Wednesday, March 25, 2015

25/3/15: IMF on Ireland: Risk Assessment and Growth Outlook 2015-2016


In the previous post covering IMF latest research on Ireland, I looked at the IMF point of view relating to the distortions to our National Accounts and growth figures induced by the tax-optimising MNCs.

Here, let's take a look at the key Article IV conclusions.

All of the IMF assessment, disappointingly, still references Q1-Q3 2014 figures, even though more current data is now available. Overall, the IMF is happy with the onset of the recovery in Ireland and is full of praise on the positives.

It's assessment of the property markets is that "property markets are bouncing back rapidly from their lows but valuations do not yet appear stretched." This is pretty much in line with the latest data: see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/25315-irish-residential-property-prices.html

The fund notes that in a boom year of 2014 for Irish commercial property transactions "the volume of turnover in Irish commercial real estate in
2014 was higher than in the mid 2000s, with 37.5 percent from offshore investors." This roughly shows a share of the sales by Nama. Chart below illustrates the trend (also highlighted in my normal Irish Economy deck):



However what the cadet above fails to recognise is that even local purchases also involve, predominantly, Nama sales and are often based on REITs and other investment vehicles purchases co-funded from abroad. My estimate is that less than a third of the total volume of transactions in 2014 was down to organic domestic investment activity and, possibly, as little as 1/10th of this was likely to feed into the pipeline of value-added activities (new build, refurbishment, upgrading) in 2015. The vast majority of the purchases transactions excluding MNCs and public sector are down to "hold-and-flip" strategies consistent with vulture funds.

Decomposing the investment picture, the IMF states that "Investment is reviving but remains low by historical standards, with residential construction recovery modest to date. Investment (excluding aircraft orders and intangibles) in the year to Q3 2014 was up almost 40 percent from two years earlier, led by a rise in machinery and equipment spending."

Unfortunately, we have no idea how much of this is down to MNCs investments and how much down to domestic economy growth. Furthermore, we have no idea how much of the domestic growth is in non-agricultural sectors (remember, milk quotas abolition is triggering significant investment boom in agri-food sector, which is fine and handy).

"But the ratio of investment to GDP, at 16 percent, is still well below its 22 percent pre-boom average, primarily reflecting low construction. While house completions rose by 33 percent y/y in 2014, they remain just under one-half of estimated household formation needs. Rising house prices are making new construction more profitable, yet high costs appear to be slowing the supply response together with developers’ depleted equity and their slow transition to
using external equity financing."

All of this is not new to the readers of my blog.



The key to IMF Article IV papers, however, is not the praise for the past, but the assessment of the risks for the future. And here they are in the context of Ireland - unwelcome by the Ministers, but noted by the Fund.

While GDP growth prospects remain positive for Ireland (chart below), "growth is projected to moderate to 3½ percent in 2015 and to gradually ease to a 2½ percent pace", as "export growth is projected to revert to about 4 percent from 2015". Now, here the IMF may be too conservative - remember our 'knowledge development box' unveiled under a heavy veil of obscurity in Budget 2015? We are likely to see continued strong MNCs-led growth in 2015 on foot of that, except this time around via services side of the economy. After all, as IMF notes: "Competitiveness is strong in the services export sector, albeit driven by industries with relatively low domestic value added." Read: the Silicon Dock.




Here are the projections by the IMF across various parts of the National Accounts:

So now onto the risks: "Risks to Ireland’s growth prospects are broadly balanced within a wide range, with key sources being:

  • "Financial market volatility could be triggered by a range of factors, yet Ireland’s vulnerability appears to be contained. Financial conditions are currently exceptionally favorable for both the sovereign and banks. A reassessment of sovereign risk in Europe or geopolitical developments could result in renewed volatility and spread widening. But market developments currently suggest contagion to Ireland would be contained by [ECB policies interventions]. Yet continued easy international financial conditions could lead to vulnerabilities in the medium term. For example, if the international search for yield drove up Irish commercial property prices, risks of an eventual slump in prices and construction would increase, weakening economic activity and potentially impacting domestic banks." In other words, unwinding the excesses of QE policies, globally, is likely to contain risks for the open economy, like Ireland.
  • "Euro area stagnation would impede exports. Export projections are below the average growth in the past five years of 4¾ percent, implying some upside especially given recent euro depreciation. Yet Ireland is vulnerable to stagnation of the euro area, which accounts for 40 percent of exports. Over time, international action on corporate taxation could reduce Ireland’s attractiveness for some export-oriented FDI, but the authorities see limited risks in practice given other competitive advantages and as the corporate tax rate is not affected."
  • "Domestic demand could sustain its recent momentum, yet concerns remain around possible weak lending in the medium term. Consumption growth may exceed the pace projected in coming years given improving property and labor market conditions. However, domestic demand recovery could in time be hindered by a weak lending revival if Basel III capital requirements became binding owing to insufficient bank profits, or if slow NPL resolution were to limit the redeployment of capital to profitable new loans." Do note that in the table listing IMF forecasts above, credit to the private sector is unlikely to return to growth until 2016 and even then, credit growth contribution will remain sluggish into 2017.


And the full risk assessment matrix:




Oh, and then there is debt. Glorious debt.

I blogged on IMF's view of the household debt earlier here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/25315-imf-on-irish-household-debt-crisis.html and next will blog on Government debt risks, so stay tuned.

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