Showing posts with label Budget 2014. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Budget 2014. Show all posts

Thursday, November 7, 2013

Ireland's Black Economy: Sunday Times, October 27, 2013


This is the unedited version of my Sunday Times column from October 27th.

In four and a half years through June 2013, Irish personal and public consumption of goods and services has declined on a cumulative basis by EUR 78.4 billion. Over the same period, Irish black economy has gained around EUR 1.2 billion worth of new business. Today, the unofficial shadow economy in Ireland runs at around EUR20 billion per annum.
Much of the recent activity in this economy is courtesy of our budgetary policies pursued since the onset of the crisis. And much of the growth is in the areas relating to the illegal supply of goods and services that are supplied also via the legitimate retail trade. In simple terms, virtually all of the growth in our shadow economy is down to high costs of State regulations, price controls and taxes. The balance of the demand increases in the grey and black markets is down to the households’ responses to changes in income taxation and the crisis impact on our earnings and employment.

The classic definition of the black markets covers a range of activities from trade in illegal drugs to money laundering, from untaxed cash transactions to underground employment, from intellectual property theft to contraband and/or illegal manufacturing of goods and services. One is tempted to depict the black market economy as being a part of urban markets, such as Dublin’s Moore Street or Meath Street, where shifty-looking characters offer illegal wares, ranging from controlled substances to contraband cigarettes. In reality, many more transactions in the black markets take place by private delivery and reach across all socio-economic demographics and into various urban and rural geographies.

In contrast, grey markets include goods legally purchased and imported by individuals, which do not register in the official accounts and as the result do not contribute to the Exchequer balance and the wholesale and retail trade revenues. The best examples of these are goods purchased for personal consumption outside Ireland. Some are imported legally, within the strict limits on values and quantities stipulated by the customs laws. Others are brought in excess of the personal allowances and can be resold or bartered to relatives and friends. Whilst illegal, such transactions are largely undetectable and these laws and regulations are not easily enforceable once the border is crossed. Grey market is the domain of the middle and upper-middle classes: from the South Dublin set’s stereotypical shopping trips to London or New York, to Middle-Ireland’s excursions into the Northern Ireland for a spot of bargains hunting.

The costs of illicit and unofficial trade also reach deeper than the headline numbers suggest. At the top of the pyramid sits the Exchequer with an estimated loss of some EUR 7 billion per annum in revenues – an amount equal to almost 3 years of austerity measures.

Beyond that, shadow economy imposes losses on consumers, legitimate producers and the society at large. The former arise from the poorer quality of counterfeit goods and services supplied and the risks inherent in illegal transactions. Included are the health and safety risks linked to consumption of counterfeit medicines and consumer goods. Losses to legitimate producers of goods and services come from the fact that black market economy takes custom from the legitimate domestic retailers and producers. In many cases, ordinary customers are reluctant to frequent areas where illegal trade takes place. Further losses arise from Intellectual Property theft, and loss of demand for officially-supplied goods and services to cheaper substitutes sold under the counter. Social losses - compounding those listed above - include increased organised crime, links between illegal financial flows and international terrorism, prostitution, and human trafficking, rise in crimes associated with drugs abuse and so on.


In Ireland's case, we are witnessing a rather unique dynamic in the growth of the black markets, courtesy of the current crisis. During the Celtic Tiger period, rising incomes and employment, and declines in personal taxes partially helped to offset the impact of higher consumer prices and hikes in excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco - the two staple goods traded in the grey and black markets. With the onset of the crisis, lost earnings and jobs were compounded by higher taxes, including VAT and excise rates. This resulted in an increased demand for illegally sold goods, but also for legal goods purchased in the Northern Ireland and the rest of Europe.

The composition of the shadow economy in Ireland also changed. Prior to the bust, majority of the losses in economic activity to grey and black markets related to cash-based construction and household maintenance activities. Since 2008, the focal point of growth in the shadow economy shifted to supplying substitutes to goods where Irish regulatory and tax-induced prices have by far exceeded European norms, such as pharmaceuticals, alcohol, tobacco and premium consumption goods.

Construction and property-related services still play significant role in driving black economy, but their overall importance in the illicit trade has declined mirroring the fortunes of the legitimate construction sector.


To see how tax-induced growth in the shadow economy has become a quintessential feature of our reality, consider Irish fiscal policies in relation to alcohol and tobacco taxation. Over the last seven budgets, increases in alcohol and tobacco taxes were supposed to raise additional EUR 494 million in revenues. Instead, the measures fuelled an already sizeable trade in illicit goods. Official consumption of these goods declined, and revenue collected fell short of targets.

Based on recently published research by Grant Thornton, losses to the Exchequer from illegal sales and personal importation of tobacco products for personal use in 2012 amounted to between EUR 240 million and EUR 569 million.
Over the last 11 years, all increases in the cost of tobacco products to consumers came from the hikes in taxes. Post-Budget 2014, Ireland will have the highest retail price of tobacco in the entire EU27, while some 80 percent of every pack of tobacco legally sold in the Republic will go to the Exchequer. Based on KPMG data, almost one in every five cigarettes consumed in Ireland in 2012 were counterfeit and contraband – second highest in the Euro area. In his three budgets, Minister Noonan ‘contributed’ some 40 cents or 9 percent profit premium to the bottom line of the criminals illegally importing goods into the country.

My estimates suggest that post-Budget 2014, total economy’s losses from illicit sales of tobacco products will rise to EUR760 million per annum. In addition, estimates based on the data from the Revenue Commissioners and the World Health Organisation suggest that illicit trade in alcohol will cost us close to EUR125-130 million in lost economic activity in 2013. Budget 2014 is expected to push this out toward EUR160 million.

Research shows that increased taxation of alcohol is driving more drinking into homes and out of public view. Much of this shift in drinking patterns falls outside the data we collect from the licensed sales. With both the state policies and the recession increasing the incentives to purchase cheaper and often illegal alcohol, actual consumption of alcohol per person in Ireland might be well above the currently reported levels. In January-July 2013, Irish Revenue seized some 3.5 times more illegal alcohol than in the full year 2012.

Overall, based on the study by Grant Thornton, my own estimates, and using data from various other sources referenced above, illicit trade in fuel, tobacco, pirated software and digital economy services, pharmaceuticals and alcohol in Ireland accounted for some EUR1.5-1.6 billion in 2013. Post-Budget 2014, this figure can rise to over EUR1.7 billion.

Last, but not least, the same forces that propel growth in the shadow markets for alcohol, tobacco, fuel, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, and digital economy services will also act to draw more purchases of other goods out of the Republic and into Northern Ireland and off-shored on-line trade.

Behavioural research shows that when people take targeted trips to purchase specific large-ticket items, they tend to ‘load up’ on other purchases along the way, especially if their trip takes them to diversified retail locations. Thus, a family travelling to Northern Ireland to shop for alcohol in bulk will also be likely to stock up on other goods, such as groceries, household equipment, car parts, fuel and so on, to ‘cover’ the cost of travel. Retail substitution in alcohol purchasing away from Irish stores will lead to compounded losses due to other purchases made abroad.


In his Budget speech, Minister for Finance Michael Noonan referenced the shadow economy on three occasions, including a direct reference to the VAT fraud, illegal tobacco selling, unlicensed trading in alcohol products, and fuel laundering. In line with these concerns, the Minister unveiled a host of policy measures aimed at targeting illegal tobacco and alcohol sales and fuel laundering. So optimistic was Minister Noonan that his measures will bear fruit that he penciled in EUR20 million in added Exchequer revenues from increased enforcement measures. Yet, both the Department of Finance and the Revenue are well aware of the fact that the current state policy on excise taxation of alcohol and tobacco contributes to the growth of the illicit trade. Both know that any measures to combat this trade are not cost-effective, requiring more spending on policing than the revenues such policing helps to generate. In other words, if we want to make a dent in shadow economy, we need to re-think our excise tax policies and markets regulations.




Box-out:

Media analysis of the Budget 2014 placed significant focus on the impact of the changes to the pensions levies. Overlooked by the majority of the analysts, however, was the issue of longer-term sustainability of our pensions system. Irish pensions remain grossly underfunded in the private sector. On the other side of the economy, State’s social insurance funds are projected to hit deficit of EUR9 billion in 5 years rising to EUR 20 billion within the decade, according to the OECD latest research. Taking into the account current deficits in private and semi-state sectors, we are facing an economy-wide pensions crisis. Unfunded pensions liabilities for those who do have some retirement savings or pensions contracts will rise from the total deficit in excess of 15 percent of our GDP today to over 75 percent in 20 years time. The impact will be equivalent to the banking sector crisis experienced in 2007-2011. Beyond this, hundreds of thousands of families will be left without any pensions provisions. The only ‘solution’ to the pensions crisis proposed by anyone to-date involves compulsory pensions enrolment whereby the state mandates required minimum levels of ‘savings’ for households. While good in theory, such a solution presents a number of problems in the case of Ireland. In today’s world, who can afford setting aside some EUR500-700 per month per person into a pensions pot to assure modest retirement 20 years after?  How will such a scheme help those who are currently in their 40s and older and have total assets with negative or near-zero net worth?

Sunday, October 27, 2013

27/10/2013: Financial Repression, Economic Suppression & Budget 2014

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article for October 20, 2013.


With fanfare of media appearances and fireworks of Dail statements, Budget 2014 was pushed off the dry dock and into the turbulent waters of reality. Full of political sparkle on the outside, overloaded with hidden taxes and charges and yet-to-be-fully-detailed painful cuts on the inside, it sailed off into the future. It will take at least 9-12 months from now to see what adjustments will have to be made in 2015 to compensate for the 'savings' on cuts delivered this week. It will take us longer to find out if the Budget 2014 will have a positive or negative effect on our ability to fund our deficits in the markets.

Yet, one thing is beyond the doubt: Budget 2014 was a significant gamble by the Government that could have done better by avoiding taking any gambles at all. Minister Noonan has decided to buy some political capital in the Budget. This capital came in the form of reduced rate of overall budgetary adjustment, compensated for by the hope-based increases in public sector efficiencies, plus some symbolic handouts to middle class families. Majority, such as the free GP visits for children under the age of 5, were poorly targeted and economically inefficient – extending scarce resources not to where they are needed most (such as, for example, long-term care provision or means-tested provision of health services) but to where political expediency leads. Many fail the core Budget objectives of making our fiscal policies more robust to adverse shocks that may occur in the near-term future.

In the end, Budget 2014 delivered virtually no real departures from the past Budgets. Predictably, there were no 'new' taxes. Instead the Budget put forward a list of new 'revenue raising measures'. The State will claw out of the banks EUR150 million in levies. Given that our banking sector is being reduced to a Three Pillars oligopoly, the levies will come straight from charging customers more for the same services. Pensions funds levy - a form of expropriation of private property - is to raise additional EUR135 million. This is a tax on present income, and in the case of pensions funds levy a tax on current wealth, plus a tax on future incomes foregone due to reduced levels of pensions funds. EUR140 million will be pumped out of the banks’ customers by taxing interest on savings. All in – financial sector will take a hit of EUR425 million on a full year basis, reducing its ability to lend, invest in the economy and to deal with mortgages distress. The measures will also weaken the quality of Irish banks' deposits base by reducing incentives to save. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff aptly termed such measures ‘financial repression’. De facto, we are bailing in ordinary banks customers and savers to pay for the past sins of the banks. Cyprus redux, anyone?

Cuts side of the Budget was also predictable. At the aggregate level, departmental expenditure as the share of GDP continues to run above 1990-2007 average. Instead of real cost reductions in Health we got some EUR250-300 million worth of new charges to be levied on services to insurance holders. And reduced insurance deductibility on the revenues side should do even more to reduce insurance coverage in the market. Net effect will most likely be falling transfers from private patients to public services, and higher demand for public health.

From businesses perspective, whatever the State added on one side of the budgetary equation, the state took out on the other. Thus, for all incentives for construction and building trade, overall capital spending by the Government in 2014 is projected to fall by some EUR100 million. As we stand, in 2013, capital spending by the Government barely covers amortization and depreciation of the total stock of public capital. Next year, things are going to get worse.

Much of the business stimulus schemes are geared toward supports for the property markets, including the incentives for foreign investors to put money into Irish REITs. Aside from the property-related measures, other business stimulus polices are either extensions of the already existent ones or more promise of doing something in the future. One example is the issue of Trade Finance supports. We are now five years into talking about the need to help smaller exporters with the cost of and access to trade insurance and credit.  Still, there is no tangible delivery on this.


However, the real question, left unanswered by Budget 2014 is: what's next for Ireland? The Government is rhetorically focused on our 'exit' from the Troika-led funding programme. This objective is a policy epicycle designed to ease public attention off the realities of bad domestic governance during the crisis. Exit from the bailout, financially, fiscally and economically, means a public recognition that Ireland has run out of funds we can borrow from the IMF and the EU. It also puts forward a commitment that, unlike Greece, we will not be asking for another bailout. Being not Greece does not make us Iceland, however, since Iceland repaid its bailout loans. In contrast, we will be carrying our debts to Troika for years to come.

The Government is promising that once we exit the bailout, we will regain our control over fiscal policies. This is a gross over-exaggeration. Having ratified the Fiscal Compact, Ireland is now subjected to heavy EU oversight as long as our fiscal performance falls short of the targets set in the treaty. It will be long time before we meet all of the conditions.

The scrutiny of our targets will increase, while our performance will remain under serious pressures arising from the crisis. Most recent IMF forecasts assume full EUR5.6 billion adjustments taken over 2014-2015 period, and economic growth averaging over 2.1 percent per annum (almost 6 times the average growth in 2012-2013 period). These forecasts imply that in 2014-2015 Ireland will still face the third highest cumulative deficits in the euro area ‘periphery’. And the debt levels of Irish state are set to continue rising. In 2013, the Department of Finance projects the level of Irish Government debt to be at EUR205.9 billion. By 2018 this is projected to rise to EUR211.6 billion.

And here's another kicker. The Fiscal Compact sets the target for long-term structural deficits (in other words deficits that would prevail were the economy running at its long run sustainable growth potential) at 0.5 percent of GDP. IMF projections out through 2018 put Irish structural deficits declining from 5.1 percent of potential GDP in 2013 to 2.0 percent in 2018. In other words, in 2018 Ireland is expected to be the worst performing 'peripheral' state in terms of structural deficits and operate well outside the criteria set in the Fiscal Compact.

Worse, comes December 15, we will lose a strong supporter of our efforts to restructure legacy banking debts and the only member of the Troika that promotes structurally more important economic and markets reforms.

On foot of our weak fiscal position, the politicisation of the Irish economy is already building up, driven primarily by our European partners and – until December 15 – resisted by the IMF.

The pressure is rising on Ireland's corporate taxation regime. The Government admitted as much by promising to close the loophole that allows some MNCs to nearly completely avoid paying Irish corporate taxes.

The pressure is also growing on blocking Ireland’s chances to restructure legacy banks debts. Germany, the ECB and the Eurogroup are angling to block Ireland's potential access to the European funds set up to deal with the future banking crises.

We are going into 2014 self-funding mode with all the costs of the bailout in place, including the Dvoika (Troika less one) oversight and substantial deficit and debt overhangs. It now appears that there will be no credit line to cover any increases in the cost of borrowing that might arise in the future. There will be no precautionary fund to cushion against any risk to market demand for Irish Government bonds. There will be no system in place to deal with any future banking problems or with the legacy debts should such arise. The ECB, the IMF and our forecasters are all warning us that we still face potentially significant downside risks to growth and banks stability. The IMF has been for months raising the issues of the SMEs insolvencies and poor quality of banks capital.

In other words, we are boxing ourselves into a high-risk game with little to show for this in terms of a positive return from our 'exit' from the bailout.

History suggests that prudence, not pride should be our guide. Back in 2010 we pre-borrowed aggressively in the markets prior to the state finances collapsing under the poorly structured banks bailouts. Now, we are gunning for the 'exit' without having secured any support from our 'partners' once again. The hope is that this time it will be different: the markets will lend us at decreasing costs, while growth lifts the entire domestic economy out of stagnation. This might not be an equivalent of playing Russian roulette, but it is certainly a game of chance with high stakes on the losses side and little tabled on the potential winnings side.




Box-out:
The latest OECD research on basic skills across the advanced economies puts to a serious test our claims to having a highly educated workforce. Ireland ranked eighth in terms of the proportion of younger adults with tertiary education. In terms of problem solving proficiency, both our college graduates and adults with only secondary education rank below their respective OECD averages. In problem solving in a technology-rich environment – a proxy for skills related to internationally-traded services, the sole driver of our economy today – Ireland ranks 18th in the OECD. Our younger workers score below their OECD peers in basic literacy and in numeracy. When it comes to introduction of new processes and technologies in the workplace Ireland is ranked between such premier divisions of the global innovation league as Cyprus and Belgium. Given our poor performance in digital economy-specific skills, exposed in October 2012 report by the OECD and covered in these pages before, it is high time for us to get serious about reforming our education and training systems.

Thursday, October 24, 2013

24/10/2013: Irish Tax Regime Hits the News, Again...

News on the Corporate Tax Haven front for Ireland:




You can follow the trend of links to various articles on Irish corporate tax status and scandals from here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/4102013-tax-haven-ireland-is-trending.html

Thursday, October 17, 2013

17/10/2013: Budget 2014 Missing the Targets: Sunday Times, October 13


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from October 13, 2013.


Recent events have led to a significant reframing of the Budget 2014. With these, the Government is now actively signaling a more accommodative stance on next year's cuts. Alas, the good news end there and the bad news begin. Any easing on austerity in 2014 will be unlikely to produce a material improvement in household budgets. In return, the Government will be placing huge hopes on robust growth returning in 2014. If this fails to materialise, lower austerity today will spell more pain in 2015. Like a dysfunctional alcoholic, unable to stop binging at closing time, we ignore tomorrow’s hangover.


A combination of the latest IMF report on the Irish economy and the outcome of the Seanad abolition referendum have settled the debate on the scale of adjustment to be taken on October 15th. Embarrassing defeat in the referendum has meant that the continuation of Taoiseach's leadership required some symbolic gesture toward the electorate. Lowering the 2014 cuts targets on October 15th can serve the purpose for a few crucial months until the New Year.

Meanwhile, ambiguity-embracing IMF lent a helping had. The IMF repeated its insistence on EUR5.1 billion combined 2014-2015 cuts in the latest assessment of the Irish economy. Yet, the IMF avoided specifying the breakdown of these adjustments between 2014 and 2015. This has given the Government confidence to argue the case in favour of partially delaying 2014 adjustment in front of the EU overseers of our budgets.

Immediately after the IMF report publication, Irish media was promptly fed the rumors that the Minister for Finance was seeking a reduction in the level of budgetary cuts. This week Minister Noonan said that the 2014 adjustment will be EUR600 million lower than EUR3.1 billion originally agreed with the Troika. The savings will amount to 0.37 percent of our GDP: a small boost for the Irish economy, but a massive splash in the PR spin terms for the Government.

With some cuts delayed to 2015, Ireland’s debt sustainability and deficit targets now hinge on the Government’s forecasts for growth materializing over the next twelve months. The risks to these are non-negligible. Last week IMF lowered Irish GDP growth forecasts for every year from 2013 through 2018. Compared to the forecasts released in June this year, October forecasts for inflation are also down. This implies that nominal growth – the source of budget deficits and debt dynamics – is expected to be even slower. If back in June this year IMF expected Irish economy to be at EUR205.8 billion by 2018, now the fund is projecting it to hit EUR201.7 billion. Cumulated forecast nominal GDP for 2013-2018 is EUR15.6 billion lower in October report than in June assessment.  Even before Minister Noonan’s latest reductions in fiscal adjustment for Budget 2014, IMF projected worsening of Irish deficits in 2014-2018.

Department of Finance forecasts, released this week and underpinning the Budget 2014 calculations are more optimistic on nominal growth, expecting higher inflation and anticipating more domestic consumption and investment than the IMF. If the Department gets its forecasts wrong, we will pay 2015 for the delays in cuts planned for the next year.



Flying on hopium of rosy growth expectations is a risky proposition for the Exchequer especially ahead of our drawing down the final tranche of the Troika funding. For this risk, the savings to be delivered in the Budget 2014 are likely to be insignificant from economy’s point of view.

Given the precarious position of the Government in public opinion polls, it is a safe bet to assume that the coalition will be putting the money to ‘work’ as an investment stimulus and a cushion against cuts to social welfare and health.

New building programmes in the more sensitive constituencies hold some serious political capital. But planning allocation of large sums to new investment is a lengthy process before construction jobs actually materialise. Growth impact of these measures in 2014 is unlikely to be significant.

But the thrust of 'savings' is likely to go to the second option. Doing as little as possible for yet another year in structurally altering the way we spend on social supports and healthcare will mean that the budgetary changes to health spending in 2014 will likely be identical to those undertaken in the past. Expect more cost shifting to private insurance, more sabre-rattling over cost overruns and more imaginary gains in productivity. Social welfare ‘cost containment’ measures will continue to rely on 'demand attrition' - the declines in demand due to unemployment benefits expiration and emigration. This means zero impact on growth in 2014.

Meanwhile, revenue side of the budgetary equation will keep pressuring the economy.

Fine Gael's side of the Coalition is promising us that the Budget will contain no new taxes. Alas, in Ireland we have a very narrow definition of both terms: 'new' and 'taxes'. In 2014 we will be facing a full annual Property Tax bill, which is expected to take out additional EUR250 from the average household income. The Budget will also likely raise charges on families to fund education and healthcare. The Irish Government is saying these are not new taxes. Anyone expected to pay them would disagree.

Last year, PRSI changes and reduction in child benefits were not identified as 'new taxes' either. These cost an average working family with two children some EUR494 per annum – an involuntary reduction in family income.

Per research note published by Grant Thornton two weeks ago, a family on EUR80,000 with two earners with two children saw their tax bill rise by 54 per cent since 2008. Their disposable income is now down a massive EUR6,132 per annum. Only a small fraction of these were officially recognised as new tax measures.

Meanwhile, the same families have also seen the costs of basic services provided by the state agencies and enterprises, or controlled by the state regulators and heavily taxed, rise dramatically over the course of the crisis. On average Irish consumer prices fell 1.6 percent between August 2008 and August 2013. Health insurance costs more than doubled over the same period, education costs inflated by 29 percent, bus fares have gone up over 46 percent, and motor tax went up 27 percent. Increases in core public services costs have taken out close to EUR3,500 annually out of the pockets of an average Irish family. These came on top of the Grant Thornton tax cost estimates cited above.

What is the opportunity cost for the families of the losses brought about by the fiscal crisis? For an average family with expected working life of 25 years, the above costs of austerity are equivalent to around EUR111,000 in foregone pensions savings. This excludes costs of the same measures continuing beyond December 31, 2013 and the new measures yet to come in 2014-2015.

The devastation of the above financial arithmetic is even more apparent when we realise that we are far from completing the full set of fiscal adjustments needed to restore our public finances to health. Medium-term Government fiscal consolidation forecasts confirmed by the IMF last week, envision total fiscal consolidation for 2014-2015 to be EUR5.1 billion. Of this, new revenue measures for 2014-2015 are to be set at EUR1.5 billion against carry forward measures of EUR0.3 billion. Current spending cuts are set at EUR3.2 billion. These adjustments translate into additional fiscal burden of EUR3,300-3,500 per annum for an ordinary family.

The hope is that the general economic recovery will mop up the household finances blood spilled by the fiscal crisis.  This rosy expectation is in turn driven by Minister Noonan’s worldview in which Irish trade partners are expected to also grow faster in years ahead. Alas, this Tuesday, IMF cut its global growth forecasts for both 2013 and 2014.


Forecasts aside, today, Ireland has run out of the road on tax hikes and revenue raising measures.

Instead of hiking tax rates, the Government is expected to widen the tax base in Budget 2014. The most efficient way for doing so would be to close loopholes on income exemptions. Less efficient, will be to lower income threshold at which upper marginal tax rate kicks in. Middle and upper-middle class families will pay in either scenario, but the costs to them will be higher in the latter.

In addition, the Government has been briefed on the potential for hiking PRSI for self-employed, while opening up access for this category of workers to social security net. Conditions for accessing cover will be so onerous, few self-employed will ever be able to qualify, but the hike will be politically acceptable. Currently, a self-employed person earning the equivalent of minimum wage pays almost six times as much tax and PRSI as an employee. Few interest groups so far have taken up a challenge of pointing this fact out.

Reality is, Ministers Noonan and Howlin have hit the brick wall. All the low-hanging fruit of marginal tax hikes and revenues extraction schemes has been picked. What's left now are two possible options. Option one: cut social welfare and health. Option two: delay adjustments and hope that comes Budget 2015 day, growth will pick up, unemployment assistance costs will fall, and Brussels will be happy enough reveling in the euro recovery to let things slip a bit on targets in Dublin. No prizes for guessing which option the Coalition will pursue comes next Tuesday.


Source: Department of Finance





BOX-OUT:

This week, the IMF published an assessment of the impact of the monetary policies deployed since 2008 by the ECB, the US Fed and the Bank of England. These unorthodox measures ranged from outright quantitative easing to lowering of the key interest rates to direct lending to the banks against riskier collateral. These monetary interventions, it has been argued in the media and by the majority of analysts, helped to ameliorate euro area sovereign crises. Per conventional wisdom, as the result of the central banks interventions, and particularly those carried out by the ECB, government bond yields and borrowing costs declined post-2011 across the euro area periphery. In addition, supporters of these policies have suggested that unconventional MPs were responsible for increasing equity funding in the real economies, thus supporting the recovery.

Rejecting the mainstream claims, the IMF researchers found that over 2008-2012 various monetary policies had zero statistical impact on the sovereign bond yields in Ireland, Portugal, and Greece. The policies have let to a moderate reduction in Italian Government bond yields, and a weak reduction in Spanish yields. In the case of Ireland, the IMF found no benefits to sovereign bond flows or prices that can be associated directly with the ECB interventions. Furthermore, ECB interventions were associated with outflows of liquidity from Irish equity funds. In contrast, Fed and Bank of England interventions resulted in net inflows of funds into Irish equities.

The paper clearly suggests that the ECB has not done enough to support recovery in sovereign debt and equity markets in the euro periphery.

Tuesday, October 8, 2013

8/10/2013: Jokers Burning Money: Public Sector Reforms - Village, October 2013


My article for the Village Magazine on pre-Budget 2014 analysis of health spending in Ireland: http://www.villagemagazine.ie/index.php/2013/10/gurdgiev-on-healthcare-jokers-burning-money/

Monday, October 7, 2013

7/10/2013: Taking an Easy Road Out of Budget 2014? Sunday Times, September 22

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from September 22, 2013.


The upcoming Budget 2014 will be one of the toughest since the beginning of the crisis in terms of the overall levels of cuts and tax increases. It also promises to cut across the psychological barrier of austerity fatigue. The latter aspect of Budget 2014 is more pernicious. Two other factors will add to the national distress, comes October 15th. Reinforcing our national sense of exhaustion with endless austerity, this week, the IMF published a staff research paper on fiscal adjustments undertaken during the current Great Recession. According to some, the IMF study reinforces the argument that Ireland should have been allowed to spread the austerity over a longer period time. In addition to this, Ireland’s planned 2014 cuts are set to be well in excess of the deficit reduction targets for any other euro area country.

The superficial reading of the IMF statement, the nascent sense of social distress brewing underneath the surface of public calm, and the tangible and very real pain felt by many in the society suggest that the Government should take it easier in 2014-2015. The policy option, consistent with such a choice would be to cut less than committed to under the multi-annual fiscal plans agreed with the Troika. This is being proposed by a number of senior Ministers and TDs, the Opposition and the Unions.

Alas, Ministers Noonan and Howlin have little choice when it comes to the actual volumes of fiscal adjustments they will have to implement next year. Like it or not, we will need to stick very close to the EUR3.1 billion deficit reduction targets irrespective of the IMF working papers conclusions, or the volume of outcries coming from the Government backbenchers and the opposition ranks.

Here's how the brutal logic of our budgetary position stacks up against an idea of easing on deficit reductions.

If everything goes according to the plan, Ireland will end 2013 with a second or a third highest deficit in the EU, depending on how we account for the one-off spending measures across the peripheral states. We will also have the second highest primary deficit (that is deficit excluding cost of interest payments on Government debt) in the euro area. In 2014 this abysmal performance will replay once again, assuming we meet the targets. Greece and Italy are set to finish 2013 with a primary surplus. Portugal is expected to post a primary deficit of less than one half that of Ireland's. Should Ireland deliver on the targets for 2014, our gap between the Government revenues and spending will still stand at around 4.3-4.6 percent of GDP at the end of December 2014. Not a great position to be in, especially for a country that claims to be different from the rest of the euro periphery.

In this environment, talking about any change in the course on austerity or attempting to enact a fiscal stimulus will be equivalent to accelerating into a blind corner on a one-lane road.

In order to stabilise government debt, Ireland will require cumulative deficits cuts of 11.6% of GDP between January 2013 and December 2018 with quarter of these cuts scheduled for 2014-2015. This is the largest volume of cuts for any economy in the euro area - more than 20 percent greater than the one to be undertaken by Greece and more than 50 percent in excess of Spain’s requirement.

Any delay in cuts today will only multiply pain tomorrow with higher debt to deflate in 2016-2018. As things stand under the agreed plans, Ireland will be spending 4.9 percent of its GDP annually on funding debt interest payments from through 2018. This is more than one and a half times greater than what we will be allocating to gross public investment. The interest bill, over the next five years, will be at least EUR46 billion. Lowering 2014 adjustment target by EUR1 billion can result in the above cost rising to over EUR50 billion, based on my estimates using the IMF forecast models.

The reason for this is that any departure from the committed fiscal adjustment path is likely to have consequences.

Firstly, with the ongoing sell-offs of bonds in the global investment markets, it is highly likely that the cost of funding Government debt for Ireland will rise over the medium term even absent any delays in fiscal adjustments. The long-term interest rates are already showing sharper rising of yields on longer maturity bonds compared to short-dated bonds. Year to date, German 10-year yields are up 64 basis points, UK are up 105 bps and the US ones are up 111 bps. The effects of these changes on Irish debt and deficit dynamics are not yet fully priced in the latest IMF forecasts. A mild steepening of the maturity curve for Ireland can significantly increase our interest bill. This risk becomes even more pronounced if we are to delay the Troika programme.

Secondly, failure to fulfill our commitments is unlikely to help us in our transition from Troika funding. Ireland will require a precautionary standby arrangement of at least EUR10 billion in cheaply priced funds. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) funds to cover this come on foot of good will of our EU 'partners'. These partners, in turn, are seeking to redraft EU tax policies, as well as banking, financial and ICT services regulations. In virtually all of these proposals, Ireland is at odds with the European consensus. Good will of Paris and Berlin is a hard commodity, requiring hard currency of appeasement. Whether we like it or not, by stepping into the euro system, we committed ourselves to this position.

The long run financial arithmetic also presents a major problem for those who misread the latest IMF research on austerity as a sign that the Fund is advocating easing of the 2014-2015 adjustments for Ireland. The IMF clearly shows that Ireland has already delayed required fiscal cuts more than any other euro area economy. In all euro area peripheral economies, other than Ireland, fiscal adjustments for 2014-2015 are set at less than one fifth of the total adjustment required for 2010-2015 period. In Ireland they are set at one third. Which means that, having taken more medicine upfront, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Iceland can now afford to ease on cutting future primary imbalances.


With this in mind, there is not a snowballs chance in hell that we can substantively deviate from the plan to cut EUR3.1 billion, gross, from 2014 deficit without facing steep bill for doing so. Which leaves us with the only pertinent question to be asked: how such an adjustment should be spread across three areas of fiscal policy: Government revenues, current expenditure and capital expenditure.

This year, through August, Government finances have been running ahead of both 2012 levels and we are perfuming well relative to what was planned in the budget 2013 profile. However, the headline numbers conceal some worrying sub-currents.

This year's current primary expenditure in 8 months through August stood at over EUR36.6 billion, more than targeted in the 2013 profile and ahead on the same period last year. This deterioration was caused by the one off payment made on winding down the IBRC, plus the increase in contributions to the EU budget. Nonetheless, while tax and Government revenues increases in the 8 moths of 2013 were running at almost EUR3.4 billion compared to the same period of 2012, spending reductions are down only EUR823 million.

To-date, only 17 percent of the entire annual adjustment came via current voted spending cuts and over 57 percent came from increases in Government revenues. The balance of savings was achieved by slashing further already decimated capital investment programmes.  Given the overall capital investment profile from 1994 through forecast 2013 levels, as provided by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, this year's net capital spending is likely to come below the amount required to cover amortisation and depreciation of the current stock of Government capital. Put simply, we are just about keeping the windows on our public buildings and doors on our public schools in working order.

In this environment, Labour Party and opposition calls for undoing 'the savage cuts to our frontline services' - or current spending side of the Government balance sheet - are about as good as Doctor Nick Rivera's cheerfully internecine surgical exploits in the Simpsons.

The adjustments to be taken over the next two years will have to fall heavily on current spending side. This is a very painful task. To-date, much of the savings achieved on the expenditure side involved either transforming public spending into private sector fees, which can be called a hidden form of taxation, or by achieving short term temporary savings.

The former is best exemplified by continued hikes of hospitals' charges which have all but decimated the markets for health insurance. The result is a simultaneous reduction in health insurance coverage, an increase in demand for public health services and costly emergency treatments. The 'savings' achieved are most likely costing us more than they bring in.

The latter is exemplified by temporary pay moderation agreements and staff reductions in the public sector. This presents a problem to be faced comes 2015-2016: with growth picking up, many savings delivered by staff reductions and pay moderation measures will be the first to be reversed under the pressure from the unions.

In short, the Government has no choice, but to largely follow the prescribed course of action. Like it or not, it also has no choice but to cut deeper into current spending. This is going to be an ugly budget by all measures possible, but the real cause of the pain it will inflict rests not with the Troika insistence on austerity. Instead, the real drivers for Ireland’s deep cuts in public spending are the internal imbalances in our public expenditure and the lack of deeper reforms in the earlier years of the crisis.


Via @IMF

Box-out: 

Recent data from the CSO on Irish goods exports painted a picture of significant gains in one indigenous economy sector: agri-food exports. The exports of Food and live animals increased by EUR101 million or 15 percent in July 2013, compared to July 2012. In seven months from January 2013, agri-food exports rose to EUR4,911 million, up 8.8 percent. Most of the increases related to exports of animals-related products, live animals, eggs and milk. The new data caused a small avalanche of press releases from various representative bodies extolling the virtues of agri-food sector in Ireland and posting claims that the sector is poised to drive Ireland out of the recession. Alas, the data on agricultural prices, also covering the period through July 2013, released just three days after the publication of exports statistics, poured some cold water over the hot coals of agri-food sector egos. From January through July 2013, the main driver for improved exports performance of our agriculture and food sectors was not some indigenous productivity growth or innovation, but the price inflation in the globally-set agricultural output prices. On an annual basis, the agricultural output prices rose 10.7 percent in July 2013. Over the same period of time, the agricultural input price index was up 5.2 percent in July 2013. This means that Irish exports uptick in 2013 to-date was built on the pain of consumers elsewhere. So good news is that our agri-food exports were up. Bad news is that we have preciously little, if anything, to do with causing this rise.

Saturday, October 5, 2013

5/10/2014: Why the News of Budget 2014 'Easing' Is a Daft Idea


The reports are out about the IMF 'agreeing' to Government taking shallower adjustment in Budget 2014 are so far not based on IMF statements of record. In its latest review, published yesterday and amended to reflect the latest data, IMF clearly states that we still need a full EUR5.1bn adjustment to be taken over 2014-2015.

Irish Times reports undisclosed sources claiming that the IMF is now not opposing a shallower adjustment in 2014 in exchange for steeper adjustment in 2015. http://www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/financial-services/imf-agrees-to-easing-of-3-1bn-target-1.1550925 This might be so. But there are several things you should consider before taking this as some unambiguous positive for Budget 2014.

Firstly, if true, this means that Ireland 'easing on austerity' in Budget 2014 to accelerate into 2015 adjustment will be equivalent to a household taking a 1 year mortgage relief in the form of reduced principal repayment relief (sort of a 'interest plus partial principal payment') that has to be recovered in full comes the following year. Even Irish Central Bank would not suggest this would be a meaningful relief to the borrower. In a sense, Irish Government will be taking a gamble if it reduces the EUR3.1 billion adjustment target - if growth undershoots the Budget 2014 projects or revenues slack or unexpected expenditure increases take place or any other possible risks arise, we will face more austerity in 2015 and possibly into 2016. All for a short-term small 'relief'?

Secondly, there are more reasons for being sceptical about the latest Government 'breakthrough':

  1. Relief to be gained from such a transaction is not worth much - at most EUR300-400 million 'savings' to be immediately swallowed up by the 'black hole' of Government 'investment' - I wrote about this in my Sunday Times column on September 22nd. 
  2. Much of this is unlikely to impact directly in 2014 due to time lags.
  3. Much of the 'investment' will go to funding building activities in politicised constituencies. Remember primary care centres locations selection fiasco? The modus operandi that produced them is still here with us. 
  4. The 'savings' will be terminated in 2015 as EUR5.1bn required total adjustment will have to erase fully the 'savings' generated in reduced adjustment for 2014. In short - we will get more waste, more future pain; and
  5. Relief comes at a price of increased uncertainty into the Budget 2015 just at the time when we are heading into even more uncertainty of having to fund ourselves in the markets (keep in mind - our 2014 borrowing requirements are largely already covered by NTMA pre-borrowing, so real uncertainty over funding will coincide with the need for larger fiscal adjustment in 2015). This uncertainty is likely to result in Troika monitoring extending into 2016 and beyond, instead of Ireland gaining any meaningful clearance from Troika cover with 2015 fiscal adjustment. I covered this in the said Sunday Times article as well.
Oh, and one more little point: there is absolutely nothing new in the IMF taking such a position on Irish budget. IMF operates on the basis of longer-term targets and greater flexibility in adjustment than our EU 'partners'. IMF has signalled on a number of other occasions the same. 

So what exactly does the IMF 'support' for Budget 2014? Not much at all so far. And the risks from it, as noted above, are almost codified.

"The review had preliminary discussions on fiscal consolidation in Budget 2014. The Irish authorities are firmly committed to meeting the 5.1 percent of GDP ceiling on the deficit in 2014. They note some room to meet this ceiling with a smaller consolidation effort than the €3.1 billion (1.8 percent of GDP) set out previously, but have deferred a decision on the amount of adjustment in 2014 until closer to Budget 2014. [IMF] ...staff stressed the importance of delivering the planned cumulative consolidation in 2014–15 of €5.1 billion (2.9 percent of GDP). Under the revised macroeconomic projections, this amount of cumulative consolidation is also consistent with reaching a deficit within the EDP target of less than 3 percent of GDP by 2015." 

Note any statement about a 'relief'? I don't see one... But: "In this context, it was agreed that the authorities will publish Budget 2014 on October 15 with fiscal targets until 2016 fully in line with the 2010 Council Recommendation under the EDP, including the required fiscal consolidation effort until 2015, and national fiscal rules (proposed structural benchmark, MEFP)." Meanwhile, "the specific consolidation effort for 2014 will be discussed with the EC, ECB and IMF staff taking into account budgetary outturns in the first three quarters of 2013 and further information on growth developments and prospects." 


The IMF reiterates the same position of serious ambiguity on Budget 2014 and strict clarity on 2014-2015 adjustments targets throughout the entire Review. The Fund also clearly states where the thrust of 'savings' should be delivered: "An expenditure-led consolidation remains appropriate, including improved targeting of social supports and subsidies while protecting core public services and the most vulnerable."

Friday, October 4, 2013

4/10/2013: IMF 11th review of Ireland: Banks & Exchequer

IMF released its 11th review of Irish economy under the Extended Arrangement for funding. I covered growth-related issues arising from the IMF release here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/4102013-imf-11th-review-of-ireland.html

Now, some other topics, namely banks and the Exchequer.

Per IMF: "Ireland is expected to return to reliance on market financing in 2014, yet further European support could make Ireland’s recovery and debt sustainability more robust. Irish banks face weak profitability that hinders their capacity to revive lending. European support to lower banks’ market funding costs could help sustain domestic demand recovery in the medium term, protecting debt sustainability and financial market confidence."

What's that about? Here are two charts:



IMF: "The recent retracement of Irish sovereign bond yields has been broadly consistent with the experience of other countries in the euro area periphery." [But wait, what about Ireland's unparalleled success in fiscal adjustments and 'best-in-class' status? Are the IMF saying that Enda did not singlehandedly deliver huge improvements in Irish bonds yields? How can this be the case, unless the Irish Government uses 'we' as denoting 'Peripheral Countries' collective in claims that the Govenment has delivered stabilisation of Government funding costs.]

"After touching record lows in early May, the 10 year yield has risen 56 basis points, to 3.98 percent as of September 11. Market tensions dissipated in July after the settlement of the political crisis in Portugal and recent turbulence in emerging markets has had limited effect on Irish bond yields. No new bond has been issued by the Irish sovereign since the €5 billion ten-year issue in mid March." The latter, of course simply means that lower supply of new bonds (lack of it since mid-March) and now the new announcement by NTMA that it will not be tapping the markets any time before official exit from Troika supports, are keeping things steady in yields terms. Otherwise… well… logic suggests, at least speculatively, they can be higher.

And on banks: "From a trough in mid-May, yields on Bank of Ireland (BoI) and Allied Irish Banks (AIB) 3 year covered bonds have edged up some 40 basis points as of September 11. Since its May 30 issuance, the yield on BoI’s 3 year senior unsecured bond has been more volatile, but overall has risen by 62 basis points, to 3.37 percent."

Bah! Two things to say about the above:

  1. Banks bonds still tracing sovereign risks and that holds even for covered bonds! Not a good sign for the banking sector. The explicit guarantee is gone, so now it is don to the implicit guarantee and the state simply cannot shake off the baggage of the original 2008 Guarantee. Irish banks are still too-big-to-fail and Irish state is still a too-small-to-bail-in banks lenders.
  2. For an army of bonds sales-desks analysts out there pontification on Irish economy, I am yet to see their honest analysis on what is happening with banks funding costs and sovereign funding costs. They are a bit too keen talking about the economy and too little about debt markets. Which is sort of 'your dentist is football analyst' analogy...

"Deposit rates continued to inch downward, however, and ECB borrowing by domestic banks fell from €39.6 billion at end March to €33.4 billion at end August, reflecting a paucity of new lending, further noncore asset deleveraging, modest amounts of new market funding, and a broadly stable deposit base."

So cheap funding dissipating, deposits (stable funding) still anaemic or declining… Happy times, folks. Stabilisation bites. Come back and argue that when businesses and households are croaking under the weight of interest on their debts with the above 'improvements'.

Why wait, however, let's take a look at IMF-reported 2009-2013 data:
Banks non-performing loans (vs provisions) as % of total loans: 2009=9% (4%) or 44.4% cover, 2012 = 11.3% (5.4%) or 47.8% cover, 2013 = 11.5% (4.5%) or 39.1% cover. So cover is shrinking! Meanwhile, personal lending rates have gone up (as ECB repo rate went down) from 11.1% in 2009 to 11.6% in 2013, and SVR mortgages rates have gone up from 3.3% in 2009 to 4.4% in 2013. Government bond yields are down from 4.9% in 2009 to 4.2% in 2013. What's happening folks" The state credit costs are being dumped onto mortgagees. The 'rescue' of the banks and subsequently the rescue of the state has been loaded up onto the borrowers from the banks.


On the positive side, Exchequer performance was good. Not spectacular, but fine - in line with (and slightly better than) budgetary targets:


Do note the caveats listed below the charts - it would be nice were the Irish authorities actually provided a clear, consistent and well-defined map of all one-off payments and receipts… but then the picture of the fiscal adjustment would not have been as pretty as our politicians like to claim. Still, the picture is broadly fine.

Crucially, the above is not sufficient for us to rest on our laurels. For a number of reasons, but chiefly for the reason not even mentioned in the IMF note: has anyone looked at how sustainable, over the medium (2015-2020) term the fiscal savings delivered by the Government are? I mean: we know that pay moderation agreements with public sector unions are not sustainable and even subject to automatic reversals in 2015-on, right? We also know that much of health system 'savings' are not sustainable, since these come on foot of extracting more and more cash out of ever-dwindling supply of private insurance holders. Right? What else is not sustainable? How much? What is the risk down the line? Is corporate tax revenue uplift we have seen over the last 24 months or so sustainable? Much of it seems to have come from MNCs booking more transfer pricing profits into Ireland. Is that 'sustainable'?

IMF does some 'sustainability' tests in its analysis and here is a scary chart:


Basically, note the path of the gross financing needs for Ireland through 2018. This returns us, under baseline (no new shocks) scenario back to the situation in 2018 where financing needs of the Exchequer are slightly above the needs in 2013. This is assuming GDP is growing 2.5% annually in real terms 2015-2018. And this is incorporating the 'savings' achieved from the Promissory Notes. And this is after we impose agreed target cuts of 2014-2015. We are swimming faster and faster to be thrown back, not even to stay put.

Now, tweak few assumptions:

So in Constant PB Scenario, the change is with no 2014-2015 'austerity' factored in, which is boring stuff. But the exciting stuff is the 'Historical Scenario' where things slide back to 'normal' on growth and government deficits:

 The outcome of the above in two charts:
1) Public debt explodes

2) Financing needs of the Government explode too

Care to argue now we can afford a 'stimulus'? As Harry Callahan put it: "Go on, punk, make my day!"

Thursday, September 26, 2013

26/9/2013: Framing Budget 2014: Village Magazine September 2013

This is an unedited version of my column in the Village Magazine, August-September 2013


With early Budget looming on the horizon, the circus of the 'austerity is overdone' politics has rolled into town. The Labour and the FG backbenchers are out in force trying desperately to salvage the little popular support they still might command in the streets. Not to be outdone, Fiana Fail, freshly converted into the Church of Socialistas has been unleashing torrents of newly-discovered social consciousness. Things are getting so hot on the anti-austerian' speaking circuit that Siptu was able to get even Jack O'Connor a gig. Their star performer was last seen thundering at the MacGill Summer School a potent brew of outlandishly misinformed comparatives between the European and the American policies for dealing with the Great Recession and calls on the imaginary Government to… no prizes for guessing… end 'human rights-violating' austerity.

Problem is, once you come back from all of the highs of this Keynesian Lollapalooza, Irish Government continues to run an insolvent state with spending not matched to revenues and with the expenditure programmes outcomes not matched to the needs of the society at large. Delivering neither fiscal sustainability, nor growth, nor value for money, our fiscal house is grossly out of shape five years into various reforms. Worse, the fiscal mess we are in has nothing to do with the lack of economic growth and everything to do with the policy institutions that the current Government inherited from the decades of political clientelism presided over by its predecessors.


Let us look at some numbers.

In the first six months of 2013, Irish State has managed to spend EUR27.12 billion on current expenditure, just EUR352 million shy of the level of spending in the same period of 2012 and EUR3.2 billion more than we spent in the six months through June 2011. Meanwhile, tax revenues rose from EUR15.3 billion in January-June 2011 to EUR17.6 billion this year. Crunchy austerity based on savage cuts, five years in still looks more like a tax squeeze and spending re-allocation from one programme to another.

Meanwhile, Department of Health spending is now running at EUR6,539 million for H1 2013, down on EUR6,754 million in H1 2011 - a whooping reduction of EUR215 million. Do keep in mind that 2011-2012 increases in the cost of beds charged to the private insurers (aka to ordinary insurance purchasers) have more than offset the above reductions in spending. Net current (ex-capital) spending on health has shrunk by just EUR128 million over the last two years.

The Department of Health is a great example to consider when dealing with the failure of our reforms. It is a frontline service by definition - the one we all are willing to pay for. Yet, it is also a symbolic dividing line between the poor (allegedly having no access to the services) and the rich (allegedly all those who hold health insurance and as 'private' patients overpopulate public wards preventing the poor from getting necessary hospital beds). Healthcare was also an epicenter of rounds of reforms over decades, including the decades of rapid economic growth and prosperity. And it is one of the two largest departments by voted spending, with budget only slightly behind the EUR6.545 billion spend in H1 2013 at the Department of Social Protection.

For this spending we - the middle classes and other payers - get little value for money in services. Over 35% of Irish households have to purchase private insurance to access any meaningful level of health services. In case you still rest in the camp of those who believes that such purchases of insurance are purely voluntary and constitute luxury, Irish Government is considering making health insurance purchasing purely obligatory.

Even with this expenditure, access to basic, quality of life-improving procedures and healthcare maintenance is shambolic. While run of the mill emergencies are getting reasonably decent attention, complex and time-sensitive treatments are wanting. Thus, Ireland ranks at or below the European averages in treatment of majority of chronic and long-term diseases, before we control for differences in population demographics. Our primary care and access to specialist consultants is pathetic outside the emergency rooms and hospitals' ICUs. Despite seeing the fastest rise in the healthcare expenditure per capita over 1997-2007 period in the entire EU27, per EU assessment, Irish healthcare expenditure increases have made only "a modest contribution to [improved mortality], substantially less than one third of the total, and possibly only a few percentage points".

In reality, of course, Irish healthcare is run for the benefit of Irish healthcare staff. In 2005-2007 pay and salary bill for HSE stood at an average 50.7% of the entire HSE non-capital budget. In 2009 it was 50.1%. In 2010, Irish salaries (excluding other income) for medical specialists were the highest in the EU, with the second highest paid cohort of physicians (in the Netherlands) coming at an average salary discount of roughly 25% relative to their Irish counterparts. These salaries were not inclusive of the Irish doctors earnings from private patients.

Per EU 2012 assessment, 33% of Irish people find access to hospitals unaffordable (8th highest in EU27) and the same find access to GP out of their financial reach (4th highest in EU27), while 53% claim that they cannot afford medical or surgical specialists (8th highest).

This is hardly surprising. Between December 2005 and mid-2012, Irish consumer price inflation (CPI) on cumulative basis has hit 9.5%. Health CPI over the same period totalled 21.4% - more than double the rate of overall inflation. Of EU15 states, Ireland and Holland were the only states where health costs were rising faster than general inflation in the last 7 years. 2005-2011 inflation run at 47.3% in Hospital services (state-controlled charges), followed by dental services 28.6%, Out-patient services 23.5% and Doctors' fees at 21.3%. This inflation took place from the already high cost base present in Ireland at the end of 2005.

By international comparisons, from 2005 through mid-2012 Ireland had the lowest rate of inflation in the EU15, while our health services inflation was the second highest after the Netherlands.

Austerity, it seems, has been a boom-time for healthcare costs. Or put differently, while the rest of the world defines efficiency-improving reforms as changes in delivery of services that reduces the cost of services given fixed or improving quality of delivery, in Ireland we define efficiency gains as providing fewer services at a higher cost.

Despite this, in Irish media and policy circles, assessment of healthcare systems performance starts and ends with the comparatives on public spending levels. Good example of such assessment was the 2010 report to the Oireachtast, titled "Benchmarking Ireland’s Health System". A foreigner reading this report can easily conclude that (a) Irish healthcare is run on a shoestring, (b) achieves great outcomes in terms of reduced rates of prevalence of and mortality from key diseases, and (c.) is delivered to the middle class and the rich, bypassing the poor.

In reality, of course, the inequality of access to Irish healthcare system means that the middle and upper-middle classes are required to buy expensive insurance to gain access to health services. Our achievements in combatting key diseases are primarily driven by our younger (and thus healthier) demographics.

And when it comes to access, only 17.2% of all non-maternity related hospitals admissions in 2011 (the latest for which we have data) were for private patients, with the balance going to public patients. On average, people on private insurance had 2.4-2.6 visits to GP in 2007-2010, while those on medical cards had 5.3-5.2. In 2012, the rich-favouring distribution of access to Irish healthcare so often decried by the media and politicians meant that 39% of population or just under 1.8 million people had access to medical cards, more than the number of private health insurance holders.

Health spending represents the case where we have at least some indications and metrics concerning the inefficiency of services provision. In contrast, in other major areas of state expenditure, there is no basis for efficiency assessments and none are being developed.

Irish welfare system is absurdly complicated, and unbalanced - providing potentially excessive services for able-bodied adults on long-term dependency and insufficient services for adults in temporary need of supports and to people with severe disabilities. Related services - in particular in the areas of skills development and training, placement supports for the unemployed - are glaringly out of touch with reality of the labour market demands. Over the last five years, Irish economy produced ever-increasing shortages of skills in several areas, most notably internationally-traded ICT services, financial services, and back- and front- office support services. Yet Irish system of unemployment supports, planned by Forfas and managed by Fas/Solace, failed to reflect these long-term trends. By the time state training behemoths turn around to face the music, the demands for skills will change again.


Irish state spending - with or without austerity - is a rich sprinkling of waste over a thin layer of substance. And it remains such in the face of five years of boisterous pro-reform rhetoric.
Irish austerity has failed, so much we can all agree on. But the real failure is not in cutting spending too much, but in failing to deliver any real gains in efficiency of public services provision or quality of these services. And it failed in containing the costs of the State, especially if we are to use long term sustainability as the benchmark for assessing the reforms.

The likes of Jack O'Connor and Fiana Fail ‘Nua’ might have discovered a magic trick for conjuring economic growth out of public spending, but reality is that the actual working population is by now sick and tired of being taxed to fund the perpetuation of the public sector mess, best exemplified by our healthcare.




Wednesday, August 21, 2013

21/8/2013: Ireland's Potemkin Village (Knowledge) Economy

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article for August 18, 2013.


This week two news items offered significant implications for the framing of the budgetary policy direction for 2014-2015 and beyond.

First there was the revelation that the Revenue Commissioners are setting up a specialist unit to monitor the use of R&D tax credits by Irish and international firms. The second item was the publication of the Times Higher Education league tables ranking universities on their ability to attract corporate research funding. Both items are linked to the flagship of Irish economic policy that aims to establish R&D and innovation as the drivers of our future economic growth. Both touch upon our sacrosanct Potemkin village: the knowledge economy.


Since the Finance Act 2004, and throughout the crisis, governments have been keen on expanding Irish R&D activities amongst the indigenous enterprises and within the MNCs-dominated sectors. Over the last ten years, the main mechanism for doing so has been through the tax credits that allow the firms to claim R&D related spending. In Budgets 2012 and 2013, the current government significantly broadened the scope and the size of the scheme, and allowed new tax relief for key employees engaged in R&D activities.

Major consultancy firms providing supports for inward FDI, our state development agencies and business lobbyists – all have heralded these tax credits as visionary and imperative to making Ireland an attractive location for R&D.  Such framing of the policy debate makes this week’s news from the Revenue Commissioners significant. In truth, R&D tax credits are long overdue some serious scrutiny. The little evidence we do have suggests that the policy has failed to foster a pro-innovation culture in Irish economy after a decade long application of the scheme.

Firstly, tax credits-supported R&D activities remain too small to make any significant difference at the economy level. In 2004-2010 use of credits rose from EUR80 million to EUR225 million and at their peak, the credits amounted to less than one sixth of one percent of the Irish economy.

This is hardly a result of the scheme being too restrictive. In Ireland, firms are allowed to claim up to 25 percent of their R&D expenditure in credit. In the UK, the maximum is set at just 10 percent for the SMEs. The UK scheme is even more restrictive for larger enterprises. Furthermore, the UK applies strict criteria for SMEs that can qualify for such credits. Yet, UK R&D tax credits cover five times the share of GDP compared to Ireland.

Secondly, our tax credits scheme, along with the rest of the existent R&D and innovation support systems have failed to deliver any serious uplift in the R&D and innovation activities. Instead, these support systems have become a magnet for tax arbitrage by the multinationals and business cost optimization by Irish SMEs.

Take a look at the latest data on private sector R&D spend. Total R&D Expenditure by all enterprises in Ireland in 2012 stood at just EUR1.96 billion or 1.5 percent of our GNP. Between 2009 and 2012 this share of GNP has barely increased, rising only one percentage point, despite the large-scale increases in tax credits and other supports. The miracle of our 'knowledge economy' is, put frankly, quite feeble.

The achievements of 'Innovation Ireland' programmes are even less impressive when we consider what types of activities the R&D investments are being backed by tax credits. In 2007-2012 labour costs and current expenditures associated with R&D activities went up 29-31 percent, just as the economy was undergoing the alleged 'internal devaluation' normally associated with declines in these costs. In 2009-2012, costs associated with Payments for Licenses on Intellectual Property rose 357%. Total capital spending on R&D activities has fallen 30 percent over the same period. All in, CSO data shows that there might be significant cost shifting taking place via R&D tax credits being used to fund companies labour expenditures, as well as to optimise transfer pricing.


From economy's point of view, tax credits are one of the least efficient tools for stimulating investment in R&D and innovation. Research from the EU, published in February this year, examined the effectiveness of special tax allowances, tax credits and reduced income tax rates on R&D output. In assessing the quality of R&D projects, the authors looked at the R&D innovativeness and revenue potential. Using data on corporate patent applications to the European patent office, the authors found that a low tax rate on patent income is instrumental in attracting high quality innovative projects. In contrast, R&D tax credits and tax allowances were not found to have a significant impact on project quality.

International evidence shows that in general, all three forms of incentives are effective in raising the R&D activity. Ireland is one exception. Here, spending on R&D did not increase significantly in 2009-2012 period, rising in nominal terms by just EUR93 million for all companies and in real terms by 1.5 percent. The share of indigenous enterprises in total spending remained relatively stagnant at under 29 percent of total R&D spending. Total increase over 2009-2012 period in R&D spending by Irish-owned firms was only EUR14.5 million.

Tax credits are also reducing the overall transparency in the Irish economy when it comes to our firms performance and Government policies. Irish Government routinely references R&D tax credits as an example of pro-growth enterprise-focused policies. Yet there is no evidence directly linking economic growth, employment and enterprise outcomes to the tax credits.

In a welcome departure from our usual group-think, New Morning IP, the intellectual capital consultancy firm, recently published a report that argued that data shows no link between the introduction of the R&D tax credit and increased patenting activity by indigenous Irish companies. New Morning IP went on to state that “in our experience this tax credit has been used as a way of getting 'free money'…" It was a rare moment of truth in Ireland’s policy Byzantium, where interest groups routinely game the system for quick fixes, subsidies and protection, while ritualistically claiming unverified successes for such policies.

More distortions to the assessment of R&D tax credits effectiveness are induced by the fact that more than three quarters of R&D spend in Ireland is carried out by the MNCs. In some international studies, world-wide R&D investments by MNCs-based in Ireland are counted as if they take place here. One good example is the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard which ranked Ireland in top 10 EU countries for R&D investment in 2012. Per report, Ireland was host to 14 of the top-spending companies for R&D, but 11 of these were foreign companies and these accounted for 88.5 percent of all R&D spending attributed to Ireland.

In contrast to such reports, the European Patent Office data for 2012 put Ireland in 26th place in terms of total number of patent applications and in per-capita indigenous innovation terms, right between New Zealand and Cyprus. Not quite the achievement one finds promoted in Irish Government speeches and promotional brochures extoling the virtues of ‘Innovation Ireland’.


The above data on R&D investments and patenting activities in Ireland, correlates with the poor performance by the country academic institutions in attracting private sector research funding. The two problems are conjoined twins, born out of the lack of real innovation culture in Irish business.

This week's study by the Times Higher Education, ranked Ireland at the bottom of global league table in terms of private sector funding per academic researcher. Irish academics get an average of just over €6,000 from business research grants and general funds, or 12.5 times less than the world leader, South Korea. These numbers, of course, should be taken with a grain of salt. Lower rankings for Ireland, as well as for a number of other countries, can be in part explained by much broader academic research taking place in our universities, as well as in the bias in funding volumes in favour of specific technical disciplines. They are also reflective of the anti-innovation ethos of Ireland’s domestic enterprises. However, it also highlights the simple fact that Irish academics are often lacking policy and regulatory supports necessary to attract larger research grants.

The main point of all the data is that Irish policy supports for these high value-added activities are excessively focused on targeted tax incentives and are insufficiently aligned with the needs of the innovation-intensive sectors, businesses and entrepreneurs. Over-stimulation with targeted tax credits and exemptions is no substitute for the creation of a real culture of entrepreneurship and innovation.

To develop such culture, Ireland needs more flexible, more responsive public policy formation capable of supporting knowledge-intensive and rapidly evolving sectors, such as biotech, stem cells research, content-based ICT, remote medicine, human interface technology, customizable design and development technologies and so on. While we do have a benign corporate taxation regime, we also need a benign income tax regime to attract and anchor professional researchers and investors in innovation. Equally important are active state policies promoting start-ups and early stage enterprises. These require agile state systems for helping enterprises with issues relating to access to markets, IP, legal and regulatory matters and so on. Last, but not least, Ireland requires more streamlined and investor-friendly equity funding systems, tax laws and regulations and more open systems of IP and business ownership.



Box-out:

The latest report on the European construction industry, published this week by the German Ifo Institute shows that the residential construction sector in Europe will remain on course for further cutbacks with activity expected to hit a 20-years low in 2013-2014. The Institute forecasts show no pick up in residential building sector in Europe until 2015 and the market for new construction bottoming out at 45% below the level in 2006. The proverbial silver lining in the report comes in the Ifo forecasts for Ireland. Ifo experts see residential construction sector here switching to a 5.5% growth in 2014, followed by a 10% expansion in 2015. According to the report, “…it is encouraging that Ireland, which also had to overcome a major crisis in residential construction, is no longer a problem child.” Lets put these seemingly rosy forecasts into perspective. Currently, residential construction in Ireland is down 93 percent on peak year activity, marking the largest drop of any country in the EU. If the Ifo projections hold, by the end of 2015 Irish residential construction sector will be returned to the activity last seen in 2011. Not exactly encouraging, is it?