.9 for July, which was down from 107.4 in June.
  • ESI for Italy signals recession at 94.1, down from 94.8 in July and off 4.8% yoy. 3mo MA is at 96.1 and the index has remained in contraction zone for consecutive May 2011.
Two charts to illustrate - one of complete historical series, and one of a more recent snapshot:
What the historical series show is a worrisome trend:
  • Before January 2001, Euro area average ESI reading was 102.1, post-introduction of the Euro, the average reading is 98.9. This implies a swing from shallow expansionary optimism in pre-Euro period average, to a shallow pessimism in post-Euro introduction period.
  • In Germany, prior to 2001, the average ESI was 103.9 and post January 2001 the average stands at 98.0
  • In Spain, prior to 2001, the average ESI was 101.9 and post January 2001 the average stands at 98.7
  • In France, prior to 2001, the average ESI was 99.4 and post January 2001 the average stands at 101.9 - the only major economy to buck the trend
  • In Italy, prior to 2001, the average ESI was 101.5 and post January 2001 the average stands at 99.5

Next, consider the Consumer Confidence Indicator (CSI):
  • CSI for the EU27 has fallen from -12 in July to -17 in August, the lowest reading since September 2009 and well below 3mo MA of -13.4. In August 2010 index stood at -11.
  • CSI for Euro area is also at -17 in August, down from -11 in July.
  • August reading is the lowest since June 2010, as Euro area consumers are generally less optimistic than the EU27 average. EU27 average historical reading is -11.1 and Euro area average historical reading is -12.0. Prior to January 2001 the historical averages were: -10.7 for EU27 and -11.3 for Euro area. post-introduction of the Euro, average historical readings are now at -11.7 for the EU 27 and -13.1 for the Euro area, suggesting that the Euro introduction was not exactly a boost to consumer confidence in either the EU27 or in the Euro area.
  • Germany's CSI came in at +0.5 in August, down from 1.4 in July. The index is now well below 3mo MA of 1.1 but is well above -3 reading attained a year ago.
  • Spain's CSI is now at -17, down from -13.4 in July and below 3mo MA of -14.1. In August 2010 the index stood at -19.8, so there has been a yoy improvement in the degree of consumer pessimism.
  • France's CSI stands at -18.4 (recall that France is the only large Euro area economy with strong focus on consumer spending) in July (latest data), down from 17.60 in June and an improvement on -25.8 yoy.
  • Italy's CSI is reading at -28.8 in August, down from -27.4 in July, down on -26.6 3moMA and well below August 2010 reading of -21.3.
Again, two charts to illustrate:

Some historical trends concerning the Consumer Confidence Index:
  • As noted above, consumer confidence had shifted, on average, from cautious optimism in pre-Euro era to cautious pessimism since January 2001.
  • In Germany, before January 2001, consumer pessimism (average) stood at -7.26. Post January 2001, the average pessimism became deeper at -10.83. In effect, then, that 'exports-led' economic growth model for Germany has meant the wholesale historical undermining of consumer interests.
  • In Spain and Italy, the picture of long-term historical trends is identical to Germany, with levels of pessimism being higher than in Germany across entire history.
  • In France, consumer pessimism in pre-2001 period stood, on average, at -19.36 - deeper than in other Big 4 EU economies. Post 2001, average pessimism actually declined to -16.94, still the heaviest level of pessimism (on average) across the Big 4 economies.
Lastly, consider Business Confidence Indicator (BCI):
  • EU27 BCI has fallen from +0.1 in July to -2.50 in August, hitting the lowest reading since July 2010. The index is now down compared to +0.17 3mo MA and is below -2.10 reading in August 2010.
  • Euro area BCI has declined from +0.90 in July to -2.90 in August, behind +0.5 3mo MA. A year ago, BCI reading was -2.60, making current reading the lowest since July 2010.
  • Germany's BCI has declined from +9.60 in July to +4.60 in August, behind +8.67 3mo MA. A year ago, BCI reading was +3.80, making current reading the lowest since September 2010.
  • Spain's BCI remained unchanged in August at -13.90, behind +-12.27 3mo MA. A year ago, BCI reading was -13.0, making current and previous month readings the lowest since June 2010.
  • France's BCI has declined from +5.10 in June to +0.8 in July (latest data), making the latest reading the lowest since December 2010.
  • Italy's BCI has declined from -4.50 in July to -4.80 in August, behind -3.93 3mo MA. A year ago, BCI reading was -7.0.

Historically:
  • Business confidence readings averaged -5.62 across the EU27 in pre-2001 period, and have since then fallen to -6.77 average reading for the period post-2001. BCI for the Euro area averaged -5.60 in pre-2001 period and -6.23 in post-2001 period. This, again, shows that the introduction of the Euro did not have a positive effect on business confidence.
  • In Germany and Italy, pre-2001 BCI averages were better than post-2001 averages, while in Spain there was an improvement in the levels of business pessimism post-2001. In France, pre-2001 average BCI was -6.59 and post-2001 average BCI is -6.41 - implying statistically identical readings.

Thursday, August 25, 2011

25/08/2011: National forecasts and systemic upward biases

New research, published today by NBER shows that national growth and budget forecasts in the Euro area tend to overestimate growth and revenue stability than in other advanced economies and are prone to provide more biased estimates in the period of economic expansion.

The paper, titled Over-optimism in Forecasts by Official Budget Agencies and Its Implications, and authored by Jeffrey A. Frankel of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and published as NBER Working paper 17239 (link here):
"... studies forecasts of real growth rates and budget balances made by official government
agencies among 33 countries.

In general, the forecasts are found: (i) to have a positive average bias, (ii) to be more biased in booms, (iii) to be even more biased at the 3-year horizon than at shorter horizons.

This over-optimism in official forecasts can help explain excessive budget deficits, especially the
failure to run surpluses during periods of high output: if a boom is forecasted to last indefinitely, retrenchment is treated as unnecessary."

In contradiction to the Franco-German recent mantra on fixed and centralized budgetary systems, the author states that: "Many believe that better fiscal policy can be obtained by means
of rules such as ceilings for the deficit or, better yet, the structural deficit. But we also find: (iv) countries subject to a budget rule, in the form of euroland’s Stability and Growth Path, make official forecasts of growth and budget deficits that are even more biased and more correlated with booms than do other countries. This effect may help explain frequent violations of the SGP."

In contrast, own budgetary discipline and honesty in forecasts pays off: "One country, Chile, has managed to overcome governments’ tendency to satisfy fiscal targets by wishful thinking rather than by action. As a result of budget institutions created in 2000, Chile’s official forecasts of growth and the budget have not been overly optimistic, even in booms. Unlike many countries in the North, Chile took advantage of the 2002-07 expansion to run budget surpluses, and so was able to ease in the 2008-09 recession."

Tuesday, August 23, 2011

23/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - Expectations

3 months forward expectations for lending conditions in Euro area, based on July 2011 data from the Banks Lending Survey run by ECB indicate that:
  • Overall lending standards by Euro area banks are expected to tighten in 3 months following July 2011 by 9% of survey respondents - a number that has been rising now consecutively for 3 quarters.
  • Overall lending standards are expected to ease by just 2% of survey respondents, down from 5% reporting back in April 2011.
  • The respondents expect virtually no change in lending conditions for SMEs
  • Lending to large enterprises is expected to tighten over the next 3 months by 10% of the banks surveyed, while only 3% are expecting lending to ease.

23/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - costs & controls

In the previous two posts I looked at the supply of credit to enterprises and the core drivers for changes in banks lending within the Euro area over the 3 months through July 2011. Here is a quick snapshot of what these changes mean on the ground.

The survey question this relates to is: Over the past three months, how have your bank's conditions and terms for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?
  • Bank margins on average loans to enterprises have tightened across 19% of the banks in 3 months through July 2011, while 18% of the banks reported easing of the average margins. Thus, overall margins remained largely unchanged across 57% of the banks - same as in 3 months to April 2011. However, in 3 months to April 2011, the percentage of the banks reporting easing of conditions on margins exceeded the percentage of the banks reporting tightening by 3 percentage points. This compares against zero percentage points differential in 3 months through July 2011 (note - these are adjusted percentages, compensating for respondents' errors).
  • Number of the banks reporting tightening of margins on riskier loans exceeded numbers reporting easing by 23 percentage points in 3 months to July 2011.
  • Non-interest rates charges have tightened in 2 percentage points more banks than eased
  • Size of the loans granted tightened in 7% of the banks and eased in 3%, with 84% reporting no change in 3 months through July 2011.
  • Collateral requirements have become tighter in 6% of the banks, while the requirements eased in 4%, suggesting de-accelerating rate of collateral requirements barriers growth.
  • There was tightening of loans covenants reported by 9% of the banks and 6% reported easing. In previous quarter, the comparable numbers were 5% and 4%, implying tighter covenants are getting tougher.

While margins and non-interest rate charges are running at virtually no change since early 2010, there is a slight uptick in pressures in these credit costs. Collateral requirements remain on moderating tighter path, while riskier loans are posting second consecutive quarter of tightening of the margins.

Overall, these responses paint a mixed picture of costs of the bank lending to enterprises and suggests that market funding and capital and liquidity concerns drive banks lending dynamics in the Euro area, rather than costs and conditions structures.

22/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - drivers

In the previous post I highlighted some new developments in Euro area banks lending to the SMEs and larger enterprises (post link here). In this post, let us consider the data (through July) from the ECB's Banks Lending Survey for the core drivers of the structural stagnation and renewed weaknesses that have emerged in the Euro area credit supply.

The survey question we are considering here is: "Over the past 3 months, how have the following factors affected your bank's credit standards as applied to the approval of loans on credit lines to enterprises?"

  • When it comes to the cost related to the bank's capital position, the percentage of banks reporting tighter (higher) costs was 6%, while the percentage of banks reporting easing of capital cost conditions was zero.
  • There were zero banks reporting easing in capital costs conditions in April 2011 and January 2011.
  • 2010 average for the percentage of banks reporting tighter cost conditions in excess of those reporting easing of conditions at the end of July (6%) was identical to the 2010 annual average.
  • As shown in the chart below, bank's ability to access market funding remains on downward trend for second quarter in a row. At the end of July, the percentage of banks reporting tightening of access to market financing was 9%, same as for the three months through April 2011 and up on 4% in H2 2010.
  • At the same time, percentage of banks reporting easing of access to market funding dropped from 2% in 3 months to October 2010, to 1% through January 2011, to 0% in 6 months since January 2011.

And a summary plot of banks access to funding markets, showing new tightening trend:

When it comes to the banks' liquidity positions, the story is also that of continued and deepening deterioration:
  • 10% of banks in the survey stated that their liquidity conditions tightened in 3 months through July 2011, up from 8% in 3mo through April 2011 and 6% in 6 months before that.
  • Only 1% of banks stated that their liquidity positions have eased (improved) in 3 mos through April 2011, the same percentage as in 3 mos through April 2011 and down from 3% in 3 months through January 2011.
Meanwhile, banks competition is now running along a flat trend:
  • In 3 months through July 2011, 82% of the banks in the Euro area reported no change in competitive pressures from other banks, up from 79% in 3 months to April 2011, while 1% reported tightening and 8% reported easing of competition.
  • The same story, but less dramatic, holds for competition from non-banks and for competition from market (non-banks) financing.
  • The percentage of banks that observed tighter expectations of general economic activity in the end of July 2011 was 15%, as contrasted by just 4% that reported easing expectations.
So in summary, despite (or perhaps because of) the regulatory and recapitalization measures deployed, in 3 months to July 2011, Euro area banks continued to shrink supply of credit to Euro area enterprises because their funding conditions, liquidity positions, capital costs and expectations for economic activity were getting tighter. In the meantime, competition in European banking sector, having eased significantly from the peak crisis period, is running at generally depressed levels and along relatively flat trend.

Surely these are not the signs consistent with stable improvement or the end of the crisis?

Monday, August 22, 2011

22/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply to enterprises

There are rumors circling euro area banks about the impeding liquidity crunch and rising risk profiles. In this light, it is illustrative to take a look at the latest Banks Lending Survey data from ECB to see if there are new trends emerging in terms of credit supply.

This post will look at some data from the Surveys covering lending to enterprises, while the follow up posts will deal with the core drivers of changes and with banks' lending to the households.

First, consider the aggregates (all data through July 2011) - with Chart below illustrating:
  • Overall in terms of lending to the euro area enterprises, 8% of banking survey respondents indicated that lending conditions have tightened or considerably tightened over 3 months through July 2011, while 5% indicated that their lending conditions eased or eased considerably.
  • The percentage of respondents who indicated tightening of conditions remained unchanged in July compared to June, but is up from 5% reported in May. Year on year, percentage of respondents reporting tighter lending conditions dropped by 4 percentage points, while percentage of those reporting easing of conditions rose 4 percentage points.
  • 87% of respondents indicated that their lending conditions were unchanged in 3 months through July 2011, down from 89%.
  • Over 3 months through July 2011, percentage of the banks reporting tighter lending conditions (8%) was below 9.25% 2010 average and significantly below 35% and 49.5% averages for 2009 and 2008.
  • The percentage of banks reporting easing of lending conditions in 3 months through July 2011 (5%) was above 2010 average of 3.75% and above 2008 and 2009 averages of 0.75% each.

For SMEs (Chart below illustrates):
  • Percentage of the banks reporting easing of considerable easing of lending conditions in 3 months through July 2011 was 3%, which is 3 percentage points above same period last year, but is unchanged from June and down from 4% in both April and May.
  • Percentage of the banks reporting tighter or considerably tighter lending conditions was 7% in 3 months through July 2011, up on 6% in May and June, but down from 15% in April. The percentage of banks reporting tighter lending to SMEs in 3 months through July 2011 was 7 percentage points lower than a years ago and at 7% compares favorably against 11.75% average for 2010 and 35.5% and 39% averages for 2009 and 2008 respectively.

For larger corporate loans (Chart below):
  • 9% of the banks reported tightening of lending conditions to large enterprises in 3 months through July 2011, which is 6 percentage points below the level of responses recorded in July 2010. However, the current percentage remains relatively close to 2010 average of 10.5%, although it is substantially down from 37.75% and 52.5% averages for 2009 and 2008.
  • Month-on-month, tighter conditions in July 2011 (9%) were less prevalent than in June (11%), but more prevalent than in May (7%).
  • Easing or considerable easing of lending to large enterprises was reported by 7% of the banks, up from 5% a month ago and 4 percentage points above the same level in July 2010.
  • Easing of conditions in 3 months through July 2011 (7%) is now ahead of the same figure for 2010 average (4.25%) and well ahead of both 2008 and 2009 averages of 0.5% and 0.75%.
On the net, data shows some stabilizing momentum in credit supply, but this momentum is extremely anemic. Overall, more lenders continue to tighten lending conditions for large enterprises and SMEs.